ginning our special section—PLANS FOR A WORLD ORDER

FREE WORLD

FRANCIS BIDDLE
The Problem of Alien Enemies

SENATOR W. R. AUSTIN
World Fronts for Peace

JAY ALLEN
The Stuttering of Death

●

ROUND TABLE:
CHANGING CULTURAL VALUES

Miguel O. de Almeida
John Dos Passos
Heinz Hartmann
Raymond de Saussure
Johan J. Smertenko
Werner Thormann
Wousaofong
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A Program for America

RECOGNIZING the important role which the United States must play in the reorganization of the world at the end of the war, the Free World Association has recently formed an American section which is dedicated to the following purposes:

1. To achieve a free world through a complete victory over the Axis Powers.

2. To establish human freedom based on equal political, economic, religious, and cultural rights for all mankind, regardless of race, creed or color.

3. To protect peace and freedom and economic security through the development of a democratic world organization comprising representatives of all nations, based on the principles of collective security and recognition of the political and economic rights and responsibilities of all men.

4. To assure the functioning of this world organization through an international judiciary, such as an expanded world court, devoted to the attainment of political and social justice.

5. To organize and maintain an international police force to prevent aggression and to assure the enforcement of law and order.

THE specific functions of the American section, in addition to support of the principles and purposes of the Free World Association, will include the following program:

1. To preserve democracy on the home front and in world affairs.

2. To urge the prosecution by our Government of active political warfare on a world-wide basis, utilizing the democratic forces of all nationalities represented in this country and all over the world, particularly in Latin America; giving unqualified support to resisting movements in occupied countries; carrying on aggressive, politically directed anti-Axis propaganda through every available channel.

3. To urge the adoption by our Government of a consistent, vigorous anti-fascist foreign policy. We must end policies of appeasement which strengthen the forces of reaction and play directly into the hands of the enemy. It is impossible to wage successful political warfare by co-operating with fascist governments, while the populations of Europe are being persecuted by them.

4. To urge the creation of a supreme council of the United Nations dealing with political and economic matters. An essential function of this council must be to formulate a clear-cut plan for post-war reconstruction and a democratic world order.

5. To urge the abolition of discriminatory policies against the people of Asia. We must renounce special privileges in the form of extraterritorial concessions, and we must end national and racial discrimination in the fixing of immigration quotas. The immediate effect of a friendly policy toward the people of the Far East would be to deprive our enemies of one of their most useful weapons. In addition, it would open the way for more effective co-operation between the United States and China, whose combined influence can have a decisive effect upon India and can do much toward making that immense country an active partner with the United Nations.

THE American Free World Association will mobilize American public opinion by working in close co-operation with already existing groups having similar aims, by creating local chapters of Free World, by securing individual memberships in the Free World Association, by increasing the support for *Free World* magazine. We propose to organize mass meetings, institutes, round-table discussions, and to utilize other methods of popular education.

If you believe in the principles of the Free World Association, apply today for membership.

Mrs. J. Borden Harriman, chairman

American Free World Association

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

He, too, dreams of a Second Front

EDITORIAL

IT is difficult to say what is more dangerous to the Allied effort—the frequent waves of optimism or the equally frequent but longer lasting periods of pessimism. Only a few weeks ago the war was almost won for some people—Christmas parties were being arranged for Paris or Prague. Now for others, or even for the same people, the war is almost lost—Hitler and Hirohito will soon celebrate their meeting somewhere between India and Egypt.

Perhaps the chronic vacillations between optimism and pessimism will have at least this effect on the infantile minds of such people: it will silence their hysterical opinions and relieve us from their discussions of the serious problems of this war. Perhaps then it will no longer be necessary to keep on reiterating that despite the potentially superior forces of the Allies they are, and will continue to be for some time, in a continuously critical situation because the Axis Powers have an immediate advantage in their stored-up armaments and in their spirit of aggression and ruthlessness. For the peoples of the Democracies there is no reason for overoptimism, because this will be a long and hard war; but at the same time, there is no reason for demoralizing pessimism, because we must be aware that mankind will never surrender liberty and that this international civil war for freedom will continue until the tyrants are destroyed.

But there is plenty of reason for criticism—not for ineffectual expressions of dissatisfaction and disappointment but for sound and constructive observations. The most difficult criticism to make is, of course, the one concerning military strategy, because it is both dangerous and unwise for the layman to formulate an opinion without exact knowledge of all the facts. Yet this reservation having been made, it is nevertheless possible and necessary to examine the events, conditions, and actions which have created a general state of anxiety about Allied war strategy. It is necessary, first of all, to point out that not the fall of Tobruk alone, nor the Lybian campaign as a whole, nor the present situation on the Eastern and Asiatic fronts has given birth to this inquietude, suspicion, and criticism. The causes for this attitude go back as far as Manchuria, Ethiopia, Spain, and Munich. They have their roots in the "phoney war" when the Allied Command, instead of attacking, was waiting to be attacked; instead of profiting by the fact that the Germans had most of their forces in Poland, did nothing to take advantage of this weakness of German strategy. They go back to the beginning of the battle of France when, instead of addressing an immediate ultimatum to Mussolini in order to secure the real neutrality of Italy or, since that was

not possible, of attacking this vulnerable side of the Axis, the Allies waited until Mussolini was able to determine the moment to stab betrayed and defeated France in the back.

The criticism of Allied Strategy is further based on the recognition of the Vichy Government and the consequent loss of the Syrian and Near East armies; it finds justification in the fatal hesitation to attack the only remaining Axis base in Tripoli after the brilliant advance of General Wavell. It is substantiated by what happened in the Far East—not because Hong Kong, Singapore, the East Indies, and Burma were lost, since, after all, everyone can understand that where the enemy can attack with superior forces temporary losses are inevitable, but because the inevitability of these losses was not foreseen, and the arms and men were not transferred to China, where with the aid of millions of Chinese soldiers they might have threatened Japan and opened up a real second front in the Pacific.

Another aspect of this criticism affects what may be called the psychology of Dunkirk which has for so long paralyzed the Allied offensive on the Western Front. For more and more people are beginning to realize that Dunkirk, despite the great loss of material and men, was still a brilliant maneuver because neither the army itself nor the will to victory were lost. Now we are beginning to recognize more and more clearly that Tobruk, Singapore, and Hong Kong were greater disasters than Dunkirk because there very little was saved, and these defeats not only depleted our forces but affected our power to strike again. Similarly, the battles of Greece and Crete, despite the defeat of the Allies, did not discourage us. And though the Russians, too, have had to retreat, we do not find the situation desperate because we understand that while the enemy is advancing, he is doing so only by making immense sacrifices which are constantly weakening him.

It is the policy of waiting, which the Allies seem to have adopted as the safest and sanest method of warfare, that is most discouraging and most open to criticism. The millions of men who are now immobilized in England and the endless preparations in Lybia which have resulted only in enormous advances of Rommel's army are what perturbs the general public. Let those who justify such action imagine for a moment what their feelings would be if Russia were to adopt a similar strategy of waiting and were to retreat to some stronghold behind the Urals in order to create impregnable positions, at the same time allowing the Nazis to work their will on the continent of Europe.

Summed up, the anxiety of the public is therefore based on all these vast mistakes and on the fear that the desire to take all possible precautions before launching our offensives will merely strengthen the enemy to such an extent that the war, instead of being shortened, will be prolonged many years. It constitutes the psychological background for all discussions about the second front. But there is something more obvious and tangible in the foreground of the public mind. People simply cannot accept the logic that

a second front which seems impossible today against the forty or fifty Axis divisions which remain in Western Europe will be possible next year against these divisions augmented by a hundred or even a hundred and fifty more which may be released for action if Russia is defeated or driven beyond the Urals. It is granted that the shipping problem in establishing a second front is very great, but by the same reasoning, it will be infinitely greater next year when an invasion of Europe will require so many more men to meet the increased Axis forces. Fundamentally, the people are convinced that even if an attempt to establish the second front does not succeed completely, even if it will result in an eventual withdrawal of the Allied armies, it will have achieved its goal by obliging the Nazis to bring back part of their forces from the East and thus to relieve the pressure on the Russian armies which will continue to threaten Germany.

The specific military operations must of course be determined by the Allied Command and must be initiated whenever and wherever they are most useful to the United Nations. But it is to be hoped that the leaders of the United Nations will not repeat the mistakes made in connection with Mussolini, that they will not allow such pro-fascist governments as that of Spain or Vichy to hide behind a false neutrality, and that they will attack wherever the Axis Powers seem most vulnerable and wherever success for the Allied cause seems most likely. For we know now from the Italian example that in the end the sympathies of the fascist governments, who fear the triumph of democracy more than anything else, will be converted into actual military participation on the side of the Axis.

We feel confident that there are no sacrifices which the Allied peoples will refuse to accept if these are made in the interests of a more militant strategy on the part of the United Nations. In the field of production as well as on the field of battle everything that can be asked by our leaders will be given in order to achieve victory. The people, not only in the free nations, but also in the subjugated countries, are so convinced of the necessity of the destruction of fascism, so determined not to surrender to the Axis Powers that there is no question of maintaining a high morale if we increase the tempo and extent of our struggle. We are only in danger of losing our high morale if we do less fighting.

All this brings us back to the fundamental conception of the particular kind of war we are waging—a war in which military and political strategy are closely interrelated, in which the purely defensive attitude exemplified in the Maginot Line is no longer accepted by the people themselves as sound or satisfactory tactics. The people demand daring and offensive strategy. They have indicated that they are willing to give such strategy unlimited support. It is not a criticism of any one country but of the entire Allied Command to state that in this war the home front as well as the battlefront must be taken into consideration. Both demand that we strike now and strike with all the force we have.

Jewish and Arab Armies?

THE present situation on the African and Russian fronts has given point and power to the supporters of the Jewish Army idea. For two years now, this question has been debated in the English Parliament and in the press of the Democracies, especially in the United States. It is a question which has many ramifications, but we are not concerned with all these implications at present. What seems to us most important at this time is that the last vestiges of a shortsighted policy, which has been so harmful to the cause of the Democracies in the past, is still to be seen in the attitude of some officials, particularly in the Colonial Office. For reasons best known to itself, the War Cabinet continues to refuse the demand of the Jews for the formation of a Jewish Army to fight wherever it may be needed, not only for Palestine but for the cause of the United Nations.

Arguments of a military and political character which weigh heavily in favor of this request have been made by Generals Edward F. McGlachlin, Ira A. Haynes, and Lewis B. Hershey, by Senators and Congressmen in the United States. Similar arguments have been brought up in Parliament by Lords Davies, Melchett, and Wedgewood, by Lloyd George, Commander Locker-Lampson, and Geoffrey Mander. They voice the prevalent feeling of the people of the Democracies that considerations, not only of right and justice, but of military expediency and morale demand the inclusion of a Jewish Army in the fighting forces of the United Nations.

We confess that, like most people, we are unable to recognize the reasons given for not establishing a Jewish Army. We should put the matter on a broader basis and state that Great Britain owes it to herself as well as to the cause of the Democracies to accept the offered help from every source. Let there be a Jewish Army; let there also be an Arab Army, if enough Arabs are found willing to participate in this struggle on our side.

There is nothing new or radical in this proposal. In the last war, a Jewish Legion formed part of Lord Allenby's Army. Even in this war, the Druses in Syria have been invited to form a Druse Legion, and the Senussi Division was recruited in Egypt from among that warlike tribe. In the early days of this conflict, Lord Lloyd took steps toward the formation of a Jewish Division which would be recruited in Palestine and overseas in what are now occupied countries, a division which is now lost to the forces of the United Nations because with the death of Lord Lloyd the matter was dropped. But it is not a matter which can be ignored. "If we desert the Jews, it may result in our losing the war, because it is a betrayal of our avowed war aims," declared Lord Davies. Certainly it is as incomprehensible to us, as it is to him and other members of Parliament, that in the present situation the services of a great number of men of the utmost loyalty to the Allied cause are refused on the pretext that it may alienate sympathies which do not exist.

The Problem of Alien Enemies

By

FRANCIS BIDDLE

DURING the period from the invasion of Poland to the raid on Pearl Harbor—a span of more than two years—at no time did the ebb and flow of military action serve as a true index of the fortunes of this war. It was not a geographer's war. It was not yet a tactician's war. It was, more than either of these, still a war of world-wide recruitment to the support of opposed ways of life, a war of psychology and propaganda and play on nerves.

True, men fought gallantly, and gallantly they died; but it was not until the march on Russia that we witnessed that large scale give-and-take best described in our American language as "slugging it out"; and even then, elsewhere in the world, the war of words and wills had not yet been overbalanced by tanks and torpedoes. In the vast sparring match of philosophies which took place then, battle was joined wherever the issue arose. That issue was the self-assertion of predatory strength over the lives of human beings. That is fascism in essence. Today, with the world's mightiest armies and navies now fully engaged, with the greatest powers "slugging it out," it is still the issue.

In declaring for a fascist world, our enemies sounded a call far beyond their national borders. To their own initial advantage they enlisted the sympathies and leanings, if not the actual military collaboration, of lesser, outlying nuclei the world over—individuals and groups that either saw eye to eye with them or were infected with some smattering of their viewpoint. There are individuals, there are groups—yes, even in the Democracies—who have shared in varying degrees of harshness that viewpoint. The devices for human oppression, of the body, the mind, the heart, are many. Some are traditional, are used by unquestioning habit. Some are employed through the subconscious. There are people, decidedly non-fascist or actively anti-fascist in their desires and hopes for the world, who nevertheless have been taught to look upon certain nationalities or races as subservient—and to be kept so, by force if other means fail.

In America, where slavery was ended three generations before the Nazis took it up, there are still some who are unwilling to concede equal economic rights and privileges to the Negro. There are still instances of discrimination in employment, still gross inequalities in the division of benefit of our material progress. There is prejudice against Jews and Asiatics in some quarters, against Italians and Germans in others, without regard to the beliefs or conduct of those it victimizes.

These Axis-sponsored concepts of race, class rule, oppressions of all sorts, are definitely on the wane in our country. But where they have been fostered, blindly, through the years and generations, it is not easy to end them in a day. And war—war against the very powers that would put them into universal practice—came in a day.

In the mobilization of mind and spirit against fascism, many of the first "recruits" in this country had volunteered from the category

now labeled "alien enemies"—those residents in America who, because of past citizenship in other nations, technically owe their allegiance to the governments we are now fighting. In a large number of these cases, hatred of fascism had been acquired the hard, bitter way of experience at first hand. They had had a taste of it. Nobody knew better than they why it was desirable to be loyal to a country that goes to war against nazi Germany, fascist Italy, or the ruling element in Japan. At the same time, there was also in the category of alien enemies a smaller number—much smaller, yet still large enough to be dangerous in time of war—who took the Axis side. Among these people were some whose business it was to translate their loyalties into action against us.

Thus the old problem of past wars confronts us again. Who, among the more than a million German, Italian, and Japanese alien enemies in this country, are our friends? Who are our enemies? How are we going to find out? Where is the X-ray machine that will show up the marks of fascism in a man's mind and heart? And if no such test exists, if we cannot get down to cases and cull out the loyal and the disloyal, what are we to do about it? This last question, if it applied to one person, or to a small group, might not be difficult to answer. Special arrangements could be made, fairly, impartially, safely, and with no great difficulty. But it applies to one million persons. To be fair, impartial, and most important, safe, under these circumstances is another story.

II

In past wars, bodies of law and convention have been built up by the various nations to protect themselves against acts of alien enemies. But war, in the early days of international law, was a more leisurely business. Oceans were not locked up the moment war was declared. Wherever it was possible, the opposed governments called their nationals home. And the emphasis—odd by contrast as it seems now!—was on protection of the alien through mutual agreements until he could be removed.

Treaties to this end, specifying a term of grace during which the alien might remain in enemy territory without molestation, date as far back as 1659. On November 7 of that year, the treaty of the Pyrenees, between France and Spain, was entered. It specified that:

> In order better to assure for the future commerce and friendship between the subjects of the said Kings, for the greater advantage and convenience of their kingdoms, it has been agreed that should any rupture hereafter occur between the two crowns (which God forbid) six months' time shall always be given to the subjects of both parties to withdraw and transport their property and persons whithersoever they may think fit; which they shall be permitted to do with all liberty, without its being permitted to cause them any hindrance, nor to proceed during the said time to any seizure of the said property, still less to the arrest of their persons.

The clause, in much the same wording, appears in many treaties thereafter, among them one which the United States entered into with France in 1778. Twenty years later this and other agreements with France were annulled as America prepared to go to war. In the same wave of feeling in our quarrel with France, the first "alien laws" were passed. The period of residence requisite to naturalization was lengthened to fourteen years. Aliens were required to register, and if they wanted to be-

come citizens, had to file intentions five years before issuance of their first papers. On June 25, 1798, the act was approved which authorized the President to "order all such aliens as he should judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States" to depart "within such time as shall be expressed in such order." On July 6, an act was passed providing that in case of war or "predatory incursion," made or threatened, subjects of the hostile power should be liable to arrest or removal, or should be required to give security for good behavior at the discretion of the President. Those not chargeable with actual hostility or other crime against the public safety were to be allowed the period stipulated in the treaty—six months—to dispose of their goods.

Thomas Jefferson, to whom the Alien Law was "a most detestable thing" and "a libel on legislation," ominously remarked that "the friendless alien has indeed been selected as the safest subject of a first experiment." Those were bitter, rather frightening words. Yet even Jefferson could not foretell the tremendous pressures, the extremes to which this distrust of the "friendless alien" was to be carried in later wars involving his country. As compared to some of the subsequent demands—which happily have been denied—the Alien Law of 1798 was but a tap on the wrist.

The aftermath of the Civil War, with its Ku Klux Klan, was still the better part of a century away when Jefferson expressed his fear of that "first experiment." The waves of alien-baiting and vigilantism of the first World War were to be the work of Americans four and five generations removed from his time. Yet, though his eyes could not pierce those veils of the remote future, his foresight was well directed. He foresaw danger, failing only to distinguish between danger inherent in the law and that which flowed from unwise administration.

III

THE risks that Jefferson hinted at are augmented today. I have dwelt at some length on the character of the war we are fighting because that diffuse, non-geographical undertone—the attempt to fight a war by spreading a philosophy or a viewpoint—has made it far more difficult for the American people to make sure of either its friends or its enemies. Past associations, especially citizenship in foreign countries, are of less pertinent value as an identifying factor than they have ever been before.

With one important exception, our past wars with foreign powers have not been "world" wars. The issues were specific; they involved no clash of principle over the relationship of human beings the world over as broad in its scope, as thoroughly pervasive, as the present issue of world fascism. The war we entered in 1917, with its threat of an all-conquering, monarchistic Germany, was our first taste of anything akin to such an issue. And in 1917, the body of laws and conventions which we had been applying to alien enemies since 1798 was already proving imperfect. If there were imperfections then, they are more glaring now. Perhaps the principal account on which the charge of obsolescence may be made against our thinking on this problem is that we have not made sufficient effort to separate the sheep from the goats. We have been thinking of our alien enemies "wholesale." To too many of us, our German neighbor is still German, but only German. We have not yet learned to think of him as an anti-nazi German—though he may have fully as much reason to be anti-nazi as we have.

This is not to say, of course, that among alien enemies there exists no disloyalty, no Germans who are pro-nazi Germans, no Italians who are actively working for Mussolini, or Japanese who are still for Japan. We know that it does exist, and that it is dangerous. And we are taking strong measures to meet it. But the question is one of proportion, of stresses. If we have learned in our thinking to place the emphasis where it belongs, we shall be able to carry over this new thinking into our body of law as it has to do with alien enemies.

In the field of public safety, the crackdown upon the alien enemy, as such, with no picking and choosing, is the blind but easier approach. War, whether by formal declaration or by sudden treachery, forces into the open, as declared enemies, those foreign powers which seek to destroy us. At home, the process is reversed. Here war drives those who would destroy us, or our ideals, into further concealment, into new protestations of loyalty, and even, where possible, into a surface showing of service to our cause. That is the ABC of espionage and Fifth Column activity. Among those who are now in the service of our enemies in our midst, the most effective and most dangerous are those whose personal views and outside connections are least suspect. Any approach to the problem of

Fifth Column activity, therefore, could be only fractionally effective at best if it is to be limited to a pursuit of the obvious. Even if other attacks are tried, when the major stress is left on the obvious, they are still wide of the real target. And they are worse than that. If we were to run down and intern those who are German or Italian in their declared nationality, we might not have touched the real German Fifth Column effort in this country, and meanwhile we shall have inflicted undeserved suffering upon a large number of helpless and innocent persons loyal to America.

IV

WE may well keep the experience of England before us and profit thereby. According to Sir Norman Birkett, at the outbreak of the war there were in that country 74,200 German and Austrian aliens, mostly Jewish refugees. England began by classifying her alien enemies, and interned only 568 at the start of the war. However, by August of 1940, the customary reserve of the British had given way to panic at the spectacle of what the Fifth Column had done to France and the low countries. The Government yielded to the pressure, and all aliens were thrown into hastily laid out camps.

Conditions there were bad. Britons themselves deplored the error. Sir John Anderson, then Home Secretary, said the wholesale internment had victimized "some of the bitterest and most active enemies of the nazi regime." Said Rhys Davies: "I am sure the treatment meted out to our alien population in the last few months is not the result of cruel intention but of panic and sheer stupidity." A letter to the *Times,* signed by a group of prominent Londoners, among them H. G. Wells, included the opinion that "nothing could be more calculated to dishearten our friends and allies in Germany and Austria than the news that Britain has put under lock and key her own anti-Nazis of German and Austrian origin." Then the reaction set in. The British public, having undergone a few bombing raids, ran true to form. In real danger the British forgot their fears. Letters began pouring in to the internees at the rate of 120,000 a week. Pressure again was exerted on public officials. Picking and choosing started all over again. Today, in Great Britain, Canada, and Australia combined, the internees total about 15,000.

Fortunately for this country, and for its cause at war, the United States has not had to learn this object lesson at first hand. We could not, if we would, go in for wholesale internment of our more than a million alien enemies, without incurring a prohibitive cost in both dollars and man power available for our war industries. Because of our unique racial makeup, the cost in morale would have been immeasurably greater—greater, even, than it was in the case of Britain. Among our alien enemies (technically enemies), we are picking and choosing. Those whom we are able to identify as enemies or who are suspected of being troublesome, we are interning for the duration. Some, who have merely talked foolishly, we have paroled. The rest of our so-called alien enemy population goes about its lawful business, most of which at the present time consists of helping us to win this war. The opportunity we are giving them to do this is large. I should like it to be even larger.

There are two broad lines along which we can work to that end. First, in our social and industrial life we can remove any vestiges of blind prejudice and discrimination against aliens as such. We can broaden their job opportunities. We can seek out the sources of propaganda which is designed to keep prejudice alive, and give a more active wartime cognizance to the damage which such propaganda is working upon our cause. We can maintain a strong and alert stand in discouraging all forms of vigilantism. Secondly, in the administrative field, we can, without jeopardy to ourselves, liberalize our regulation of alien enemies. To accomplish this, we need not nullify the intended and legitimate effect of those safeguards which have been set up against sabotage, espionage, and all forms of Fifth Column activity —measures restricting the freedom of movement of alien enemies, for example, excluding them from military areas, limiting the mechanical equipment they may possess, and other rules of similar purport to be in effect for the duration of the war.

These general safeguards we should, for the most part, retain. But as time and opportunity permit, we can make certain exceptions. Differentiation might be made, for instance, as to those who have lived in our country for many years; who have sons fighting in our armed forces; who have American children. These possibilities are now being studied. We must never take any risks. But we must weigh all considerations, and act wisely as well as firmly.

Home Fronts for War *shape* World Fronts for Peace

by
Warren Robinson Austin

THE idea that is stronger than arms for the winning of this war is beginning to unfold. The addresses of Vice-President Wallace and of Under Secretary of State Wells apply the ideals of the Atlantic Charter to the whole world.

It is now generally recognized that the winning of the war will be speeded up and the victory consummated through singleness of purpose of all the integrated peoples who are comrades in the cause of freedom.

There are hosts of men and women who recognize the spiritual foundation of this purpose, but who have not yet articulated it. The unfoldment of the concrete form of the idea is nourished by the spoken word, and the time is near when it will be given practical effectiveness through the magnitude of the voice of many peoples.

Self-discipline by nations is necessary for coordination in winning the war, and collaboration for removing the causes of another war. Practices of ordinary times will not serve. Many millions of people, everywhere, must concur in new concepts and cultivate new habits. The Golden Rule gains consideration in foreign policy. It would have taken a long time to arrive at an idea of this high standard through any other experience than the dross-consuming fire of war, a war which involves all great treaty powers and all racial stocks. It has unfolded to men who have endured the pain and sorrow of battle—men who have survived such experiences as Bataan. They have a vision of the future in which justice and benevolence are supreme. To them, this war inaugurates an epoch—a new era lights up the horizon of tomorrow. We must stand with them.

In practical, everyday life, our habits must be converted to conduct motivated by the realization that self-government may not survive in a world menaced by men of malign ambitions, whose effort is directed to the reduction of free men to forced servitude and starvation, and to the subjugation of governments to their totalitarian rule. Our every resource must be aimed at the complete defeat of the aggressors. We must synchronize our lives individually and collectively to the transformation, rapidly occurring, from comfortable living to restricted and rationed existence. The crisis created by separation from our sources of rubber and petroleum products must be met. We will not permit the shortage of critical materials to throw us into chaos. America awake will muster her ingenuity and her potential resources against the test.

Knowing our requirements for war and for civilian activities exceed the supply, we have promptly allocated material to war. If we know that facilities cannot be created and got into production of rubber for civilian use within three years, we will so limit the use of cars in the meantime as to prolong the utility of existing tires to prevent a collapse. But if collapse should come, we would again do the impossible, and devise other means of transportation. Frantic complaints cannot obstruct arming and equipping our armed forces and our Allies for the colossal struggle they face. America aroused will provide the tools to do the job though civilian rationing must be revised to the minimum.

Those enemies of supreme effort—"everybody for himself," "non-essential wants," "hoarding," "stampede for preference," "civil disobedience," and "obstruction," will be driven out of our system by the spirit of common service. This co-operative medium is the central power in all the controls for war purposes which have been, or will be, created by legislation. The internationalization of American mines, manufactures, and farms which has been put into effect by the Lend-Lease Act, advanced by various requisitioning and war-powers acts, and financed by mammoth appropriations, manifests recognition by the United States of the world-wide scope of the moral issue and the physical conflict requiring unity.

The joint declaration by the United Nations of January 1, extending the scope of the Atlantic Charter to all other nations contributing now or hereafter to victory over tyranny, and the agreement between the United States and Great Britain, dated February 23, granting participation in its benefits to "all countries of like mind," mark the collaboration already accomplished by the several nations. Such a propitious beginning uplifts hope for ultimate world betterment.

Excessively high and unstable prices interfered with production, as did disorder in the conduct of industry. They threatened social distress through inflation. On this front also rose America and stabilized prices as a necessity for maximum production and as a bastion of social justice. The effects of this control of billions of transactions will encompass the world. They touch the business and family life of every citizen of America. They are to save the economic soundness of America and prevent revolution in the system of free enterprise. Order, reason, restraint, and patience by all are eminently necessary for efficiency on this front. Though a large administrative machine to police and supervise this effort is being organized, its success will depend upon voluntary compliance. Deep lying devotion to the cause of freedom should move the people to share in the common control.

So it is on all the other civilian fronts: production, conversion, conservation, co-ordination, reduction of surplus tissue, salvaging and husbanding, economizing and keeping vital and ready to "come back" the small industries of the nation. A program in charge of the Government, and a nation cheerfully working in harmony therewith, will support our arms and render millions of toilers the privilege of doing their part in the struggle for a better world.

Determined to throw in every resource necessary to expedite victory, and holding fast the belief that new sanctions for lasting peace are feasible, we are, nevertheless, sensible of the interregnum which must be dominated by superior military power. For that period of study, negotiation, and the just settlement of vast problems, the United Nations must maintain order.

In maintaining, even temporarily, political and territorial arrangements conducive to peace, in guarding the ancient and the pioneer routes of commerce, communication, and transportation, and in maintaining the open door to strategic and critical materials for all who help to defeat tyranny, the United States is not to be a satellite of some other nation. Geographically and ethnically, this country occupies a place in the world which will have an important influence in the reconstruction and in the peace. It divides the great oceans and consequently is astride the trade routes. While its citizenship comprises racial stocks from many different parts of the earth, it practically divides the ethnic worlds.

In a realistic consideration of the probable armistice leading up to the negotiations for definitive peace conventions, we must recognize the inevitable responsibility of leadership of the United States in the policing power to be created and in the preparedness for the peace. Along all fronts, in the battlefield, and in the home area, the joint service to mankind animated by the spirit of the Atlantic Charter will help prepare a good-will basis for a wise and righteous collaboration among the victors. Many opposing interests under consideration will need the solvent of justice. Comrade nations, therefore, must have understanding of each other's problems, and sense the brotherhood of common aspirations.

More frequent and more direct communication between the various representative bodies of the world, those branches of government which speak and act for the people, would be enlightening to legislators, and serve as a medium of transmission to the people of the developing plans. As Chief Justice Hughes expressed it when he was Secretary of State:

"Co-operation is not dictatorship and it is not partisanship. On our part it must be the co-operation of a free people drawing their strength from many racial stocks, and a co-

operation that is made possible by a preponderant sentiment permitting governmental action under a system which denies all exercise of autocratic power. It will be the co-operation of a people of liberal ideals, deeply concerned with the maintenance of peace and interested in all measures which find support in the common sense of the country as being practical and well designed to foster common interests."

We ought to expedite the interchange of views and the submission of ideas to the people, to further participation by all in the attainment of the spiritual and economic objectives. If there has been created good will and common understanding among the peoples of the United Nations while they were comrades in arms, if a common vision of humanity has arisen from the smoke of battle, the foundation for the structure of peace will have been laid. Only thus can an enduring structure be erected.

excerpts from a correspondent's prison diary

THE STUTTERING OF DEATH

BY JAY ALLEN

AS a prisoner in Chalon-sur-Saone and Dijon, Jay Allen kept a diary with the permission of the German officials. At the end of his stay, this diary was taken from him but, anticipating such a move, Mr. Allen managed to preserve his notes by persuading released prisoners to take out copies into unoccupied France. From these notes Mr. Allen has just written an autobiography, "My Trouble with Hitler." One of the episodes included in the book was published in our December number. The second is presented now.

I AWOKE hearing boots, very near. And coming to, I had that baffled sense of not knowing where you are on first awakening. The light, still the dirty gray of before dawn, was behind me. So I was not in Chalon where for so many months I had awakened with the light in my eyes. I heard the stirring about of chickens and we had no chickens in Chalon. Then an alarm clock and a Frenchwoman's husky, sleepy voice, "Marie, make the coffee, *Monsieur Jean* will be in right away."

Of course—next to me was the yard occupied by the dwellings of the French prison guards. And the boots? The usual early morning *Aufmarsch,* no doubt, and any minute there would be song. No, the boots were too near, almost below my window. There weren't many men, not enough for an *Aufmarsch,* ten or fifteen at the most and they clumped on gravel. On the path I had seen. And there were the sounds of feet which were


¡ARRIBA ESPAÑA!

not in boots—two or three pair of feet in ordinary shoes—whether two or three I wasn't sure until a moment later. There were two. Suddenly something in my subconscious brought me upright, listening closely. The sound of the booted and of the bootless feet stopped abruptly. Then I heard a grating sound—a gate being unlocked and opened. That was it, the path with the gate at the end. There were commands, four sharp one-word commands the sound of which is the same in any language, and then the crash of rifles . . . then a pistol shot . . . another pistol shot . . . and then another brief command and the sound of booted feet coming back along the gravel—this time without the bootless feet.

And then from the prison-wing next to ours, the German prisoners' wing, a long, sustained animal howl, the same that I am told is raised in every prison in the world when the volley of the firing squad is heard or the lights dim when the switch for the electric-chair is thrown in.

Then an angry voice, *"Ruhe!"*

A moment later the silence was broken by the clocks in the town striking five.

Soon the chickens began to stir again. A door slammed and I heard whispered voices. *"Monsieur Jean"* had no doubt come to his coffee and to his husky-voiced wife. I lay down again. The time passed at the same pace as always, I suppose, but it was a long time before the clocks in the town struck six.

I don't remember what I thought of exactly. But I do recall thinking how lucky I had been till then. No executions in Chalon. And about the first time I had heard such a volley—in Algeciras in July, 1936, when the sunburned young men from the Foreign Legion just over from Africa on a mission shot the schoolteacher, the shoemaker, the two Freemasons, and the brother of my cartoonist friend in the patio of the abandoned monastery.

I remembered what a fuss there was: how the young lieutenant wouldn't give the order to fire and how the colonel said, in such a quiet voice too, "All right, if that is the way you feel, *you too,*" and, stripping off the lieutenant's belt and sidearms, led him to the wall beside the others. And how the lieutenant then stripped off his tunic and stamped on it and stood very stiff and defiant with the others. And how unreal it seemed when the rifles spoke and the six bodies slumped to earth at the white wall with the purple bougainvillea vine along the top. It had seemed so unreal that later in the day, when the shoemaker's wife asked about him, I found myself saying that he would be along shortly and meaning it, as though at the foot of the white wall where I had left him he had been sleeping off a heavy lunch with too much wine.

And in the weeks that followed, from the Hotel Cecil in Gibraltar, we used to hear the volleys every morning, muffled by distance, from across the arm of the bay toward La Linea. It never seemed very real then either, what with the way things were in Gibraltar and your being able to go aboard the *Rex* or the *Savoia* or some other great liner, coming in every week from New York and lying out in the harbor for four or five hours during the evening, and see the tourists in flowered dresses and white dinner jackets dancing on the gloriously lighted decks. A few asked what all the shooting was supposed to be about. Another one of those spick revolutions, what? The agony in La Linea, half a mile away, and in Algeciras across the Bay—the agony that was spreading up through Spain like poison in the veins and that would spread further across the world—seemed far less real than the lighted ships and the tourists in evening clothes, believe me. Either one had to be real or the other had to be. Now, of course, we know which was real. But at the time it was easier, more comfortable not to doubt that the real reality was that of our own safe world. And the other? The other was merely a bad dream, an irrelevant bad dream left over from another century.

I remembered other times when I had heard the stuttering of death at dawn. In Madrid, in the fall of 1936, when a righteous Republic executed a cheap little grafter—he had been Minister of the Interior—who had betrayed it. The firing squad was bigger than usual because so many men wanted to get in on it. One of the candidates for the firing squad I knew; his brother had lost his arm from gangrene after having been made to walk halfway across Spain until the rusty handcuffs were burned in the swollen flesh of his wrists. And because they all hated this minister so, everyone of his executioners had fired at his head (his was really a very special case) and he fell without any head at all. Thirty-two Mauser bullets do things to a cranium. And later when they carried his body out in a ridiculously short box, women massed outside in the

streets pulled him from it and mutilated him. It was very unpleasant, but I could go back to my hotel and write a dispatch (not about that —they wouldn't let me) but just any dispatch, and in the writing of it become an American again, just an observer, aloof from this reality —attach myself to that other reality of the safe world which sent me my pay checks and (imagine!) insured my life with Lloyds.

The last time I heard a firing squad, I think, was in Bilbao in the spring of 1937. The client was a man who had forgotten to blow up a bridge of great strategic importance. Nobody said he was a traitor. He was worse; he was negligent. And in a society desperately at bay—and knowing it, (that is the catch, knowing it) negligence is worse than treason because it is so frivolous. But from Bilbao it was only twenty-five minutes by plane to Biarritz which, in the spring of 1937, was worlds and ages away from Bilbao. And in Biarritz you soon forgot the perils of that beleaguered city. Not "forgot" so much, perhaps, as ceased any more to feel in your own flesh, since you had got *your* flesh the hell out of there, that such perils justified the shooting of the negligent. Yes, that was the last time I heard an execution. I am sure, for—come to think of it —in the other countries where I was afterward, in France, England, and America, there was no shooting at all, not of the negligent, not even of the known traitors. And in France later, the traitors were to do their damnedest to shoot the others and may do it yet.

Now, for me in Dijon prison, it was real, all right (though I had no idea at all who the clients might be) for I had no handy method whatsoever of scampering off to my own safe world, to another reality of my own election. And that wasn't so much because of any doubts I may have had as to the solidity of my distant world but because there were tangible barriers between it and me—a series of prison walls and a flock of nazi soldiers among others. And there was no opportunity whatsoever for me to try the tricks I mentioned, like writing a dispatch for the paper or a quick visit to a hotel bar to help along with the illusion that none of this was real, or wasn't of the only reality that counted in the world. Since then (remember that was July, 1941) many things have changed for us all. The time when, a round-trip ticket in your pocket, you could leave the Stork Club for an excursion to a war somewhere—where didn't much matter—has passed.

Can DEMOCRACY *flourish in the* NEW ASIA?

BY
H. G. QUARITCH WALES

ONCE the Axis is defeated, it is to be hoped that Asia is to share with the rest of the world the freedom and equality that we believe to be the rightful heritage of mankind. Such a consummation would entail the wide acceptance and practice of democratic principles of government. But can one expect democracy to flourish in the absence of political maturity and where the great masses are still illiterate? The danger is not so much that we doubt the *bona fides* of those enlightened leaders who have assimilated democratic ideas; but rather that from the masses other and more powerful individualistic leaders may arise, actuated by mere greed and the desire for power. Then would the lot of the Asiatic peasant be worse not better.

The passing of white domination and the old-fashioned imperialism will not benefit Asia if that great continent is going to slip back once more into oriental despotism. In the case of China, Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, contemplating post-war possibilities, has expressed the determination of the present Central Government to see that "within our country there shall be no exploitation of society by any other society or even by the state itself." To allow in the name of liberty such a fate to overtake Asia would be to go far toward torpedoing all our hopes for evolving a better world. It is not too early to consider what the United Nations can do to guard against such a tragedy.

A few years ago, I happened to be traveling in a very remote part of eastern Thailand, the poorest part of the country. Late one afternoon, I arrived at the outskirts of a little Thai village among the rice fields. While my tent was being pitched, I strolled into the village where I heard that some event of local importance was taking place. I found a document had just been received from the provincial governor. The village headman had understood that he was to call the people together and read them the contents. I got there just in time to hear the proclamation, which turned out to be a copy of the new constitution, such as was being sent to every village. The new constitution was the outcome of the *coup d'état* of 1932, and it was intended that the proclamation should inform the villagers of their new found freedom, their right to a voice in the government of their country. I watched the expressions of the assembled villagers as they listened unemotionally. Faces remained blank and uncomprehending. The meaning entirely escaped them. Though the constitution had in fact been extracted from the king by the new leaders as the result of an ultimatum, the import of the document was completely lost on the villagers. The elders decided that the village had in some way deserved a special mark of royal esteem, perhaps because they had been law abiding and regular in paying their taxes. With one accord they raised their joined palms to their foreheads on the conclusion of the reading. The document was reverently placed on a lacquer bowl (the village possessed nothing more valuable), raised on a litter, and carried off to be deposited in the temple. After this pleasant but quite meaningless interlude, men's thoughts drifted back to the serious business of harvesting the padi.

One can as easily imagine this incident as having taken place in any Chinese village (at least before Japanese aggression began to awaken a

new consciousness), or indeed almost anywhere among the rural populations of Asia. In India the peasant cultivator is interested only in a good monsoon, light taxation, and being left alone. *Dilli dur ast* (It's a far cry to Delhi) sums up his attitude to the Government; and all the varied propaganda that is blared at him over the radio leaves him mystified and indifferent. It is against this background that one must estimate the chances of democracy thriving in the new Asia. In America one is naturally inclined to give too much weight to the claims of the few articulate leaders to represent the millions of their illiterate countrymen.

We may use the example of Thailand once again because it provides a useful laboratory experiment as to what is likely to happen in any oriental state that finds itself suddenly free of European domination. This country had, of course, alone among the nations of southeastern Asia, retained its independence. But it would be useless to deny that the beneficent autocratic rule of the Siamese kings was colored rather by a desire to retain their status vis-à-vis the European powers whose territory bordered on Thailand than to advance their own subjects toward political maturity. When freedom came in 1932, the educated class, consisting mainly of officials, many of them educated in Europe, were anxious to try democratic principles of government. But because of the backward state of the masses, half of the representatives of the Assembly had to be nominated by the leaders, while the polling for the remainder degenerated into a farce. During this period of tutelage, which was to have corresponded to that favored by Sun Yat-sen in China, it is not surprising that the real control of affairs rapidly got into the hands of a few energetic and unprincipled adventurers. This led to the setting up of a dictatorship under Luang Pibul Songram, and representative government was set at naught.

The fact that the Siamese dictator threw in his lot with Japan is merely coincidental. It suited his purpose thus to reconcile his position with a stronger force with which he would otherwise have found himself in conflict. That fascism appealed to the Thai leaders, just as earlier it had fascinated the Japanese military clique, should not blind us to the fact that fascism has not the monopoly of despotism and is only one phasis of the barbarism that has its source deep in original sin. If it is primarily the West that has evolved in democracy a panacea against despotism, in so doing it is merely repaying the debt of enlightenment and culture that the West owes to the East.

II

THE maintenance of a strong central government at Chungking gives the best guarantee that China will emerge as a powerful and united democracy after the war. The extension of education on which this government has concentrated, and the way in which it has set its face against exploitation of the people by the old provincial officialdom are factors which give good ground for hope. So are the integrating effects of the war against a common enemy, and the experience that industrial co-operative units are gaining in local self-government throughout China. All these trends lead one to hope that there will be no reversion to provincial war lordism and that a strong united China, occupying a strategical position of the first importance, will naturally claim a position of leadership in Asia when peace returns. Can the same be said of India?

Probably the world has now been made sufficiently alive to the nature of Indian political problems to be no longer shocked by the suggestion that the word India at present signifies little more than a geographical expression. The facts are inescapable that there are religious and racial distinctions, that there is mutual intolerance, and even a failure to agree on a common linguistic medium. And these pose problems that seem for the moment almost insuperable. One must bear in mind that unity, apparent unity that is to say, has never been achieved in India except by conquest, a *pax* imposed by the strong over the weak. Nor has it always been an alien domination. The great Emperor Asoka, who in the third century B.C. was the first to unite the greater part of India under one rule, was a Hindu who adopted Buddhism in remorse for the horror and butchery for which he had been responsible in building up his Empire. Harsha, who in the seventh century A.D. succeeded in welding an empire out of Northern India after he had gone "from east to west subduing all who were not obedient," was also a Buddhist. Again, in the miserable period that followed the decay of the Mogul Empire, the attempt of the Marathas to build up by force of arms a new empire was only forestalled by the British.

Unfortunately, there is some evidence that freedom for India may merely precipitate an-

other period of disruption and strife, like that which followed the break up of the Mogul Empire, in which the only alternative solution to a long and bloody civil war might be the stepping in of some predatory foreign power. Pandit Nehru has hinted at the likelihood of internal bloodshed; and once that begins, no one could say when or where it would stop. One appreciates the desire on the part of the Congress leaders for a united India and one may accept their intention to safeguard the minorities. But one must equally sympathize with Moslems, so far as they themselves are united, in their desire for partition, disastrous as such a policy would probably prove. But it is when one learns that such a small though militant minority as the Sikhs seriously cherishes the idea of succeeding to the British power in India, and with that end in view is doing all it can to add to its numbers by conversion, that one realizes to the full that freedom has its dangers too.

While unity in India is, as elsewhere, a laudable goal, an attempt by one party to force the issue is only likely to usher in a new disintegration leading to a bitterness which no time would be long enough to heal. First the underlying causes of disunity in India must be removed. The communal basis of politics is the most acute cause of discord. It is scarcely possible to foresee a united India until the domains of church and state are separated and politics are relegated to their proper sphere of temporal government. This is unfortunately as foreign to the ideas of the average Moslem of what is fitting, as it is to the Hindu, whose every daily act is bound up with religion. But in course of time these deep-rooted inhibitions could be overcome by mass education, preferably accompanied by the development of eclecticism in the religious sphere. So long ago as the sixteenth century, the great Akbar foresaw the possibility of a united India developing along these lines. In modern India the same need has been recognized by such teachers as Ram Mohun Roy, who established the Brahma Samaj, a church open to all sorts and conditions of men, and by Ramkrishna Paramahamsa, who came to the conclusion that all creeds are only facets of the same truth.

III

LET me illustrate what I mean by taking the case of Ceylon, which has already advanced far in the direction I am suggesting as a solution for India's problems. Despite the small compass of this island (23,000 square miles), when the British took over the coastal districts in 1795, they found themselves confronted by a medley of peoples, as mutually antagonistic by reason of race and religion as anything to be found in India. At the present time, in addition to the three and a half million Buddhist Singhalese there are over a million Tamil Indians, more than half of them recent arrivals from India who have come to work on the plantations. Then there are over 300,000 Moslems, a fifth of them born in India, and the small but influential group of 30,000 Dutch burghers, who, although in fact Eurasians, are highly educated on Western lines and range themselves politically with the 9,000 Europeans.

Not only was there the usual friction between the Tamils (who are Hindus) and the Moslems, but each religious group also differed among themselves according to whether they were born in India or in Ceylon. Again, one third of the Singhalese, the people of the island's mountainous core centered around Kandy, until recent years have entertained much ill feeling toward the coastal Singhalese. The Kandyans, who were never conquered by the Dutch and voluntarily handed over their kingdom to the British in 1815, after having expelled their own unjust monarch, blamed the coastal Singhalese for having allowed the Europeans to get a foothold on the island. Then the Singhalese always regarded the Tamils as unwanted intruders.

In 1915, a clash between Buddhist and Moslem traders led to an inefficient panic-stricken governor ordering an inexperienced garrison commander to fire on the rioters. The bitter feeling and agitation that followed this serious error of judgment led the Government in 1924 to introduce a series of far-reaching reforms. These culminated in 1929 in the Legislative Council being replaced by a State Council with administrative as well as legislative functions. The membership of this Council now consisted of fifty elected and eight nominated unofficial members as well as three officials, so that the country became in effect 80 per cent self-governing. It was thus brought nearer than almost any other colony to dominion status. At the same time, the manner of election of members of the State Council was changed to a more democratic basis. The former communal representation, which had only tended to perpetuate religious and racial cleavage, was abolished, as also were all property and literacy qualifica-

tions. Instead, a system of territorial representation was substituted and the franchise was extended to all adults of both sexes. The experiment has proved so successful that it is now many years since there has been any communal trouble in Ceylon. Though there has been no eclecticism, there has been a new-found spirit of tolerance. The people are now simply wondering when they will receive the complete freedom which they feel they deserve.

India naturally represents a much larger problem than does little Ceylon. But the difference is one of degree rather than of kind. A loose federation of democratic self-governing Indian states and provinces, with representation on a non-communal basis, and living side by side in a spirit of compromise, seems to offer the best medium in which a gradual progress toward unity and mutual understanding might be fostered. Naturally, such an organization could not flourish unless it were itself part of some greater organization, by means of which mutual suspicion could be ironed out and minorities safeguarded during the process of transition. Now that the idea of the Council of the United Nations has been born, we do not need to look further for that superior organization.

IV

THE Council of the United Nations must be free of those limitations that render suspect even the best intentions of the paternally governed native state or kingdom and the most enlightened colonial government. The natural reluctance to take the final step in a country like Ceylon, where all the tea estates are British owned, and the tinge of commercial self-interest which colored even the advanced Dutch government when it took steps to raise the standard of living of the Javanese, would not operate with the Council of the United Nations. It would merely provide for all those who had need of it that period of guidance which Sun Yat-sen recognized would be necessary for China until her people were politically mature. Its objective would be merely to ensure freedom and equality for all, with undreamt of possibilities of economic peace and prosperity, necessarily backed by adequate sanctions.

The United Nations Council would not seek to bind states together against their will, nor would it seek to do other than encourage the closer union of states which developed a natural affinity, such as in the first place the Congress provinces of India. On the other hand, to force, for example, the Shan States to combine with either Burma or Thailand against their will merely on account of blood relationship, would be only to continue the Axis game of exaggerated nationalism. It would be the same with the diverse states of Indonesia in all their varied stages of development. But the gradual and natural growing together of neighboring provinces to achieve a natural unity on the basis of community of interests and culture, such as we may hope for in India and China, would be a desirable eventuality. Certain it is that the world has everything to gain from a strong united India and a strong united China. The influence of both these great countries has in the past always been in the direction of the spreading of culture and free trade to less enlightened lands.

Nevertheless, the object of the Council and its members would be not to foster a renewed accent on ultranationalism and isolationism, but rather on interdependence with a certain degree of renunciation of political and economic sovereignty. Thus the United Nations Council may at last bring East and West together in an atmosphere free from suspicion and fear. The past will be forgotten when Asia is able to recognize the full implication of the words of Rabindranath Tagore: "It is only by knowing the Europe that is great and good that we can effectively guard ourselves against the Europe that is base and greedy."

INDIA *since* CRIPPS

by

Henry Stanley

AT the moment one of the major items on the agenda of Axis strategy appears to be a drive through the Middle East for the purpose of effecting a junction with the oriental partners of Germany and Italy, either in India or on the borders of Burma. It goes without saying that success in this enterprise will have extremely serious economic and military consequences for China and the U.S.S.R. on the one hand, and Britain and the U.S.A. on the other. If the Axis Powers succeed in establishing themselves along three-quarters of the enormous coastline of the Eurasian continent, they will be nearer victory than ever before. For this reason every citizen of the United Nations can rightly ask what is being done to insure that India will be able to withstand the double blows which may at any time be delivered against her.

The United Nations must frankly face the fact that on the eve of what may be one of the greatest campaigns in history, India is a liability rather than an asset. It is a liability because, being of fundamental importance from a strategic and economic point of view, it is at the same time so weak politically, economically, and militarily, that men and supplies must be sent there to insure resistance against the Axis. Indian economy is colonial in character, and the output of its heavy industry is in no way comparable with that of Japan. India, for example, manufactures no airplane engines, and produces only a limited number of service air frames. The Indian Army is small, relative to the Japanese Army, and until recently it was planned as a force whose duties were chiefly to deal with frontier tribesmen and internal disturbances. It is doubtful whether General Wavell, with all his great ability, has yet been able to convert it into a force capable of dealing with a modern army which has demonstrated itself capable of defeating British arms quickly and efficiently wherever it has encountered them. According to the London *Times*, there are scarcely one hundred Indian pilots available for the air force, and the Indian Navy is correspondingly weak. An over-all survey of the material resources of India indicates that India is not capable of self-defense unless greatly reinforced by British and American supplies and men.

In this respect India resembles China. The Chinese Government has, however, learned how to mobilize the people and the nation so that in some degree the backwardness of Chinese economy and the poverty of technological equipment is offset by the militant struggle of the Chinese people harassing the Japanese as they lose themselves in the vast spaces of the Chinese homeland. In India, there is no such source of strength to counterbalance India's material weakness. On the contrary, the political order is India's greatest source of weakness. Already martial law has been declared in three provinces and the Viceroy's Council has announced that collective fines will be levied in all cases of sabotage. We believe that martial law and collective fines will fail. We cannot avoid the unpleasant but very real fact that the principal political organizations of the Indian people are either neutral or hostile to the Viceregal authority, and that the largest political organization, the Indian National Congress, has recently made a declaration of neutrality tinged with hostility.

No British, American, Soviet, or Chinese citizen can any longer afford to deceive himself that the failure of the Cripps Mission has mysteriously paved the way to future understanding. The outcome of the Cripps failure is patent. The democratic and egalitarian forces in the Indian National Congress of whom Nehru is the leader, are in eclipse. Because Nehru was unable to secure any real power from Cripps, the Congress rank and file are in increasing measure giving their support to Gandhi. Gandhi has no known preference for democracy, and he has never yet made any distinction between the fascist and the democratic powers. Since his control of the Congress has been re-affirmed he has given a *mot d'ordre* which can only be interpreted as neutrality. He has instructed the Congress to meet the Japanese with nonviolent non-co-operation—in other words, to treat them just as the Congress treats

the British. In military terms, this means nonresistance, and lest there be any doubt in anyone's mind, he has categorically pronounced against a policy of scorching the earth.

Nehru is a national leader of a wholly different order. He believes passionately in economic and political democracy. The influence of Nehru and his friends is responsible for the fine anti-Axis record of the Indian National Congress. No political organization of any size in the British Commonwealth has as consistently supported the struggle of free China and the European anti-fascist movements as the Congress. This has been Nehru's work. His hope has always been that India shall take a part in the world community as a peaceful, progressive nation. He wishes to have the power to fight the Axis. His policy for defense involves the raising of a national people's army of regulars and irregulars numbering 100,000,000 men. In short, he wishes to duplicate in India the national defense policy of China—the only one suited to an industrially backward nation in the presence of Axis aggression.

The Indian National Congress is not the only political organization in India, and even generously estimated, its membership numbers but one per cent of the Indian population. We must recognize, however, that it is the only political organization capable of speaking for a high proportion of the people of India without regard to caste, race, religion, or class. Its electoral success in both the Moslem and Hindu areas of India has been demonstrated. Its authority was apparent during the course of Cripps' visit, and Cripps has acknowledged in the British House of Commons that his mission failed when the president of the Congress rejected his declaration. Because the Indian National Congress is a national political organization of considerably greater strength than its nearest rival, and because it is the only important nonsectarian political organization in India, its policy is of the greatest consequence to us. Whether we like it or not, the Congress will be an important factor in any course India may take, and the fact that the British Government has failed to win the Congress as an ally has the gravest implications not for Britain alone, but for the entire democratic world.

II

WHY did the Cripps mission fail? In seeking allies in this war, Britain has not been unsuccessful. When the opportunity presented itself, the British leaders did not allow traditional political formulas, ancient hatreds, and current misunderstandings to stand in the way of an alliance with the U.S.S.R. They acted with courage, breadth of vision and complete sincerity in their approaches to the Soviet leaders, and the hope of victory for the United Nations is the stronger for what Britain has done in this matter. As much may be said for their relations with the United States and, with some qualification, of their relations with China. When the British Cabinet is so demonstrably capable of political understanding and adjustment to new situations, the ordinary observer is astonished by the complete failure of Messrs. Churchill, Amery, and Cripps to achieve even the slightest success in their endeavors to win an alliance on behalf of the United Nations with the principal political organizations of India.

The British Government is deceiving itself if it believes that Cripps' declaration has embodied a new policy. Twenty-five years ago, Mr. Edward Montagu, the Secretary of State for India in Mr. Lloyd George's Government, devised the formula for dealing with agitation for Indian independence. This formula consisted of two tactical parts: a generous promise of future action, and a resolute retention in the immediate present of all essential controls in the hands of the Viceroy. The Cripps' declaration did not represent a departure from this formula. True, his promises were more generous and concrete than any yet made, and his offer of office under the Viceroy was the most comprehensive yet recorded, but in terms of real power, there was nothing new in Cripps' proposals. It would have been very much better had Cripps made no promises for the future, and the fact that he did so would seem to indicate that in dealing with India, the British Government has lost all capacity to understand both itself and India. Promises are suspect in India. Regardless of whether or not the British have been sincere in their past promises, the fact is that even the best promises have never had any meaning satisfactory to the authentically Indian politician. Promises made at the present time are particularly open to suspicion because the future is something which Britain alone has not the power to shape. Promises, however definite, are gratuitous in the circumstances of the present, because any conditions under which they can be executed will be the product of the struggle not of Britain alone, but of the sacrifices of all the United Nations, and not least, of the Indian people themselves. The Indian leaders know this, and they rightly suspect any declaration of which such promises are essential substance.

The Cripps mission did not, however, fail because of the quality and character of his promises of independence. Sir Stafford has admitted that the discussions with the principal Indian political organization broke down on two questions: defense and the function of the Viceroy. On both these points Cripps insisted that *power* be retained in the hands of men owing their final responsibility to the British Government. Cripps in effect offered the Indian leaders an opportunity to advise the Viceroy on a number of subjects but not upon the important subject of defense. In the Viceroy's Council they could have duties of a precise departmental character, but they could have rights only in so far as the Viceroy thought expedient.

The difference of opinion between Cripps and the Viceroy, on the one hand, and the leaders of the Congress and the Moslem League, on the other, was not an academic constitutional difference but a real difference about policy. As Nehru has made it plain, the Congress policy under his leadership would involve a national *levée en masse* similar to that taking place in China and the U.S.S.R. In the circumstances of India's poverty and technological and industrial backwardness, such a policy would appear to be an absolute necessity, but it is not the policy of either the Viceroy or the Commander in Chief. Nehru does not regard such a defense policy as an alternative to the operations of British and American armed forces in India, but as a supplement. British and American technicians, trained troops, and supplies are as indispensable to India as they are to China, and no responsible Indian leader who advocates resistance to the Axis believes otherwise. It may safely be said that Indians of every political complexion are prepared to honor General Wavell as the Commander in Chief of the Army of the United Nations fighting for the defense of a free India, in the manner that the Filipinos honor General MacArthur, an American soldier and a one-time participant in the conquest of the Philippines.

III

In their dealings with India, the British Government sees the necessity for action but the British leaders, including Cripps, remain bogged down in traditional political formulas which are completely inadequate in the circumstances of the hour. They are not even true to their own traditions evolved in the course of their dealings with Canada, Australia, and South Africa. Prior to the grant of responsible government, Canada was divided into antithetical racial, religious, and class groups, and the bitterness between the English-speaking and French-speaking parts of the country was extreme. Great Britain did not wait for the Canadians to settle their differences before responsible government was granted. The British Government let the Canadians work the matter out for themselves. Although the question of racial dissension is not yet settled a century later, real progress has been made by the Canadians acting by themselves, and the races have grown together as the measure of their political independence has increased.

A great many antithetical theses can be proved from history, but there does seem some ground for believing on the basis of Britain's own history that state building involves a selective political process. The problem is not to insure the rights of minorities regardless of their political capacity, their organization, and their ideals. Cripps and Halifax in their public utterance seem to believe that the Indian princes have a value equal to that of the Indian National Congress in any scheme of national development. They seem to think that one tendency in the Congress is about as embarrassing to them as another. They seem incapable of qualitative judgment and of understanding that some political forces have the capacity to strengthen Indian resistance while others cannot but weaken India.

In any overtures made by the United Nations to the Indian leaders, the test of alliance must be willingness and capacity to maintain Indian unity, willingness to draw the peasantry and working people of India into the life of the state, willingness to resist with arms the Axis Powers, and willingness to help build a new order based upon international economic and political co-operation between states. It does not require much imagination to realize that, if Britain, the United States, the U.S.S.R., and China make it absolutely clear that they will unequivocally support with all their power any national government of India which will seek such objectives, that government will be able to keep order, to win the affectionate support of the vast majority of Indian people, and will make India into a real asset to the United Nations. It is a gross deception to say that such a government so supported would be at the mercy of disgruntled minorities of Moslem and Hindu reactionaries and sectarians, disappointed Punjabi militarists and depressed castes. India is a badly divided nation at the present time, but like any other nation, unity will grow with common national experience. National resistance against Japan has transformed China, and national resistance by India will transform that country economically, politically, and socially.

The United Nations have a duty to the enslaved nations of Europe, and we cannot afford in our own interest and theirs, to dissipate our strength over the face of the world because there are vast colonial nations incapable and unwilling to take up the task of defending themselves. Indian leaders of great influence have expressed their determination to fight on their own account. We must give them the power to do so, fully realizing that such a gift will transform India. The events which have taken place in Burma and Malaya demonstrate that anarchy and revolution are close to the surface of large sections of Asiatic society. These forces cannot be exorcized by Churchillian blunt answers. They are there and we must learn how to make them operate against Japan as they are doing in China, and not against us as they have done thus far in the rest of Asia.

•

ANALOGY

I saw a thousand men lay down
Their lives for one poor summit;
A nation arm for seven years
Against a child, and bomb it.
I've seen a man plough seven fields
For one poor loaf of millet;
And in his heart hold one short word
Against his love, to kill it.

RALPH GUSTAFSON

ARAB ALIGNMENTS *in the Near East*

BY EMANUEL NEUMANN

AS these lines are being written the Axis forces are 225 miles within the borders of Egypt. For the fourth time since the beginning of this war, the cities of this ancient country are in danger of destruction by nazi and fascist planes and Rommel's artillery. Yet the King and Parliament of Egypt have stubbornly refused to declare war even after their territory was repeatedly invaded, declining to go beyond the stage of "non-belligerency" despite the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of alliance.

The attitude of Egypt is not easily understood unless one fits it into the mosaic of the entire situation in the Near East. But that situation is little known outside of a few government offices. A shortage of vital accessories in the Libyan desert is instantly registered in Cairo and flashed to Washington; within a few hours the missing parts are on their way by plane from a factory in Michigan to the assembly plant in Egypt. But intellectually and politically the Near East has remained to us what Czechoslovakia was to Chamberlain in the halcyon days of Munich—a region remote and exotic "about which we know so little." The mischief wrought by the psychological "remoteness" of Czechoslovakia is too well known. It is no exaggeration to say that the "remoteness" of the Near East constitutes a greater danger not only in the immediate sense but in the long view—a danger which must be overcome if civilization is to escape future disasters comparable to those of the past.

At the outbreak of the present war the Near East was a political question mark, as the Ottoman Empire had been a quarter of a century earlier. At that time Turkey, an independent but rickety empire on its way to dissolution, broke from its moorings to take the fatal plunge on the side of Germany. In 1939, the Near East presented a radically different pattern: a group of countries ranging in status from complete independence to semi-independence and mandate, but all linked with the Western Democracies to whom most of them owed such degrees of freedom as they enjoyed. Three of the countries, Egypt, Turkey, and Iraq were—and still are—formally allied to Britain by treaty; while others, Palestine and Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon, as well as Arabia proper with its peripheral principalities (Yemen excepted) were within the British or French orbits.

Despite these political affiliations, the situation has been an unhappy one from the Allied point of view. With the single exception of Palestine—unique in more than one respect—the attitude of these countries and their populations toward the Democracies has ranged from tepid neutrality to open hostility. Not one of the three enumerated "allies" has joined in the struggle against the Axis. Turkey has clung to a precarious neutrality out of considerations of caution and expediency, but there are disquieting signs of its veering toward the Axis as a result of Von Papen's ceaseless intrigues and dynamic diplomacy, and—more important—of nazi victories in Russia and Africa. Iraq, did draw the sword not to fight the Axis, but to strike against her British ally at a particularly dangerous moment, and had to be subjugated by force of arms. Throughout the vast region, larger in extent than half the continent of Europe, there has been hardly a spot which the Democracies could regard as terra firma.

As for Egypt, the strong influence of Count Mazzolini and other Italians upon the Court has long been notorious. King Farouk in common with his entourage has been a convinced believer in the triumph of the Axis. In a private conversation with an American visitor, he commented sadly upon the impending doom of

POPULATION & ARMIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST
P. Population
N. No national army
1. " but some arabs in foreign Legion
2. " " regiment under Free French direction for home defe
3. " " 16.000. chiefly Jews serving in british forces in Egypt (Libya, Greece, Crete)
4. " " arab legion of 1500 under brit. direction for guarding Eastern Desert frontiers
TR. organized and armed tribes = men whose strength flexible
MOST FRIENDLY ATTITUDE
DOUBTFUL
LEAST FRIENDLY ATTITUDE
AFGHANISTAN
U.S.S.R.
Rostov
Istanbul
TURKEY
P.17000000
A est. 750
IRAN
P.15000000
A est. 250
IRAQ
P.3500000
A. 20-25
SYRIA
P.2700000
N.(1)
LEBANON
P.800000
N.(2)
P.1500000
N.(3)
PALESTINE
TRANSJ.
P.300000
N.(4)
EGYPT
P.16.000000
A. 35-40
Alexandria
Bahrein
QATAR
TRUCIAL OMAN
OMAN
ADEN
YEMEN
P. 3500000
TR.
SAUDI ARA
P. 3500000
TR.
ERITREA
SOMALILAND
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
UGANDA
CONGO
SUDAN
FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA
LIBYA
TUNISIA
ALGERIA
Southern Territories
FRENCH WEST AFRICA
SPAIN
FR. MOROCCO

British civilization as the result of total defeat. For a time the Italian legation in Cairo was the center of Axis intrigue and propaganda, as was the Japanese legation in Iran. It was a transmission belt for nazi influence, instructions, and subsidies to nazi agents and sympathizers in Arab lands. It was here that Rashid Ali came when he was planning his coup in Iraq. The traffic went on under the eyes of British representatives who failed to suppress it. The Egyptian Prime Minister, Ali Maher Pasha, was in active collusion with the enemy during his term of office. He was caught *in delictu,* having betrayed British military secrets to the Italian headquarters at Tobruk. Forced to resign, he was allowed to retire to his villa in the country. Aziz al Misri, the Chief of Staff, was tarred with the same brush and was seized as he boarded a plane for a rendezvous with the enemy. The Wafd, the only political party in Egypt with any claim to mass support, might have been led to take an active anti-Axis stand and vote for a declaration of war; but the policy of the British High Commissioner, Sir Miles Lampson, and his colleagues involved continued relations with the reactionary and anti-democratic elements. By the time the Wafd came into power it had been alienated and antagonized, though perhaps not hopelessly so.

Palestine presented a favorable opportunity to build up a strong position for the Allied cause, both morally and practically. Out of a population of a million and a half, over five hundred thousand are Jews, chiefly of European origin and wholeheartedly devoted to the democratic cause. The notorious Mufti, Haj Amin el Husseini, was in exile and the power of his terrorist followers had been broken. Active encouragement of the Jews and of Arab moderates and a clean break with the Mufti's followers might have produced a genuine coalition of all pro-democratic and anti-fascist elements of the population. But the hope of winning over, or at least placating, hostile elements hampered constructive efforts for strengthening the Allied position and largely accounts for the failure to establish a Jewish fighting force of at least two or three divisions. At the same time, close friends, relatives, and supporters of the Mufti who had been arrested in Iran following their complicity in the Iraq uprising, were released and permitted to return to Palestine—among them such well-known figures as Musa el-Alami, Jamal el-Husseini, Amin Tamini, and others. As a net result of this policy, that arch conspirator, now an honorary member of the nazi party, still has his network of agents and associates—a dangerous Fifth Column—who eagerly await his messages from abroad and secretly hope and work for "the day" when they may join hands openly with the Axis Powers and be reunited with their own fuehrer-in-exile. Nevertheless, by virtue of its large Jewish element, Palestine stands out as the only country in the Near East which has contributed thousands of volunteers to the British forces and which is likely to give a good account of itself in the event of invasion, provided the loyal elements are promptly and adequately armed.

The liberation of Syria from Vichy control last year proved a more difficult and costly business than had been anticipated because of the attitude of the native population. Contrary to expectations, the Arabs of inner Syria were disappointingly lukewarm to British advances. Moreover, when the collapse of France deprived them suddenly of their traditional protector, the Christians of the Lebanon, in continuous dread of Moslem domination ever since the massacres of the 1860's, began to veer toward an Italian orientation. Having observed the drift of British policy in the Levant, they shunned a British connection, apprehensive of being let down as the Jews had been in Palestine and the Christian Assyrians in Iraq. It was only the emergence of the Free French as a political factor and De Gaulle's emphatic assurances that he would preserve the autonomy of the Lebanon that carried them safely into the Allied camp.

The position in Iraq is somewhat better understood because it had flared into open rebellion. What is not so generally appreciated is the fact that basically nothing has changed in Iraq since its pacification. More particularly, the upper classes, who normally rule the roost, and especially the caste of military officers, are still shot through with pro-nazi ideas and sympathies. Even those who now head the "pro-British" government had welcomed the Mufti, paid him honor and given him every possible encouragement in his activities which contributed directly and substantially to Rashid Ali's rebellion. The assassination of Fakri Nashashibi in Baghdad after the pacification, was widely accepted as evidence of the long arm of the Mufti and the inability of the English to protect their friends. At the moment, the presence of British and Allied forces preserves the

peace and a semblance of loyalty; but the underlying situation presents a constant source of anxiety both to the Prime Minister Nuri Said, who has no popular following, and to the British authorities.

To the south lies the kingdom of the Hedjaz, otherwise known as Saudi Arabia. Its ruler, Ibn Saud, the only really great figure in the Arab world, has been wise and circumspect. Ringed as he is by British and Allied forces on land and sea, he has observed strict neutrality and acted with meticulous correctness, and recently is reported to have provided the British with bases for military operations. The same cannot be said, however, for the Imam Yechieh, the fanatical ruler of Yemen. He was definitely friendly to fascist Italy until the conquest of Abyssinia by the British induced him to withdraw into his shell and to behave with prudence.

II

A CANDID and realistic view of the situation indicates that these countries are permeated by a widespread sentiment which is anti-British, anti-French, and pro-nazi in character. Nor will it do to accept uncritically the usual explanation of such flagrantly pro-Axis tendencies as even a cautious officialdom cannot gloss over. Such explanations tend to stress the ubiquity and cunning of Axis agents and to put forward hostility to Zionism as the principal, if not the sole factor. But this interpretation naïvely fails to take account of more substantial reasons of far greater basic importance.

The first and most important of these factors is one rooted in the character of the Arab masses. Socially backward and illiterate, and living under primitive conditions in a feudal, authoritarian society, they have retained an inherited respect for force and an instinctive admiration for the violent, the aggressive, and the masterful. It is natural that Hitler should appeal to their imagination as a conquering hero of the kind they have idolized in their songs and legends. There is no democratic tradition or ideology among them sufficiently pronounced to counteract this powerful appeal. Not only are their imaginations and passions stirred by Hitler's victories, but they believe in his ultimate triumph. "Why do you continue to sell land to Jewish settlers?" an American visitor recently asked a group of Arabs in Palestine. "No matter," was the frank reply; "when Hitler comes, we will take back the land and keep the money, too."

Secondly, the British suffer in Arab eyes by comparison with the Nazis. British moderation has long been misinterpreted as a sign of weakness, and too often vacillation and infirmity of purpose have seemed to bear out that view. In recent years the policy of moderation coupled with irresolution has been supplemented and vitiated—by actual appeasement, by that strange but obdurate refusal to recognize the enemy as such, even after his hostility has become open, notorious, and avowed. A reluctance to encourage one's friends, coupled with persistent wooing of implacable foes has been a fatal aberration which has proved as costly to the democratic cause here as elsewhere.

Thirdly, the natural resentment of all foreign control expresses itself here chiefly against the British as the predominant foreign power in the Near East. Foreign direction, however benevolent and light-handed, still provokes resistance; and while the British (and French) are present in the flesh to serve as targets of nationalist agitation, the Germans are remote and generally unknown except in the persons of slick, resourceful, and glib-tongued agents. Nor is the possibility of an exchange of masters and the results of fascist rule clearly grasped by the Arab masses.

Whatever the causes, it is an undeniable fact which the Democracies must face, that the peoples of the Near East, with the exception of certain important groups, like the Christians of Lebanon and the Jews of Palestine, are not on our side. It is not a question simply or solely of potential military assistance; for apart from the Turks who are maintaining a large army and are unquestionably redoubtable fighters, there is little of real military strength to count on. Iraq has an army of some 20,000 to 25,000 men and Egypt one of about 40,000. But no one is under any illusion as to their military value or effectiveness in the field. Indeed the suppression of Rashid Ali's rebellion in Iraq by a few British batallions was a rather clear demonstration of the caliber of Iraqi forces. But over and above military considerations, there is the question of morale, which is of immense importance. The bald fact is that all the countries under consideration with an aggregate population of some 45,000,000 (if Turkey is included) have contributed not a single soldier to the forces of the United Nations, the one exception being Palestine, which has given some 16,000 volunteers, of whom more than three-fourths are Jews. For the sake of completeness

it may be added that the Lebanese have been recently enlisting in special units under the guidance of the Free French, for the defense of the Lebanon, though not for service abroad.

The picture thus painted is not generally presented to the public in any degree of detail. The loyalty of the Arab world to the Democracies in general and to Britain in particular is still part of official fiction; but the real situation has gradually come to be understood in democratic circles, more particularly in England, where there is keen disappointment that so much investment in Arab good will has produced no dividend but Dead Sea fruit. But we on the democratic side of the barricade must ever be on guard against political over-simplification. The Arabs may deserve their present unpopularity in our eyes. We may justly condemn their Quislings and applaud, under the circumstances, the display of force and the rigorous suppression of disloyalty. But when all is said and done we must ask ourselves, as the builders of a democratic world, "Where do we go from here?" We must also ask ourselves whether the attitude we have described, however justified, does not bear the seeds of future perils, crises, and conflicts.

The beginning of wisdom is to realize and bear firmly in mind, despite all trials and provocations, that the Arabs constitute not merely a nuisance, but a people. To put it more accurately, they are peoples with traditions, problems, and needs of their own, and with rights and interests which must somehow be reconciled and harmonized with those of the non-Arab peoples in the Near East and of civilization as a whole. The second step to take, intellectually speaking, is to recognize that the relationship of the Occident to the backward peoples of the Near East has proved unsatisfactory and that the policy expressing and implementing that relationship, namely, benevolent imperialism, has been tested in this war, and found wanting.

III

THE neo-imperialism of the Western Democracies, particularly the benevolent imperialism of Great Britain, represented an effort to effect a transition from the naked imperialism of the past, based upon coercion, to a higher relationship, based on mutual co-operation. Like all transitional devices, it was a compromise; and like all compromises, it has its defects and inherent contradictions. Even benevolent imperialism is still bound up with a system of double exploitation, external and internal. The former consists in arrangements designed to ensure to the controlling power substantial advantages such as access to raw materials, markets, strategic positions, bases, waterways, and the like. But in recent years such control by the foreign power has tended to become increasingly unobtrusive and "invisible," depending less upon the direct applicaton of force and more upon indirect control through the medium of native princes or ruling classes allied with the foreign power.

This technique involves a secondary, internal exploitation, quite as objectionable as the first —the exploitation of the native masses by their own upper classes, by a hereditary aristocracy intrenched in power, wealth, and position. Such groups are, for the most part, politically and socially reactionary. They take little interest in the well-being and advancement of their own masses but tend to oppose strenuously the introduction of genuine rather than fictitious democracy and to resist measures for the social and economic progress of the common people. In the Near East the British have attempted to win the confidence and collaboration of these Arab chiefs and aristocrats, as well as nationalist leaders. In pursuit of this objective they have tolerated anti-democratic elements in the leadership to the point of compromising the interests of the masses and jeopardizing the very existence of non-Arab groups. A perfect example is seen in the situation at Iraq which was conquered by the British at a heavy sacrifice of blood and treasure and with no Arab assistance.

When one considers the generous treatment accorded to the Iraqis, the tremendous political gains they acquired with little sacrifice, the almost complete satisfaction of their "national aspirations," the great economic benefits whic have accrued to them, the valuable training in self-government received under British guidance, and, not least, the guarantee of security against external aggression provided by the Anglo-Iraq alliance—when one considers all these enormous advantages, the present strength of anti-British sentiment and pro-nazi sympathy in that country appears startling and well-nigh incomprehensible. It would seem to mark the utter failure of Anglo-Arab co-operation as a substitute for sheer colonialism.

There are several explanations for this phenomenon. The most important is to be found in the nature and structure of the Arab "na-

tionalist" movement. Unlike modern movements of liberation in other parts of the world, including China and India, Arab nationalism has not yet matured into a people's ideal with broad social and economic goals. It is unrelated to any labor movement and lacks roots in democratic philosophy and liberal conceptions of social emancipation. One looks in vain for a document embodying a great constructive program such as Sun Yat-sen's testament to his people. Arab nationalism has produced no "mass education" movement such as China has known. Nor has it produced a spiritual leader like Gandhi, with his affinity for the poor and disinherited, or a great revolutionary figure like Nehru, as deeply devoted to social and economic freedom as to the cause of political emancipation.

The Arab movement expresses essentially the ambitions of very limited groups drawn from the upper classes, comprising feudal landlords, aristocratic families, and scions of these families in the liberal professions—all avid for power and belonging to the exploiting group that is indifferent to the best interests of the poor and downtrodden masses of their own race. Such conditions—a patriarchal society, backward masses, and a shallow, intolerant nationalism—provide an almost ideal breeding-ground for quasi-fascist tendencies. The external stimulus furnished by nazi agents and Hitler's glittering victories have converted these tendencies into a pro-Axis orientation.

Thus the special virulence of the opposition to Jewish resettlement in Palestine is due in a large measure to an instinctive and bitter hostility to the new patterns of cultural, social, and economic life introduced by the progressive pioneers, who represent a challenge and menace to the old feudal order. The leading group in the Jewish community is the highly organized Labor party and the predominant trend is toward a co-operative economy and a social-democratic society. Reactionary leaders among the Arabs fear the spread of the social-democratic contagion and the stirring of the Arab masses no less, and probably more, than they resent foreign domination. Left to themselves, they would be content with two freedoms: first, freedom from foreign control and, secondly, freedom to dominate and exploit their masses. The second is at least as important to them as the first. That is why the Mufti, archtype of Arab fascism, is now commuting between Rome and Berlin. He has found his spiritual habitat.

IV

THE failure of what was conceived as a pro-Arab and pro-Moslem policy in the Near East has caused not only disillusionment but also considerable heart-searching and self-criticism in British circles, particularly among forward looking politicians and intellectuals. But little has thus far been produced toward a solution of the problem. The only significant idea, that of Arab federation, was advanced about a year ago. The prospect of such federation of several Arab states was held out by Anthony Eden in rather vague and cautious terms and the possibility of making an actual start was subsequently canvassed by Sir Oliver Lyttleton in a series of exploratory conversations, but the idea failed to make tangible progress because of innumerable obstacles which were encountered.

The artificial creation of an Arab federation from without would mark no genuine or radical departure but would amount, in fact, to a further step in the evolution of the existing policy within a new administrative framework. It might produce among the Arabs a temporary illusion of greater power and invoke a momentary feeling of exultation to be followed inevitably by a sense of frustration, for it would have changed nothing basically. A political super-structure will have been erected which cannot prove stronger or more stable than the foundations on which it would rest. These foundations are the cultural, social, and economic conditions which constitute everywhere the basic realities, the decisive and limiting factors of natonal life. What is required is not a more smoothly working instrument of power politics, but a new policy, revolutionary in conception, which will grapple with root problems and be designed to change for the better the lives of millions of submerged human beings rather than to resolve political rivalries and conflicting ambitions of dynastic or power groups.

The key to a democratic solution must rather be sought in the utterances of forward-looking thinkers and statesmen, such as the recent addresses of Henry Wallace and Sumner Welles. They reflect the evolution of a new philosophy, new conceptions of international policy, implicit in the Four Freedoms and epitomized by such phrases as "a people's revolution," "the century of the common man," "a people's peace," and the momentous declaration that "the age of imperialism is dead." If we ap-

proach the problems of the Near East in the light of these ideals, we may work our way toward a post-war program more just and promising than anything yet attempted by the Western Powers. It would be based upon a few basic principles:

1. The whole imperialist position must be abandoned as untenable both in theory and practice.
2. In order that the Near East may not fall prey to aggressors, its internal strength must be rapidly built up through international assistance and it must be protected by international forces.
3. The contribution of the West to the regeneration of the Near East should be made not merely along political lines but above all and primarily in the form of economic, cultural, and intellectural assistance.
4. The philosophy and practice of exploitation, whether internal or external, must be replaced by a policy of development and an economy of conservation in the interest of the common people.

In order that such a program shall be wholly free of the taint of imperialism its execution should be entrusted not to a single power, however democratic and benevolent, but to an international commission. A further safeguard would be provided through the participation in this commission of small but highly developed and progressive nations like Norway and Switzerland with no colonial empires of their own. Moreover, to avoid the reproach of racial imperialism or of Euro-American domination, it is desirable that democratic Asiatic powers like China or a free India should likewise share in the responsibility. The establishment of such a commission as the channel and vehicle of international assistance does not imply the suppression of existing autonomous states in the Near East, but rather recognition of the fact that some of them are too weak for the present, to stand alone and unaided.

The International Commission for the Near East, in which it is essential that America be represented along with the British Commonwealth and a revived France, should endeavor to work out in the course of time, the bases for eventual regional organization. But that will take years, perhaps a generation or more. The principal task of democratic statesmanship represented by the Commission will be not merely the delimitation of frontiers, the settling of dynastic questions, or the adjustment of political disputes, but essentially more basic, more formidable, and more promising in the long run. It is the task of evoking the creative impulses of the masses, of raising their cultural and economic levels, of emancipating them from the tyranny of ignorance, want, disease, and an oppressive feudal order which is a dangerous anarchronism in the modern world. Where necessary, entrenched reactionary elements should be outflanked by establishing direct relations of confidence and co-operation with the common people.

There are immense potentialities to be realized. The Near East presents an extraordinary opportunity and challenge to the constructive genius of democratic civilization. The Arabs themselves are endowed with native gifts of imagination and quick intelligence though they are seriously deficient in organizing ability. In the post-war years considerable progress was made under European leadership, but there are still huge areas of uncultivated land to be reclaimed and made fertile; there are arid wastes to be irrigated; there are untapped natural resources to be developed; there are nomadic tribes, a constant menace to the peaceful cultivator, who may be settled and made part of a more stable society; there are diseases sapping the vitality of the people which can and must be eradicated; there are native industries to be encouraged and developed. Above all there is youth to be trained in the arts and crafts and to be taught the meaning of social and political democracy in a language they will understand.

That such things can be accomplished in this neglected domain has already been demonstrated to a degree in Lebanon and Palestine under the influence of European civilization. The latter country, in particular, offers impressive models of achievements in reclamation and development, in forestation of denuded hills, in scientific agriculture to increase the fertility of the soil, in producers' and consumers' co-operatives, in a highly organized labor movement, modern industries, popular housing schemes, and co-operative health services. There is, in short, the rich experience of sixty years of democratic progress and development in Jewish Palestine which can be applied with advantage throughout the Near East once the attention, talents, and energies of the common people are aroused and redirected from tribal and sectarian conflicts and political rivalries to the vast and stirring adventure of rebuilding what was once the cradle of civilization.

"IT'S SAFER IN

by Stanley Postek, as narrated to

WHEN this is in print, I'll be just leaving Reykjavik in Iceland on the final lap of my second journey to the Russian Arctic port of Murmansk. Once there, I'll live through three or four air-raids per day, as I did last spring. I'll be in constant physical danger there on the northern pivot of the vast Russo-German battleline. And yet I'll be glad to be back.

You see, I'll feel safer.

Let me explain myself. I was born in Boston a little before World War I, and I've been a deepwater sailor for the past ten years. Most of that time I spent working on boats which carried cargoes up and down our East Coast. There were a few trips to South America and Europe, but the coastal trade was my dish. At least it was, until December 7, 1941. That was when I got dissatisfied with my work despite its importance. I wanted to get a little closer to the shooting, to do something a bit more vital in the war effort. That was why one day last February I stepped aboard the S.S. "Mormacmar" of the Moore-McCormack Line, bound with a cargo of high-test gasoline, munitions, and chemicals out of Boston for Murmansk. Our cargo was a direct boost for the Red Army, and this gave me the feeling that what I was doing was of immediate importance.

We joined our convoy in Halifax late last February, and after a long and weary passage punctuated by brushes with U-boats, I got my first glimpse of Russia one foggy morning—a monstrous snow-cloaked mountain rising out of the gray Arctic Ocean. It was big as Russia is big. It would take more than a few raids of the *Luftwaffe* to shake it up. When I landed in Murmansk, I found that the mountain and the Russian people are pretty much alike.

And now I'll tell you why I say that I felt safer in Murmansk late last spring than I do in Manhattan tonight. And by the way, I mean that "tonight." I don't mean Manhattan if England falls or Manhattan if Hitler grabs South America. As Maurice Chevalier—and what a nazi skunk he has turned out to be—

MURMANSK"

Able-bodied Seaman Denis Plimmer

used to say, I mean *right now!* First, the *Luftwaffe* were sending some of their best planes daily and nightly against the Russian port. Few of the ships ever got through the outer-ring defenses. Those that did ran into withering anti-aircraft fire from spots throughout town. They dropped their eggs and flew to adjacent Finland for cover. I saw those eggs drop. They dropped all around me along the Murmansk waterfront. I watched the faces of Red Army men, of girls doing men's work on the docks, of tireless stevedores, of sailors, of children. None of those faces showed fear. None of those faces told me through its expression that the war was a bother, an annoyance, something they'd like to let George do if they could. All of those faces were exalted, unafraid, and—hold your seats, folks! —happy!

Yes, in this war which is striking Russia twenty-four hours of every day the people of the Soviet are happy because they're working hard to win and because they know they will win. Sure they're in danger, but they're too busy to worry about that. War to them is an urgent business which must be dispatched before all else. When your appendix bursts, you don't take time out on the way to the hospital to see a movie. You keep moving. And that's what the Russians were doing when I last saw them. Their consciences were clear. They were doing every last thing they could to lick the Axis.

But when your conscience isn't so clear—when the bombs are falling and you begin to wonder if maybe you couldn't have built that shelter a little more solidly, bought an extra war-bond or two—then you're scared. In America our armed forces are busy and on the alert. But our civilians are not. Our civilians are still trying to protect their good time. That's what will make them afraid.

It is not so in Murmansk.

There on the Arctic Circle every Russian who can lift a finger is lifting that finger for victory and not for self. When gas was rationed in the United States, I ran into dozens

of adults who were scheming with all their might to get a little more fuel than they actually need for daily living. I wish they'd put their effort into winning the war. In Russia the gas is saved for the boys who run the tanks—not for that little week-end in the Soviet equivalent of Atlantic City.

When I returned to New York after sighting at least three nazi subs only a few miles off Cape Cod, I found New Yorkers objecting to the dim-out. I stood with a Manhattan air raid warden during a practice blackout, and how many people do you think he had to bedevil in one apartment house before they'd douse their lights? Seven! In Russia you don't have to be cajoled or convinced. You're glad to do yourself a favor—to win the war. And the Russians have been taught that you can't get something for nothing—particularly from A. Hitler.

Only a few days back I was talking to a friend about sugar-rationing. He winked slyly.

There is a heart-warming by-product of the all out spirit in Russia, and that is the comradeship which exists today between human beings over there. There seemed to me to be absolutely no selfishness. One young fellow I met on the docks was wearing a striped sailor's blouse. I admired it briefly, and the day I was sailing he ran up to me, stripping the blouse off. "I want you to take it," he said. "You liked it, and maybe you'll be cold on the way back." In Russia these days, there's no clothing to spare, believe me. Cloth is strictly rationed. He wouldn't get another blouse soon. But I was an ally, a friend, a guy in the same boat as himself. And in Russia you think in terms of the general good—not in terms of individual comfort and satisfaction. Incidentally, that's the only time I ever met anyone who actually gave me the shirt off his back! "If you need a little extra," he said, "come to me. I've got two hundred pounds of the stuff stowed away in my attic!" I didn't report him, although I wanted to. Over here, apparently, it isn't sporting to turn in a guy like that. God knows why! In Murmansk they don't feel like that.

One thing more. In all the time I spent in the U.S.S.R., I never heard a man say, "Whee, my wife's pregnant! No army for yours truly!" As a matter of fact, I saw few males who weren't in Red Army regalia. And in that connection you might be interested to hear about a girl I met. She was a pretty thing, very trim and graceful in her uniform. When I was introduced to her, she'd just landed her plane—yes, *plane*—after downing a Messerschmidt over Murmansk Harbor at 300 m.p.h. She was a nice girl, too, and a whiz on the balalaika.

Yes, it's a good safe feeling to stand shoulder to shoulder with people like that, and it's comfortable to be in their city. They're in the thick of the scrap but they've got the situation in hand very nicely. If I had less conscience, I'd jump ship next time I hit the place.

You see, it's safer in Murmansk!

Planning of the Future—
A Weapon for the Present

By LOUIS DOLIVET

AMERICA is one of the main elements on which the immediate future of humanity depends. America has the greatest number of universities and schools, the greatest number of newspapers and radio stations, the greatest number of meetings and round table discussion groups, and yet it is one of the most difficult countries to know. Hitler has created a fairly perfect system of detecting and undermining public opinion in other countries, but he was mistaken in evaluating the degree of attachment to freedom which exists in America, an attachment greater than the attachment to peace. Germany was also mistaken in her judgment about the determination of America to destroy the Axis as a political system; she underestimated the strength of the Administration and she underestimated public opinion.

Friendly and pro-democratic observers have also made many mistakes in judging America. Quickly they went from one extreme to the other. They had overconfidence in America's capacity to wage, in a few weeks, a glorious and victorious war. They overestimated her immediate military, technical, economic, and political power, and when the day-by-day hardships and difficulties appeared after Pearl Harbor, they began to lack confidence in her ability to mobilize fully and effectively her forces. The truth is between these two extremes. It is a country of immense potentialities, but it has to be organized systematically, just as every other country in the world. War is, and has been, a surprise to the Democracies because essentially they were prepared for peace. The whole structure of the country must be adapted to the necessities of war. This adaptation takes time.

In this article we shall examine only those things which have a direct relation to international affairs and which might serve as a basis for an answer to the question: Is America thinking about the future and what kind of world order will American public opinion support? The three main characteristics that distinguish America from most other countries are: (1) America is a young, self-confident, and highly emotional country. It could therefore turn from immense enthusiasm in favor of world organization to disillusionment and retirement. (2) Its people, while comprising important sections representing almost all nationalities and cultures of the world, is united in its love of Americanism and constitutes a nation *sui generis*. As a result, the American nation as a whole is interested in the fate of humanity, but different sections, because of their origins, are primarily interested in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece, etc. (3) America has only one great tradition, that of democracy, while most of the other countries have traditions of prejudice, dictatorship, tyranny, and monarchy. This third characteristic might have as a repercussion an underestimation of the anti-democratic dangers which existed even in such democratic countries as France, for example. In France, there was an active anti-democratic minority opposed to the republican form of government, and it was never disarmed so that it constituted an ever-present threat to French democracy.

III
POTENTIAL FORCES OF THE AMERICAS

The democratic American tradition does not

mean that the prejudices and social distinctions which exist in Europe do not exist in the United States. On the contrary, they exist and sometimes are even more dangerous, because they are backed by much more powerful groups than in Europe. Shortly before the United States went to war, one could very clearly find the American counterparts to Hitler, Mussolini, Petain, Laval, Quisling, etc. Some publications were perfect adaptations to the *Stürmer* or to *Gringoire*. Even the typical weaknesses of democratic attitudes toward those dangerous manifestations reminded one very much of Europe. But the important distinction is that those tendencies were never openly in power in the United States and that the supporters of fascist ideas had to render lip service to democracy. The danger therefore was even greater than in Europe because it was more veiled, but since the sole tradition was democratic, the resistance too was stronger.

Most of the people who came to America left their own countries because of persecution or economic misery. The natural resources of America, the two oceans which were considered as insurmountable military barriers, created a favorable climate for isolationism. But fascism and modern military art have completely changed the situation. For the first time in modern history, the majority of Americans is taking cognizance of the law of interdependence and are realizing that the United States of America is a part of the world. The same majority, or even a larger one, is aware of the danger of fascism and is ready to make whatever sacrifices are necessary in order to destroy it. Fewer people, but still a majority, realize the necessity of world order, but they have only vague ideas about how it could and should be brought about.

Paradoxical though it may seem, the greatest problem confronting America is the practical sense of the average American. If all the other countries had a plan of their own providing perfect solutions in every case and outlining a smooth running international machinery, something like an American factory, then everything would be simpler. People, of course, are not machines. They are subject to an infinite number of opinions and feelings and, therefore, purely technical solutions cannot be applied with success. America has to overcome not only isolationism but also to understand, without being discouraged, the historic realities of a humanity divided by wars, nationalism, economic interests, cultural diversities, etc. The gravest mistake that America could make would be to see only the more apparent difficulties without discovering the immense desire for unity, freedom, economic welfare, and collective peace of the rest of humanity. In seeking out these uniting and progressive factors, particularly of Europe, America should take as a point of departure the enthusiasm with which all the peoples of Europe greeted Wilson's arrival to the peace conference and their readiness to accept his conception as a basis for world order. They should take into account that since that period, nationalism and chauvinism have produced deep disillusionment as well as endless suffering and misery. There is a new humanity in the making which suffers everywhere but understands today even more than yesterday the necessities of a united and free world. The people are ready to go further than they were twenty-five years ago in the interests of world organization. Fortunately for America, and this is an essential characteristic of the situation, it has a Government composed of some of the best brains in the world, and the present President is even more a world figure than was Wilson. This Government has in its staff and in its ideas all the potentialities for a great American contribution toward world organization.

II

TWO different schools of thought appear immediately when one looks into American forces discussing international problems. The first comprises the different variations of isolation. They range from the pro-fascist, anti-British, anti-European, anti-Russian, anti-Japanese, and even anti-Chinese to groups who are in favor of an Allied victory only because of Pearl Harbor but who wish, after the war, a strongly fortified and defensive militaristic America staying out of international entanglements. Their solution for post-war peace is the complete defeat and destruction of the military forces of Japan; defeat, but not destruction, of the political and economic structure of Germany which was responsible for fascism; and absolute security for the United States and a balance of power adjusted to avoid strengthening Great Britain or Soviet Russia. In one word, to them this war is similar to previous wars; America is fighting because she was attacked, and after victory, she will continue in

her old policies. This conception will sooner or later result in isolationism.

The refusal to undertake planning for the future is as short-sighted and dangerous as was the policy of appeasement which was responsible for this war. The common argument in favor of appeasement was: Our first job is to preserve peace. The common argument against planning for the future is: Our first job is to win the war. Both arguments are justified as aims, but in fact, they serve the contrary purpose. Appeasement brought war and to many countries, temporary slavery. Anti-planning might endanger the victory and will certainly endanger the future of democracy and peace.

Why? Because democratic planning for the future is political war in the best sense of the word. It is the greatest moral factor at the disposal of the United Nations. It means better production, better fighting, and a greater revolt against the Axis all over the world. If we fail to give humanity the vision of a just world, a vision which is after all still the most powerful motive of the human soul, we endanger victory. We risk having less support for an eventual invading army in Europe and we risk the most successful Axis propaganda all over the world. Therefore, anti-planning is a direct threat to the war effort of the Democracies.

Moreover, post-victory planning means that the United Nations will be able to undertake immediately the task of reconstruction; that is to say, no time will be lost in salvaging what will have remained after this terrible war. The common welfare of humanity, economic cooperation, the progress of science, peaceful resettlement of humanity—everything will depend on how the United Nations will have considered in advance the organization of the world and on how rapidly they will co-ordinate these plans with the aspirations of the subjugated countries. A prolonged period of groping in a starving world might be fatal and peace might fade more quickly than it was achieved.

The second school includes an even greater variety of opinions, all of which admit the vital necessity of America's participation in international affairs. One conception which is the natural consequence of the breakdown of most of the European Democracies and of the fact that the United States is a decisive factor in this war, is the idea of American leadership. The American Century idea is a prototype of this school of thought. Not only Americans, but many prominent Europeans, discouraged by the failure of their own Democracies, think it would be the solution to all the difficulties. The promoters of this conception foresee a sort of master solution, worked out by the United States, which will have to be accepted by all other countries. Some people think that this conception constitutes the beginning of American neo-imperialism. This designation is not quite correct, for none of the old characteristics of imperialism are contained in this conception. These people do not want an imperial American government, and they do not advocate seeking or extending control over other nations. But there are some other characteristics which constitute neo-imperialist tendencies: for example, world control or world domination through financial and economic means. There is no doubt that this leadership idea could degenerate later to some imperialistic tendencies, or could be considered as such by other nations.

Another conception could be qualified as the legalistic conception. It is based essentially on the respect of international law and on some revised principles of the old Covenant of the League of Nations. It is interesting to note that even the most formulistic supporters of international law understand the necessity of taking into account social and economic problems. Based on conceptions of the Atlantic Charter, they are trying to create the legal background and basis for economic and social arrangements. This, a result of the Rooseveltian conception, goes much further into social and economic aspects of freedom than the Wilsonian conception, limited to policy and international law. Nevertheless, this conception does limit itself to classical notions of international relations and does not envision universal economic planning. For example, according to this plan, the United Nations, particularly the United States, ought to concern themselves after the war with policing and feeding the world and slowly, after consideration of the various problems, to prepare a general peace treaty as just as possible and based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter. The world resulting from this conception would not necessarily be a democratic world, but there would be respect of international law.

Then there is the labor movement, which in general is for a democratic world order but without very definite and precise ideas. The particular structure of the American labor movement, limiting its activities in the past to trade union questions, has always been consid-

ered a great weakness for the whole international labor movement. It was frequently used to discourage attempts for a stronger and more democratic international organization. Even today, the conservative and nationalist elements inside the United Nations are constantly advancing the lack of interest of the American labor movement as an argument against a world democratic order. But lately there have been interesting tendencies inside the labor movement toward an increased interest in international affairs. The labor movement's participation in favor of active help to Great Britain was remarkably important and in the past year, this activity covers help to Russia and China. Mr. Wallace's speech at a dinner of FREE WORLD was received enthusiastically by the labor movement, and many leaders endorsed the views expressed by the Vice-President. Mr. Welles' Memorial Day address was received with equal interest. This is an interesting evolution, but it is only the beginning. Much will depend on the attitude of the American labor movement, not only because of its influence in the United States, but also because of its influence in the entire world labor movement. The voice of American labor representatives in the International Federation of Trade Unions, or in any other international labor council, will be as decisive as the American Government's voice in an international governmental conference.

Different industrial and commercial concerns have also established research institutions whose primary concern is to rationalize the existing economic and commercial methods. Those conceptions neglect completely the economic and social crises of Europe which have been instrumental in the rise of fascism. Refusing to consider the deep social changes to come if democracy is to survive, they are not answering many of the most urgent questions about social security.

III

THE federalist tendencies are well known. They conceive world government as the solution to the problem of how to secure peace, freedom, and democracy to humanity. The federal system is considered by their promoters as the solution. Their constitutional ideas are strongly influenced by the American constitution. Undoubtedly the federal movement in the United States represents great progress in thinking about world organization. It is an immense step away from the old nationalist conception and one toward constructive internationalism. But the idea as presented neglects important social, economic, and political problems. Many of the Democracies which were suggested in the beginning as the eventual founders of the new federation have only achieved a superficial and formulistic degree of democracy. They have no economic democracy at all and in fact the life of the respective nations is controlled by vested interests. Furthermore, many of those Democracies have refused to collaborate in any collective action against aggression, and some of them are even today neutral while a life and death struggle is going on between freedom and slavery. The federalist ideas, as expressed, have reduced the crisis of our present world to the lack of world government and have neglected completely many of the other essential causes of the weakening of democracy throughout the world.. Without first eliminating the essential elements of crisis, the federal idea risks remaining a utopian hope. It is only through transformation and adaptation of our whole structure that the federal idea can become, not only a historic necessity, but a historic possibility.

The most interesting ideas are represented by American liberals. Nobody, not even themselves, could give a precise definition of what they are or what their program is, but they are a great and hopeful force of the future. Without party prejudice, they apply liberal and progressive solutions to every issue as it presents itself. Here lies their limitation. Instead of constructing a great doctrine, they are working on day-to-day policies. Whenever one injustice is committed, the American liberals stand up as one man in the defense of the victim. They have, by doing so, written glorious pages in the history of freedom. But once this particular fight is over, they disappear—nobody knows where. The man in the street who was moved and convinced by their arguments writes letter after letter. He offers to join, but nobody is there to reply. They are organizing committees for the best causes in the world, but the committees disappear as quickly as they come.

The labor movement requires a great deal of attention. It requires endless meetings, much smaller but much more important than the meetings à la mode, organized by commercial agencies for reporters home from abroad. Sooner or later American liberals will have to

take this modest road which is the only one leading to the hearts and brains of the working man. American liberals will have to work out a complete constructive conception on international policy. Now, in reading their opinions, one goes sometimes from the greatest enthusiasm to complete despair. Recently one of them wrote about signing the peace. The governments of Finland, Rumania, and Hungary offered no difficulties to the writer. Even in Italy, he wrote, after the departure of Mussolini, the elements of a legal government will be found in the army and elsewhere. He would have been right one hundred years ago, but he is wrong today. The above-mentioned governments are fascist or pseudo-fascist. They represent the fascist principles adapted to their countries. If democracy and peace are to survive, the peace treaty will not be signed with any of those governments, but with the peoples, after having guaranteed the existence and the continuation of a real democracy in those countries.

But this does not represent the general orientation of American liberals. Most of them are much more aware of the nature of fascism and their judgment is very sound. American liberals have conceived and worked out some new and creative methods of international democratic policy; for example, the Lend-Lease Act. But the lack of organizational continuity of the American liberals, the lack of capacity to create great popular organizations, and sometimes a sort of blasé attitude toward movements and organizations, is a serious weakness. And yet, there is nothing more beautiful than the sincerity and the courage of the American liberals. Their names are known and their ideas loved, not only in America, but everywhere where human beings fight for freedom and for justice.

Another remarkable factor is the many women's organizations which are becoming more interested every day in the establishment of a just world order. Free of all imperialistic and egoistic conceptions, they think of the future in terms of the common good for all peoples. The American woman in particular has stepped beyond all the other women in the world. In more and more fields of the life of the nation, the American woman is playing an important role. The women's organizations are among the best organized in the country. The discussions about future world organization held in different women's groups are showing a high degree of enlightenment and political maturity.

Altogether, the labor movement, the intellectuals, the student organizations, the different liberal groups, the women's organizations, and pro-league and pro-world-order organizations are an immense potential asset for America's participation in the building of a democratic world. They have more chance of successful action than ever before, and they are constantly encouraged by the growing interest of the general public. But they are not united and there is even no co-ordination between them. They are often confused by the differences among Europeans and by the complexity of the problems of Asia and Africa. The fight in the United States between the interventionists and the isolationists will be very bitter and hard. On its outcome depends, to a great extent, the immediate future of humanity.

The progressive movements in other countries have a great task to fulfill in this order of ideas. They must work hard and establish quickly a common program of action. The faster they work, the better the relations between the occupied countries and the democratic representatives outside will be and the greater are the chances of full American participation in world organization. It is an urgent, mutual task because America's potential forces are the strongest, because her influence will be decisive, and because her responsibility is also the heaviest. Americans must realize that behind this war there is more than violation of international law, more than weakness in the Covenant of the League, more than personal failures and weaknesses of European prime ministers. It is an international civil war against every form of oppression and injustice, and a whole economic system is in the process of disappearing. Conditions of life in the United States of America are different. Changes will appear sooner in the rest of the world than here. The important thing is not to hinder them in the rest of the world, not to delay the course of history, but to understand the nature of this war. Conservative and classic solutions, whatever military guarantees might be taken, will be insufficient if the fundamental order is not changed, if chauvinism is not replaced by international democracy.

The American people have their hands on the wheel of destiny. If they turn it toward real progress, progress will come, and the second half of the twentieth century will inaugurate a new era in the history of humanity.

Situation in Latin America

IT is very hard to speak of Latin America as a whole despite the many similarities of language and of tradition. Every Latin American country has its own distinct problems and its own aspirations. There is, of course, a great sentiment of continental solidarity but for the moment this has not penetrated very deeply into popular psychology. The study of the economic and social problems of Latin America is a great temptation, but the limitations of space force us to sum up only those essential tendencies which are common to all the Latin American countries and which pertain to international affairs. This task is somewhat easier owing to the fact that there are more common elements in the international than in the national policies of Latin America.

First then, Latin America is the least involved continent in this war. Even the countries which have declared war against the Axis are not, for the time being, preparing expeditionary forces and are not fighting actively in the war. This situation can be partially attributed to problems of equipment and transportation but there are more important causes. If the desire for active participation had been expressed, means would have been found to overcome those difficulties as they were overcome by the Poles, Czechs, Free French, and others who had no arms and no equipment. The fact is that, despite the mortal danger which hangs over Latin America exactly as over the other countries, the Latin American peoples are not fully committed to participation in the war.

Four main characteristic attitudes can be found in Latin America toward the war and world organization: The first is based on the belief that the war concerns mainly the principal belligerents on both sides and that Latin America has no other interest than to stay out as long as possible. This attitude of course does not exclude economic co-operation with the Democracies because they are the only ones with whom trade is still possible. The second and much more positive attitude reflects real consciousness of danger from the Axis and recognizes that some military facilities should be granted to the United States in order to secure common protection against the enemy. This military collaboration however is limited to problems of common defense without any plan of offensive action. The third attitude, openly in favor of a democratic victory, shows a real understanding of the causes of this war between freedom and fascism. The fourth, on the other hand, is in favor of an Axis victory with the hope that regimes similar to those of the fascist countries will be established.

This situation greatly facilitates open and secret Axis propaganda. In the midst of confusion a ceaseless political war, which becomes more important every day, is being waged between the pro-democratic and anti-democratic elements. The totalitarian propaganda has added to its usual arguments two new ones, particularly adapted to Latin America. The first consists of an infinite variety of charges against so-called Yankee imperialism. The second promises, in case of an Axis victory, a golden age of trade relations between Latin America and a Hitler-dominated Europe. In its usual strategy of making use of the existing economic and political difficulties in order to create trouble, the totalitarian propaganda attempts particularly to persuade the large German, Italian, and Japanese populations there to act as Fifth Columnists. The Axis Powers have not limited their activities to propaganda, but they have organized, or attempted to organize, sabotage terrorist and military organizations. Recent measures adopted by different governments, the splendid work done by many parliamentary investigation committees, and the beginning of co-ordination of police measures with the United States as a result of the Rio de Janeiro Conference have led to the destruction of some dangerous pro-Axis organizations, but they have not eliminated the danger itself.

The democratic forces have been handicapped by many difficulties from the beginning. First of all, their financial resources, coming mostly from the contributions of the poorer sections of the populations, were negligible in comparison with those of the pro-Axis organizations. Axis diplomatic funds, Axis-controlled banks, money extorted from Axis subjects in Latin America or robbed from the occupied countries in Europe, and even forged American dollars, were used to supply and help the anti-democratic forces. At the same time, the United Nations, and particularly the United States used the utmost tact in pressing their viewpoint and refused to resort to such open interference as the Axis diplomacy.

But despite these difficulties, the Democracies had and have a powerful potential ally in

the peoples of Latin America. The whole evolution in Latin America, since the beginning of this century, and particularly since the last war, has created a great potential receptivity for democratic ideas. Despite their slight participation in the last war, the Latin American countries have undergone great changes as a consequence of it. The most important change was the economic transformation and a considerable industrialization of Latin America. Likewise, the political and social structure of Latin America was entirely transformed, thanks to the rise of the middle and the working classes.

In Chile, for example, after the last war, the political bloc constituted by the labor movement and the middle class brought to power Arturo Alessandri, who inaugurated an entirely new policy based on liberal tendencies. Progressive ideas influenced labor and social legislation as well as the whole constitutional organization of the country. But dictatorial aspirations were not dead, and only five years later General Carlos Ibanez established a dictatorship. His government was short-lived, however; the Left groups returned to power with a People's Front Government. In the recent election Generel Ibanez was defeated by Dr. Juan Antonio Rios, who had the support of all the Left groups. Very recently a National Democratic Front was formed linking the Radical, Socialist, and Communist parties and the Labor Confederation into one great movement aiming to consolidate democracy, to destroy nazi and fascist activities, and to work collectively for a severence of relations with the Axis Powers.

In Uruguay, too, great progress has been made since 1919 toward constitutional democracy. The powers of Parliament were extended, the powers of the chief executive limited, titles of nobility were abolished, and equality before the law, freedom of religion, and the right of trial by jury were established. Through the work of the National Labor Office, the conditions of the working man became much better, culminating in an eight-hour day as well as pensions and insurance for the workers. There too, however, Gabriel Terra established a dictatorship in 1933; but popular resistance ended it in 1938 and re-established democracy. In Argentina, electoral reforms were effected in 1912, and the coalition of the middle class and the workers has made constant progress until the sickness of the late President Ortiz obliged him to resign in favor of Vice-President Castijo, whose pro-Axis leanings have made their impress on the political development and orientation of that country.

In Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, and many other Latin American countries, similar transformations of great historical importance took place. One of the most interesting of these occurred in Mexico, where not only the whole political structure of the country was modified, but important measures of a new social economy were adopted. The revolutionary movement has not succeeded in all the Latin-American countries, but popular tendencies in favor of more democracy and more freedom cannot be denied anywhere. French, Italian, and Spanish democratic or socialist doctrines have had immense influence. The literature and intellectual outlook of these Mediterranean countries have influenced the whole present adult generation far more than Anglo-Saxon culture. The persecutions of fascism in Europe have created a great sympathy for its victims. This was indicated most strongly during the Spanish Civil War, when the Loyalists had the most enthusiastic popular support for their cause from Latin America.

In this fight which is going on all over Latin America, planning for the future can be an immense weapon on the side of the Democracies. All the popular and intellectual aspirations point toward a democratic world order in which the Latin American countries will share fully. To found the planning program of the United Nations upon the idea of equality is the soundest means of quieting the fears of Yankee domination. The potential forces for a full cooperation with the Democracies are almost unlimited. Recently in the pages of FREE WORLD, Professor Artucio urged a Latin American expeditionary force of 500,000 men fighting side by side with the United Nations Army. The moral, political, and military value of such an army would be of immense importance. It would be an element of great encouragement to the anti-Axis forces all over the world, and it would be an element of terrible discouragement to the Axis forces everywhere. To utilize this reserve of power, the United Nations must determine to make democracy the fundamental war aim. No part of the world has known more heroism, even if sometimes futile, than the Latin American countries in their fight against tyrants and dictators. This fight is not over. It is up to the United Nations to make it a part of the world-wide struggle between slavery and freedom.

CHANGING CULTURAL

ROUND TABLE Nº 9

IN ALL discussions of the future, the emphasis is on political and economic questions. That is as it should be. We must prepare an answer to these questions if this war is not to end again in the disorganization and chaos which is the fertile breeding ground of new wars and new tragedies for humanity. But the Editors of FREE WORLD believe that an intelligent consideration of these questions must include a clear knowledge of the changing cultural values which affect the mores and the thought of mankind. They therefore asked Professor Ozorio de Almeida, president of the Brazilian Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, to lead the Round Table of men whose primary interests are in the cultural field.

Within the general theme, specific consideration was given to the following four questions: What changes are taking place in social ethics and morality? Has democracy taken on a new meaning? Has there been a change in attitude toward wealth and work? Is there a new concept of the function of the artist in contemporary life?

The other participants were: John Dos Passos, whose novels, plays, and essays have dealt with contemporary social and cultural problems and whose best known works are "Three Soldiers," "Manhattan Transfer," and "Adventures of a Young Man"; Heinz Hartmann, Swiss psychiatrist and author of "Die Grundlagen der Psychoanalyse"; Raymond de Saussure, formerly professor at the Institute of Psychoanalysis in Paris and author of "Psychoanalytic Method," whose essay on "The Psychopathology of Hitler" appeared in the June issue of FREE WORLD; Johan J. Smertenko, author of "Alexander Hamilton" and contributor to many periodicals on social and literary subjects, who is at work on "American Taste," a book about American culture; Werner Thormann, formerly editor of the Berlin New Republic, whose work as a German Catholic leader and writer made it necessary for him to flee Germany when Hitler came into power; Wousaofong, one of the Editors of FREE WORLD and former member of the League of Nations Secretariat; Gregory Zilboorg, psychiatrist, lecturer, and author of "The Passing of the Old Order in Europe," as well as many other books on cultural and medical themes.

MIGUEL OZORIO DE ALMEIDA—It is a significant fact that the people present here for an interchange of ideas pose the question of a change in cultural values. The question would not have been raised if we had not felt that our ideas regarding many of the bases of the intellectual and moral life do not correspond to reality. This reality has indeed been changed and it is inevitable that it will continue to produce constantly new modifications. Do all these changes represent progress, improvement? Are they, on the contrary, merely deviations or deformations—perhaps a temporary, perhaps a permanent sort of corruption of that which has always existed and will continue to exist?

An affirmative response to the first question leads us logically to an attitude of active inquiry into the meaning of an evolution of ideas

which may develop so quickly that it will assume the character of a revolution. A contrary reply, an affirmation that at this moment reality is nothing but a crisis of degeneration, of decadence or corruption will indicate no less logically that it is possible to adopt only a conservative attitude in defense of those values which have been secured by tradition.

From a certain point of view one must admit that there is always, even in the most normal periods, a great difference between culture and actual life. Life is that which can exist, whereas culture represents precisely that effort toward the true and the beautiful which may be contained in our conception of what is true and beautiful. Cultural values form the total of our noblest aspirations toward the higher life. If the way in which we regard culture changes, it is because our aspirations have changed, or because we have decided that it is impossible to realize even a part of these aspirations and seek to be more modest and more realistic. If there is, therefore, a change in cultural values at this moment, to what is it due? Perhaps to the pressure of events or to an evolution which originates in the character of the culture itself?

We cannot doubt for a single instant that the actual state of the world has shocked our spirit as well as life itself. This shock must be analyzed, and we must first consider the psychological aspect of the entire question. Dr. Zilboorg, who is perfectly qualified to shed light on many of the most important points, has prepared an exposition of this aspect.

GREGORY ZILBOORG—The discussions of the peace to come and of post-war life are naturally agitating the minds of intellectuals all over the world, and all over the world there is as much confusion on the subject as there is bloodshed on the war fronts. This confusion, inevitable in times of crises, would present nothing ominous if it were not for the fact that it presents certain fundamental aspects which unless clarified bid fair to lead us into a number of blind alleys.

In the past, particularly since the Napoleonic wars, people seem to have known what was wanted. There was disagreement as to method of achieving it, but there was more or less general agreement among liberals and radicals as to the ultimate goal; serfdom and slavery had to be abolished, parliamentary democracy had to be established, universal suffrage had to be attained.

Today the accent seems to be on what we wish to preserve rather than on what we want to achieve. The aggressor, the reactionary, the tyrant speaks of the "New Order," while the liberals, the Democracies, seem to be fighting for the preservation of a certain way of life. Outwardly then, the progressive forces to which we all proudly belong seem to be forced by history to fight under the banner of conservative slogans—a paradoxical and even embarrassing phenomenon; from the standpoint of traditional understanding of the march of history—an abnormal situation.

The first striking difference between this crisis and that of the Napoleonic era, or even of the last war, is that all seem to be agreed that peace will not come soon and probably will not come in the traditional manner. More and more one hears that there might be no peace conference; something else will happen—one does not know exactly what—but this war probably will not end like other wars. In so far as this attitude has to do with something that has not yet happened but rather with a presentiment of what is going to happen, one cannot examine it; still less can one discuss it. However, this anticipation is in itself very characteristic and denotes a profound change in our civilized thought. It would seem that in this crisis the liberal intellectual is as on the defensive in relation to history as he is in relation to fascism. He feels that history has something in store for him which he will not be able to offer as his own at the conference table of an Erfurt, a Vienna, or a Versailles. He is now more fatalistic, without admitting it fully to himself—yet.

WERNER THORMANN—If that is the case, it represents an about-face on the part of the liberal intellectual, for our generation has been characterized by a most cynical attitude toward past history.

ZILBOORG—Yes, this new respect for history is rather commendable; it brings about a rather unwonted humility in the progressive statesman and liberal intellectual in place of the usual conceit with regard to historical events. He no longer trusts so much in his own power to shape history; in this gradually and unwittingly and newly acquired humility, he might even study history more seriously and struggle less to manage and direct it with an illusory sense of mas-

tery, which never yielded him much more than a personal self-delight at apparent knowing and an ultimate disappointment about his own efforts. The intellectual of today lives in a world which has so changed under his own eyes that before he can undertake a consideration of the peace to come, he must get acquainted with his own world which has neither the form nor the content to which he has always been accustomed.

What are these changes in this changed world?—A very difficult question to answer because it is easier to enumerate the few simple things which have not yet changed. We still eat and sleep and love and hate: our psychobiological needs, and many a manner of gratifying them, are still the same as twenty-five years ago, or even perhaps, twenty-five centuries ago. Almost everything else in our society is different. There was a time when wars were formally declared, or were more or less declared. But in this war the bows made to old world amenities are trivial: one strikes first now and "declares" afterwards. In the past, guerrillas, *franc-tireurs* were considered illegal and governments claimed that they had nothing to do with them; today the warring governments are proud of their guerrillas in Russia, in the Philippines, in China. In the past wars, civilians were spared the horrors of war as much as was possible. Battles were conducted in the "fields"; they were fought by soldiers only. Today we have total war and offices for civilian defense. In the past, it was not difficult to recognize the enemy. If you were a Frenchman, one knew that you hated the Germans with whom you were at war; the language you spoke or the accent with which you spoke it would at once tell on which side you were. Now there are Free Frenchmen, who have no government, and enslaved Frenchmen, who have an official government; there are free Germans, who are scattered all over the world, and enslaved Germans, who have a most powerful military machine. We have Quislings in Norway, in Belgium, in America. Quite obviously, while this war is seemingly still conducted on national lines, there are Dutchmen who help the Germans and Germans who help the English against their own respective homelands.

ALMEIDA—You conclude that this war is wiping out national distinctions? If so, is the tendency toward genuine internationalism or toward a new kind of nationalism?

ZILBOORG—Nationalism seems to have sustained a serious fracture. Like a fractured leg it still looks like a leg, but it seems limp and unable to function. In the past, the working men developed a proletarian, revolutionary ideology and tended toward pacifism, while the capitalistic groups were more inclined to favor settling acute international crises by means of war. In the past, the revolutionary working man was internationalistic while the industrialist was keenly nationalistic. Today the working man supports the war more readily than the industrialist and capitalist who find themselves less nationalistically minded and who would rather have a "negotiated peace," a super-Munich with a super-cowardice in morning coat and dusty respectability. In the past, the Krupp and Schneider-Creusot plants were spared bombardment; today factories, bakeries, passenger ships, and churches are freely bombed.

The more we study the contrasts between past wars and the present one, the clearer it becomes that despite the semblance of formal national armies and of national states of war, so-called international law no longer governs these international relations. The whole struggle bears greater resemblance to a gigantic street battle, to a titanic civil war. Civil wars and revolutions know no traditions, no amenities, and no formal conclusions of peace. Civil wars are either fully won or fully lost; they admit of no compromise, no negotiations, and no mercy.

ALMEIDA—This is an interesting point. If we think of this war as a civil war, we begin to realize how closely it touches every individual. We can see that cultural changes are the immediate result of its contacts, not, as in past wars, of its ultimate consequence.

ZILBOORG—Precisely. This characteristic of the war and of our world crisis makes our problem of studying changing cultural values much more difficult. There being no compromise in a civil war, there is no middle of the road, no staying out; civil wars force themselves into the household of every citizen. In the past, he would peacefully contemplate life, waiting until the slaughter on the war front was over, peace concluded, and normal life begun again; now he is forced to die fighting, or die struggling or passively. He cannot escape, whether he understands it all or not. What we call "total war" is not merely total economic and industrial effort: it is total in the psychological sense as well. This totality is easier stated than achieved, because for centuries the peaceful

population was taught the sanctity of non-participation in combat. A non-soldier was considered respectable by the very virtue of being a civilian pillar of society whose business was always to sit and wait until the uniformed heroes finished their job of winning or losing the war. Today the sudden, universal militarization of our minds has become a frightful necessity; but it is a dangerous thing, because the civilian who is so suddenly brought out of his historical slumber must perform an immense job of psychological transformation.

JOHN DOS PASSOS—I take it that what we shall try to do here is to analyze the nature and the extent of this psychological transformation. Yet the basic difficulty of all discussions of this kind is, in my opinion, that the basic terms are so deceptive. If we start in on definitions, we are likely to spend all our time thrashing them out. Still, if the people who join in the discussion are willing to treat these big five dollar words a little like the symbols in algebra, symbols of which the exact value is to be determined later, it might be possible occasionally to accomplish something more useful than mere talk. I don't mean we should reach too definite conclusions; they are hardly possible in the society, rapidly dissolving and reforming, that we live in. I think we should rather aim for improved ways of seeing what's going on around us. Any trick to keep the wits sharp. We must never forget that intelligence is only an occasional achievement for the human brain and that most of what passes for intellectual talk amounts mostly to automatic responses of one kind or another more or less artistically dressed up.

ZILBOORG—However simply we deal with them, we must recognize that the cultural changes which we are undergoing, the shift of emphasis, the modification of values are many. Yet despite their great number and great importance, they appear almost inconspicuously and are apt to be overlooked in the heat of actual combat. Take as an example the seemingly trivial fact that women now wear trousers which appear with increasing frequency even in so-called good conventional society, at home and in the streets. The last war produced the "boyish bob" and the knee-length skirt; this war has brought the external appearance of women a step further along the road of so-called equality with men. This portends more than meets the eye, for it not only marks the increasing participation of women in our social changes, but represents primarily a self-assertion which man—the true master of the world as we knew it heretofore—must recognize. The man of tomorrow will no longer be master merely because he is a man. The fact that his social significance will thus be challenged is especially important because it is highly doubtful whether man will give up willingly the privileged position which he has enjoyed for many, many centuries. Consequently, a deep conflict between the sexes may be expected after the war, a conflict which has not only esthetic but also and primarily psycho-biological connotations.

It is now quite clear that as a result of the complex forces released by the last war homosexuality in art and in actual life became more active and more open, if it did not actually increase. One wonders what type of changes in sexual morality and family relationships we are to expect as a direct result of this war, and what bearing this will have on that peace which is to come after this war. Homosexuality was most obvious and conspicuous in Germany before this war. It is a well-known psychological fact that homosexuality, hostility, and certain types of social sadism are interrelated.

THORMANN—Would you say that these influences are operating now and that our programs of reconstruction after the war will be too late to affect or correct them? If that is the case, the situation seems serious, if not actually hopeless.

ZILBOORG—One cannot view lightly the signs of these changes of our cultural values. Here economic programs and programs of political organization will not solve the fundamental problems of peace after this war any more than they solved them after the last war. Economic and political forms, despite their great importance, are after all rather tenuous solutions because they are least of all subject to conscious individual control.

Hence our present-day preoccupation with what we call "morale." From a certain standpoint this morale is but a well-galvanized state of inspired hatred—a state absolutely necessary in the present war, but equally dangerous because hatred is not something that is turned on or off at will. It continues to push man toward activity and destruction for a long time after the last German and Japanese plane is destroyed. It is not a mere academic question, the question as to what we will do with our hatred when the war is over; it cannot be signed

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away at a Versailles table or a Hague convention. It will continue to brew. This is not a problem of theoretical morality or ethical philosophy, but of a cultural change which is taking place under our own eyes, a change extremely potent and dynamic in its implications. One wonders how much real freedom a world filled with civic hatred can offer; how much we can afford to expect; how much we are willing to sacrifice in order properly to canalize this hatred into contructive paths.

Dos Passos—I suppose that by social ethics we mean the rules of social behavior as distinguished from that behavior as it actually is. The tremendously tight and ever tightening organization of the societies we live in, either for peace or war, inevitably demands a different social ethics from the loosely knit arrangements of the nineteenth century world.

Thormann—I do not wish to speak of fundamental changes in social ethics and in morale but rather of an application of eternal principles to the changes in our social structure. Our history, that is to say the history of Western civilization, has already gone through three periods of similar adaptation. It began with the discovery and consideration of the individual in the Jewish theology, Greek philosophy, and Roman law. It became the Christian civilization and, while defending itself against the assault of barbarism, was transformed into the feudal society of the Middle Ages. It regained the classical concepts of humanism and opened the way to that development which was climaxed by the bourgeois revolution and a declaration of the Rights of Man.

We see all around us the realization of the fourth great change; that is to say, a new adaptation of the principal values of humanism to new social and economic bases of our civilization. And again, we are engaged in the defense of these values against the attack of barbarians. The new era of development started toward the end of the last century. It concerns the transformation of the bourgeois era, characterized by political liberalism, economic capitalism, and spiritual individualism into a new form of society. But at the same time it concerns the task of maintaining the essential values of Western civilization, that is to say, the idea of personalism. The ethics of the Ten Commandments, Christian morality, the ethics of Plato, the social principles preached by St. Thomas Aquinas, the declaration of the Rights of Man, the slogan of the French Revolution: *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*—all of these are perfectly consistent and harmonious if we recognize the prime importance of man, God's image, and the unalterable values of the individual in society. In all the domains of public life, political, social, economic, and spiritual, it is our task to prevent man from becoming a mere instrument.

It is for this that we fight all the ideologies which do not recognize the individual, which consider man simply as a function of the collective spirit: the race, the class, the people, the state. We have seen the emancipation of the masses, but we have yet to reconcile this emancipation with the concept of personalism. Fascism has made us understand the dangers of the mechanical age in which for too long we have seen only the benefits.

Zilboorg—In a general way one may view the present crisis as one of the final steps of a cultural struggle which began with the Renaissance. The Renaissance originated humanism, and the substance of humanism is the recognition of the value of the individual. It was not the French Revolution, not the commercial bourgeoisie, not industrial capitalism that brought on democracy and the respect for individualism. It was rather the deep cultural

revolution which broke down the dis-individualized medieval world. Montaigne, Rabelais, Cervantes had more to do with it than Hugo Stinnes, Henry Ford, and Basil Zaharoff. This war, whether we dare to admit it or not, calls upon us, as a matter of dire necessity, to abandon many humanistic attitudes. The individual as such begins to count less and less. Masses of people, not individuals, statistical wholes, totality and not personality are what matter—another painful paradox of our day.

We must win this civil war by sacrificing a number of those very values which we associate with a free world. The fact that we all believe that this sacrifice is only temporary does not make it temporary. Somehow, it is incumbent upon us to realize that while our willingness to make sacrifices is both commendable and imperative, once they have been made, some steps to retrieve what was given up will have to be undertaken. This cannot be done for us by political conventions, economic treaties, and international cartels. We must bear in mind that the intellectual life of Europe has been decimated, that despite the humane cultural hospitality which the New World offers to many intellectual forces of Europe, these forces do remain uprooted and reduced in their creative efficiency.

II

ALMEIDA—If we break down the problem presented by Zilboorg into its component parts, we see that it embraces great changes: psychological, political, especially in respect to nationalism, and social, pre-eminently in regard to the life of noncombatants. Similarly, he holds that individualism has become almost impossible and that the inevitable dominance of the masses will undoubtedly produce profound cultural changes. All this permits a more precise statement of the question that I raised at the very beginning: whether these changes will be modifications imposed externally by the pressure of events rather than of an inner revision of cultural values. Zilboorg has effectively presented the evidence that intellectuals and liberals are now converted into conservatives. Does not this paradox prove that at bottom they always believe in the same principle, that they always accept the same bases of culture?

JOHAN J. SMERTENKO—I am afraid that I cannot see the paradox because I do not believe that the anti-Fascists—the intellectuals and liberals—are wholly on the defensive. There is a basic difference between them and the conservatives who merely wish to retain the old values, cultural and moral, which are being challenged by the Axis Powers in this war. It seems to me that we do stand for a new concept of democracy, a more complete and a more universal political democracy than has ever existed. We are fighting for an entirely different conception of economic democracy, not merely one which safeguards the minimum rights of the worker and adjusts the serious social inequalities in distribution of wages and profits, but which stands for the economic improvement of the so-called backward nations.

This is primarily but not wholly a political question. Implicit in it are tremendous cultural changes. Politically it means the end of democratic imperialism as well as autocratic imperialism. That is to say, empires like Great Britain, France, and Holland will no longer tolerate the contradiction of democratic institutions at home and more or less autocratic institutions in their colonies. It will bring about a complete transformation in the lives of the so-called backward peoples of Asia and Africa. Today millions of people—I dare say more than half the world's population—do not understand and have had no experience with democracy. To the masses in Asia and Africa, and even in South and Central America, democracy is a meaningless word, and the impact of democratic ideas on these people will result in revolutionary changes in their lives, changes which will in turn have an inevitable influence on our own *mores*.

As a matter of fact, this war has already affected all criteria of cultural values. For too long we have based our estimate of these values on the false standards of political and military superiority. We have assumed a dominance by the "first class powers" in the domain of the spirit similar to their domination of the "second class powers" in the political sphere.

By "we" I do not mean merely the ignorant and chauvinistic man in the street. It is indeed the exceptional English, American, French, or German scholars whose work does not show both the conscious and the unconscious assumptions of superiority in regard to other cultures. To be sure, they render lip service to Greek and Jewish and Roman cultural traditions—and make a polite bow of acknowledgment toward oriental cultures—and then proceed to disregard the actual contributions to our life and

thought and institutions which these cultures have made in the past—and what is more important—the potential contributions which they can make in the present and future, if we are only wise enough to accept them.

But two circumstances have jolted us out of this complacent attitude and are even now challenging and modifying this concept of superiority and opening a way for a sounder basis of exchange in cultural values. First, by carrying to its logical conclusion the proposition that their military might has proved nazi culture to be superior to all others, Hitler and Goebbels have shown us its absurdity. We are beginning to recognize that, if the crass, paranoiac nazi claims of superiority are baseless and false, the politer and less exaggerated claims of superiority by other nations are no less stupid and false.

And secondly, we see the "first class powers" being leveled by the war and growing more and more dependent on the support and collaboration of the "second class powers" for their very existence. We see in the morale and the powers of resistance of China and Russia, Greece and Yugoslavia proof of the vitality and vigor of their *mores* and their cultural traditions—the only spiritual reservoir of a people—and we must recognize that they are in no way inferior to the vaunted cultures of the dominant nations.

I believe that the liberal intellectual has associated all these things with the war we are waging. That, and not merely the defense of political democracy, is what we mean when we speak of this war as a civil war, a people's revolution. In our hopes for victory in this war, we have bound up not merely the perpetuation of certain eternal ideals and cultural traditions but the immemorial desires for a good life toward which we have made such slow and halting progress.

THORMANN—Certainly, we have realized that political democracy is not enough for the defense of human liberty and dignity. As long as there exists the possibility of the exploitation of man by man in other fields of public life, in the economic and spiritual fields, so long democracy has failed in its task—that of guaranteeing the freedom of man, on the one hand, and the authority of society on the other. The meaning of democracy is to prevent anarchy as much as tyranny. We need a new interpretation of democracy for the masses, especially for those subjected today to the propaganda of the totalitarian powers. It is wrong to speak always of the defense of democracy. Too often we create the impression of defending an outmoded social system along with democracy. It is necessary to show the world that democracy is perfectly capable of adapting itself to the economic and social changes which are consummated in our time, and that simultaneously democracy—and democracy alone—is able to prevent the loss of individual liberty.

HEINZ HARTMANN—Well, the old concept of democracy, of course, has some everlasting elements, but it has changed. It has changed very often since the Renaissance. It is somewhat similar here, I think, to a style in art.

Take, for instance, the way in which the Gothic cathedrals were built in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Of course, there was always something of Gothic art in them, but sometimes one gets the impression that the spirit, the manner of the century in which they were built, was more important than the original Gothic intention. It is the same with political styles, and I think it is the same with democracy.

The usual picture that you find in the many papers on the psychology of democracy presents a clear-cut opposition of totalitarianism and collectivism, on the one side, to individualism and democracy, on the other. Well, this is certainly only one side of the picture. Actually a compromise is possible between the development of individual, autonomous conscience, as we think of it, and collectivism in the sense of a mass aggressive psychology. Now this agreement is lacking by virtue of the fact that the individual human conscience is able to make as part of its own structure a set of social values. Psychologically, an identification, in so far as those social values are concerned, is even one of the basic elements of democracy. It depends, of course, on whether these values are really accepted by society, and here I agree with Dr. Zilboorg when he says that they are not, to a considerable or sufficient extent. Actually, I think that this individualistic form of democracy would be completely unable to deal with the most dangerous problems democracy is facing today.

RAYMOND DE SAUSSURE—You raise an important point here, but I wonder whether it is possible to generalize on democratic development as a whole. Our world is in the process of transformation and even at this moment we can detect a number of changes in its cultural manifestations. These, however, are different

in Germany, in France, in Russia, or the United States. To understand them it is necessary to take note of the charactertistics of the era which immediately preceded the war and of which they are the result.

The desire for security forced man into social organization. Primitive man was not an individualist; he operated with his neighbors and together they hunted, fished, traded, and prayed to the gods. The serf accepted his condition in order to be protected by his lord; the citizen supported his constitution because it guaranteed him certain rights. Originally, therefore, all these relations implied a certain reciprocity. In our modern Democracies, on the contrary, the state has been charged with an increasing number of growing responsibilities while the individual has sought to withdraw more and more from these responsibilities of collective life.

The individual did not find his security in the state but in a political party. He no longer desired to defend the interests of society; he protected only his own interests. Thus the political party became primarily concerned with helping the individual at the expense of the state. It became for a section of the nation the *deus ex machina* responsible for its security and complete freedom, while for the masses of the people it was a Moloch which devoured the product of their toil. The ministers became solely the representatives of their political groups, whereas the nation, as such, was represented by no one. Because the individual had lost his sense of responsibility toward his country, it no longer served for his protection. This situation left the Democracies disarmed and weak and vulnerable in the face of the threat of totalitarian powers. A lessening of the responsibility toward collective society, the desire to take everything from it and to give nothing, that is the primary characteristic which I wish to point out for this pre-war period.

Our modern world has become such a complicated organism, in which the economic, social, political, and psychological factors are so numerous and so closely interwoven that the isolated individual feels powerless to change evil conditions even though he recognizes them perfectly. He becomes disinterested in an organism on which he can exert no influence. He becomes cynical or fatalistic. He functions unprofessionally without assuming responsibility, for if he were determined to establish his ideas, it would be necessary to give up his livelihood and to dedicate his time to the creation of a new movement—and often he simply cannot do it. Because success is so far removed and so difficult to achieve, the individual feels that his own contribution is insignificant in the total effort necessary to attain it, and thus he hardly recognizes the responsibility he owes to this great struggle.

The individual, finding it difficult to assert himself in all of society, tends to seek a place in a group which claims to be interested in gaining for him special advantages in the community. At the time of the Renaissance, the individual predicated the liberation of his kind from a yoke of false tradition upon a truth. In our time, the individual asserts his singularity in order to free himself from his fellow men. The more he is disassociated from communal activity, the more one is likely to recognize his individual talent. Not being able to offer himself usefully to society, the individual, in order to quiet the anxiety of his loneliness, tries, by his singularity, to attach to himself a group of his fellow men.

Nazism and fascism have sought to find a



Heinz Hartmann

remedy for this excess of individualism in again establishing the nation as a living reality which needed the enthusiasm of each citizen. We are obliged to recognize that, especially at the beginning, they knew how to revitalize the social consciousness of their followers; however, we see to our sorrow that they utilized this solidarity only for purposes of domination and destruction.

In modern times, we lose many aspects of personality because the individual participates in only a few functions of his existence. Servants or a restaurant furnish him his food; secretaries perform for him his routine tasks; the lawyer defends him against his opponents; insurance relieves him from his cares for old age; schools instruct and sometimes educate his children; the state secures for him a good share of his liberty. Everywhere man reduces his responsibilities, delegates his powers, and concentrates more and more on his own vocation. Modern man tends to accomplish one function instead of living fully his life. He tends to develop a group of aptitudes instead of maturing and establishing his personality.

Zilboorg was right to insist that we are fighting to conserve the past and not to establish something new. It would however be a grave error to think that most of the Allies are fighting to defend the values of the Renaissance or of the Revolution. If this were the case, they would be inspired by an altogether different enthusiasm. They are fighting to return to the condition of non-responsibility where one is free to do the same job every day; they are fighting to stop the war but not to abolish it. To win the war, modern man must understand that he has lost his personality, that he must not live any longer to accomplish merely one function, whether it be civil or military, but he must fight because he is an adult responsible for a culture, and above all responsible for his own personality.

I think that the hope for the future lies not in the doctrine of hatred and domination preached by Hitler, that it is not in the irresponsible and egotistic Democracies of yesterday, and certainly not in an egalitarian communism. I think that it lies in the gospel of love preached by Christ to the world and in our own desire to make truth triumph over untruth, justice over iniquity, responsibility over self-interest, and charity over egoism.

HARTMANN—Psychologically, the distinctions you have drawn really center around the problem of aggressivity. In the totalitarian countries, aggressivity, brutality, even sadism, are idealized. That is generally not so in our democratic systems. They aim at increased security and depreciate aggressive behavior. This corresponds, of course, to a general trend in civilization. But there is no reason to deny one's love for a definite form of civilization even if it proves to be less aggressively efficient, and I am sure that what many people of good will said in that respect after the fall of France, for instance, was thoroughly unjust. However, I think the chance for a healthy organization of aggressivity and for better adjustment between what is allowed and what is oppressed so far as aggressivity is concerned seems to be greater in the social form of democracy than it is in any imaginable individualistic form.

Another problem which is very interesting here is how far democracy can appeal or is allowed to appeal to the irrational factors of man. There are many people who believe that every appeal to emotional factors is already a compromise with totalitarian ideas of social life. I disagree with them wholeheartedly. I think that history proves that that is completely wrong. What we have to do is something quite different. We should never forget that even the most rational tendency in social life is ultimately based upon emotional forces. The question is rather whether these emotional forces can be made to support our conscious aims or whether they are found to be in opposition to them.

III

ALMEIDA—If you will allow me to make an observation, I think that we ought to consider a question which has perhaps been a little too much neglected, the question of liberty even in the Democracies. I know very few people who have not felt extremely embarrassed when asked the direct question on how they understood the meaning of liberty. One feels always very directly the lack of liberty. One recognizes easily enough all the factors which limit liberty. When one fights for liberty, one fights against very definite things. But now it is evident that all the world is searching for a definition or at least a delimitation of the concept of liberty. I have already observed elsewhere that the progress of positive knowledge has forced limitations upon liberty. We are not free to say that one side of a triangle is greater than

the sum of the other two sides. Each time exact knowledge is acquired our freedom of thought on this point disappears. In the social and political field, knowledge is far from exact, but there are forces which result from the existence of society itself which impose these limitations of knowledge. We must make a thorough study of the extent of these limitations as well as of their legitimacy. Perhaps one of the origins of the actual crises of democracy is just simply the incapacity of the average man to understand really what liberty is. It is not a simple idea within everyone's comprehension. And one of the primary tasks of liberal intellectuals, it seems to me, will be precisely that of explaining and interpreting this point.

Mr. Hartmann has touched a particularly important point in the appeal which can be made to the emotional elements (I am almost tempted to call them *unreasonable* elements) outside of the life of reason. He questions whether Democracies are capable of utilizing these elements. As a matter of fact, that which characterizes fascism in all its different forms is precisely that it perverts and exploits collective emotion to its own advantage. What is inexplicable in these emotions, or rather what is beyond reason, must nevertheless be accepted as a fact. Even when we find something unexpected which does not enter into the categories of our rational philosophies, we must still accept it as a reality. The collective emotions play a great part in the life of nations. There is nothing we can do about them; they are there; they exist. Democracy must take this into account but instead of stimulating them, as is done in fascist countries, Democracies must orient them, explain them, and never exploit them for tendentious aims.

ZILBOORG—I have two or three remarks to make. First of all, at the beginning, at the risk of being somewhat too emphatic, I described a phenomenon rather than a fantasy, what the phenomenon should be. It is not true—and I think it is the task of our intellectuals to understand this—that we had already formulated a new idea of democracy. Mr. Thormann is perfectly right when he says that a new interpretation of democracy is required now. The education of the backward people, so-called, to which Smertenko referred, is a double-edged sword. What are we going to educate them about? If we teach them to build as good tanks as we build, then we corrupt the so-called backward people, who are more advanced than we.



Raymond de Saussure

On the other hand, a world crisis means, according to a great many people—Mr. Smertenko voices not only his own personal point of view—a new social organization, in the economic sense as well as in the spiritual sense. And to avoid the exploitation of man by man, we must admit that democracy as it stands today has not yet reformulated itself. Hartmann is right when he says that democracy is elastic enough in the sense that it adjusts itself to each crisis. It is elastic enough, that is true, but the question arises before us today—and here is an example:

The war presents today an alliance, *de facto* if not *de jure,* of China, Russia, England, and the United States against fascism as a whole. I wouldn't call it Germany; I wouldn't call it Italy; I wouldn't call it Germany and Italy any more than I would call it Czechoslovakia. It is an invasion of ideology as well as a military invasion of a certain part of Europe. If you take these four nations and add to them the good Protestant nation of Holland, you

will find a conglomeration of extremely contrasting points of view—an extreme suspiciousness of Russia on the part of the United States, for instance. As Archibald MacLeish recently stated, there are still in America today people who would rather lose the war than win it with Russia. There is an ideological opposition.

I did not mean that we are reactionaries in that we have conservative slogans. I meant, psychologically, we stand for the preservation of something instead of for the production of something new. I do not know how it is, for instance, in China, where China's struggle represents at the moment a very strong entrance into world civilization as a whole, in a unification of the Chinese political activity, at least, with the activity of the white man. Perhaps in China there is already a formulation of a new thing.

We, the representatives of the intellectuals of democracy, have not yet formulated this thing. As Mr. Thormann pointed out, from St. Thomas Aquinas to the best representatives of humanism today, we have struggled for the preservation of the autonomy of the personality. I disagree with Mr. Hartmann in trying to equate personalism with individualism. Individualism is a social concept; personalism is an egotistic concept. I think it is merely a matter of style rather than what you meant.

HARTMANN—I mean equal, yes; a combination.

ZILBOORG—Therefore, it seems to me that we will do better if we do not take the simple point of view of optimism and say, "Yes, democracy adapts itself; yes, democracy will survive." Democracy, unless it is human and guided by human beings, cannot survive; and the human being, in order to survive, has to carry within himself a certain deep-seated harmony between his aggressive, irrational impulses and social adaptation with what we call respect for an individual. Individualism means our ability to identify ourselves with the other individual. This is the primary and fundamental Christian ideal.

That is why it seems to me that through democracy today, post-war democracy must represent a positive program; that positive program is undoubtedly a Christianization of our ideal, both in the ethical and the sociological sense: namely, a more equitable distribution of wealth, more serious measures against the exploitation of man by man, and more serious evaluation of peaceful life without wars.

DOS PASSOS—Democracy damn well better take on new meaning if it's going to survive in the new setup that has made centralized control in government and industry so immensely easy to seize by any small group of skillful manipulators. Democracy, a society in which we aim toward some recognition at least of the rights of every man (just because he is a man) as well as of his duties, in order to survive has got to discover new political leverages for the individual by which he can stand up against the hierarchical group, whether it's an industrial monopoly, or a labor union, or a state organized for total war. The Anglo-Saxon countries have the best record of achievement in that sort of adjustment in the past, so I think it's not too presumptuous to hope that with the help of some new rising tide of libertarian practices among the peoples of Europe and Asia (This is the great unknown quantity at the moment, the question of how far the despotic rule now established over the immense majority of the peoples of Europe will have destroyed their aptitude for living like comparatively free men once that rule is overthrown.) to hope, I say, that some improved machinery for the implementation of democracy will be discovered before it's too late.

There are a lot of people in this world who still want to be something more than cogs in a machine run by whatever boss has fought or intrigued his way to the controls. If we are smart enough and courageous enough, and able to free our minds from all the gurry of outworn phrases that no longer represent facts, we'll be able to save and to improve the democratic method.

WOUSAOFONG—If I understand the word democracy, it means really a system of government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Since the political revolution of the eighteenth century in the West, you have political democracy. But in China, we call it democracy of hypocrisy, because such a form of democracy does not realize an equality between individuals and between peoples.

Therefore, in order to have a real democracy, we in China, since the revolution started by Sun Yat-sen, conceived a democracy which consisted of political, economic, and international equality. I mean a system of government which gives not only equal political rights, but also equal economic rights; that is to say, socialism, if you like. But we conceived in China a new form of socialism which differed from com-

munism in Russia or socialism, as you understand it in Europe or in America. The new form of socialism in China, of course, had to be suited to the Chinese historic and economic background. Besides economic democracy, we conceived also an international democracy.

The result of the first World War was the emancipation of some oppressed people in Central Europe; therefore, you had the new republics of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and so on. Some oppressed classes have also been emancipated as the result of the first World War. You can take, for example, the Russian revolution and the agrarian reform in many countries in Central Europe. However, the first World War did not emancipate the oppressed peoples in Asia who have been under foreign yoke for a long time, nor did it emancipate the oppressed classes elsewhere. We hope that the second World War will emancipate not only the peoples who are now oppressed by fascism or nazism but also the peoples oppressed by international imperialism in Asia, such as the colonial peoples in India, the Dutch East Indies, and so on. This will be the logical evolution of history after the second World War.

ALMEIDA—In addition to the manner in which war affects any specific nation, it also affects certain general aspects of civilization. Zilboorg has already pointed out a few of the changes which we are now undergoing. There are many others. All of us have, therefore, a two-fold duty: to fight against the common enemy who would impose his primitive standards of culture upon us and to battle against the disintegrating and the degenerating consequences of war itself.

IV

THORMANN—I believe that there are two trends as a result of this war, just as there have always been two trends in the actual development of the world. History shows that always, when the social structure became uncertain and great changes took place, by this disintegration of the social bases of the old world, there was an effort to establish a so-called new order, which was in reality a sort of barbarism against humanism.

I should like to point out that at the time of the end of antiquity we had a special kind of tyranny of the Roman emperors; we had the persecution of the Christians, and so on. At the time of the end of the medieval period and the beginning of the modern humanistic trend in history, we had resistance of power subdued by means of the Inquisition; we had the cruelties at the time of the religious wars and the Thirty Years War. And I believe we must make the same discrimination between progressive trends in history which would lead us to a new social structure of society, a new kind of social democracy, and fascism, the new barbarism, which was the consequence of disintegration of class power, of privileges, and of forces resisting the trend of human progress. Therefore, we have to fight in two directions: One fight against this new barbarism, against fascism, and the other fight for a better future.

HARTMANN—What Mr. Thormann has just said is extremely important. This problem of democracy, a new democratic order, has a positive side but it has a negative side, too, because, as you know, at its origin, every form of fascism was thought to be nothing other than a genuine expression of the soul of its people. After a certain time, one found out that, after all, there were common elements in fascism that are of no less importance. Let me say that fascism is something like a discovery. It is a discovery, in the present social and technical state of evolution by a league of people who are not inhibited as to what amount of power they can accumulate. There is not the slightest reason why, after the fascist powers of today have lost their force, we hope, there should not be the possibility of a recurrence of the same social effect, made possible by this mere fact. Therefore, one of the most urgent sides of this social organization will be a negative side; that is, to do what is possible in this form of society to prevent a recurrence of this or the use of this discovery in fascism.

SMERTENKO—Perhaps I miss your point. You say that in its origins fascism was always thought to be the discovery of the soul of the people?

HARTMANN—Well, the Fascists represented it as such.

SMERTENKO—The discovery—

HARTMANN—You see, the Italians told you that that was the Roman soul and the Germans told you that that was the spirit of their ancestors. We know that is true in only a very limited sense. In reality, there is just the form that society can take in our time, given a certain development of technical and social meanings, and even if a fascist state may lose this war, there is no guarantee that other people in

other countries will not try again. That is why I think this defensive position is necessary even after the war.

SMERTENKO—The question I raise is: How valid was the cry and how much was it pure propaganda that it was discovery of the ancient soul of the people? I wonder whether fascism in Italy, for example, wasn't really an attempt to arouse the Italian people to an imperialistic ideal rather than to a spiritual nationalistic ideal? Mussolini did not promise the Italians that they would be Romans but that they would have an empire such as the Romans had. Hitler did go one step further. He did attempt to present, in a semi-mystic kind of way, a racial-national ideal. Don't you think so?

ZILBOORG—No. I mean, I say no merely to start an argument. The point is this, that I begin to see what might be called a psychological mistake that we are making, and if we avoid that mistake, we will probably find ourselves in agreement—which is a terribly sad state for debaters to be in. But I do not believe that it is right for us to forget the point that I tried to make very emphatically in my introductory remarks. What I tried to make clear was this, that the statesman of today, the politician, the sociologist, and the journalist, in the course of the past three-quarters of a century assumed an attitude that he is the master of history and he just wiggles history in the same way that a fellow wiggles or pulls the strings of a marionette. As a matter of fact, why be afraid of looking at the thing first without knowing in advance what it is all about? Then you will see that Mussolini could have appealed a thousand times to his people. If his appeal had been an appeal for which the Italians were not ready, that appeal would not have worked.

There are a great many reasons why the things in Italy were addressed to the Italians in Italian and why the things in Germany were addressed to the Germans in German. The simple thing that we call language we understand, but when he says to them, "You are going to have an empire such as the Romans had," and when Hitler speaks to them about Wotan, that is also the German language and that is the Italian language. The political program that he outlined to them is as much a language of the historical tradition as anything else.

I think we will be able to see clearly that what is happening today—and that is why

Werner Thormann

Hartmann's warning comes in, as a very serious warning—is this: I shall return to Dr. Wousaofong and say that—and here I am going to assume a white man's arrogance without a sense of superiority, if you know what I mean—it is not at all true that the last war liberated some small nations such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, or anything else; nothing of the kind. It did not liberate any of them, because if it had liberated them, they would have been strong enough morally not to give in. You know that.

The first sign of the crisis between economic cosmopolitanism and chauvinistic nationalism was in Italy. The crisis broke out in Italy. Why it broke out in Italy at the first drop rather than elsewhere is a different story. What did the Italians do? The Italians were the first, on the wave of traditional chauvinistic nationalism, to want absolute imperialism. Hitler was much more sequential. He said, "Imperialism? An empire for Germany? Not at all! The world as a whole must be united under the Germans." Hitler is telling the truth without knowing it. He doesn't know that the world is being united anyhow, but not by him and for him, but against him. However, the fact remains that these nationalisms, strong nationalisms, with a new drive to international collectivism, wanted to become exclu-

sive empires and enslave the rest of the nations.

WOUSAOFONG—I think you have considered a program of world reform but you have not given the philosophical causes of that phenomenon. I have been fortunate to observe the evolution of world politics for the past ten years in the political center of the world, in the League of Nations at Geneva. My conclusion is this: The present crisis of the world is only one of a series of crises of occidental civilization. I am going to tell you the fundamental defects of your occidental civilization, but without denying its qualities that I admire very highly. Your civilization has a tendency to expand toward the exterior. Since the beginning of your civilization, you have incessantly tried to conquer everything in the world, to conquer the men that are in contact with you, to conquer the nations that are in contact with your nations. The greatness of your civilization is that your knowledge is so great that the stars which are so far from our earth that their light takes a million years to reach our planet can be analyzed. But you forget completely the problem of the life of man. You are able to create machinery which gives you so much comfort, but you are unable to enjoy it.

You remember that Chamberlain and Daladier, who were certainly the most pacific men in the world, did their best to prevent war, but the circumstances created by your modern civilization are such that nobody can prevent war, for you have become the slaves of the machine that you created. Why? Because of the tendency of your civilization to dominate, to dominate your inanimate surroundings and your fellow men.

The Chinese, on the other hand, have always tried to dominate human instincts. They fight against human instincts in order to achieve perfection of the personality. That is the real reason why the Chinese are traditionally pacifist. They never try to conquer their neighbor countries. The Chinese empire has been growing slowly through the centuries, but not as the result of war. It was due to the force of attraction of the Chinese civilization that brought the peoples around China toward what the Chinese call their central land.

Why have the Chinese people always behaved more morally than the other nations? Because their cultural tradition and the aim of their civilization are to make man perfect.

ZILBOORG—And not the country.

WOUSAOFONG—Not the country in the narrow nationalist sense. I think the possibility of world reform lies in a fusion of Western and Chinese civilizations.

SMERTENKO—I realize that in the present situation, it is almost impossible to discuss any subject without constantly reverting to its political implications, because those seem dominant, pre-eminent, but after all, we have gathered here to discuss cultural values as they are affected by the present situation, and not its purely political implications.

For example, this question that we put here as to whether there has been a change in attitude toward wealth and work—I don't know how you would answer that question, but I do know, for instance, that in so far as I have been able to observe, the attitude toward wealth has been unchanged. For example, the Quislings—

ZILBOORG—Whose attitude—of the wealthy?

SMERTENKO—Let's say of the wealthy, first, and I think we shall find a similarity in that to others. But the attitude of the wealthy, certainly the Quislings, the saboteurs of democratic forces in every nation, has been to weigh their own personal economic interests against the national interests. They chose to accept Hitler or to accept fascism because they thought it would be beneficial to their own personal economic interests. That they were mistaken, as they later found out, does not matter; what matters is that they were willing to

Wousaofong

sacrifice whatever national interests there were. And that has been the dominant reason for the Fifth Column everywhere.

In this country, for example, I don't know what your experiences have been, but every time I enter a home where a man pays a considerable income tax, he says he would just as soon have Hitler take his money as have Roosevelt take it. He may be partially joking but there is, as Dr. Zilboorg pointed out—

ZILBOORG—And Dr. Hartmann.

SMERTENKO — And Dr. Hartmann also pointed out, there is a considerable element of truth in that so-called joke, and it seems to me that in so far as there is an expression of our present cultural standards or attitudes, that attitude toward wealth remains unshaken.

DOS PASSOS—Wealth is no longer the seat and foundation of power but rather the garment or perquisite of power. Toward work I don't see much change in point of view, either. Our attitude toward manual work in this country has always been better than that of the rest of the world. We do not consider it permanently degrading; in fact we feel that everybody at some time in his life should do a little of it. However, in spite of the romantic halo with which we have clothed the worker, I don't see many people (I do know one or two) who actually chose manual work by preference over administrative work. Most of us would rather be the man who tells the other guys where to dig the ditch.

ZILBOORG—May I make just one remark? I want to say that this is not exactly the way of sampling a cultural change. In the midst of a crisis, the fellow who loses or is about to lose most will naturally be figuring how not to lose it, but keep it. Where we ought to look for a change of attitude toward wealth is in the broad masses of people and see whether their acquisitive instinct goes in the direction of thinking that only wealth makes them powerful and therefore they want to become rich.

If you look for economic laws, the legislation that goes on in England and the message that President Roosevelt recently sent to Congress, you will see that regardless of those die-hards, who will continue to stay die-hards a thousand years from now, there is undoubtedly a general change toward wealth as a criterion of achievement, all over the world. This is an extremely encouraging sign, that nations as a whole consider that pure individual wealth does not bestow great distinction on a man. Heretofore, a rich man was a great man. Today, a rich man is a fellow who got his money somehow —which is a totally different attitude.

The deep social changes that have taken place in England, the deep social changes that are going on under our own eyes in America, the tremendous changes that go on under the influence of fascism in Denmark, in Norway, in Holland, where limitless fortunes are destroyed, but the advances of the people remain —I think there is definitely a change toward wealth as the criterion of goodness.

WOUSAOFONG—In China, we take it for granted that the establishment of democracy will mean a more equitable distribution of wealth, certainly a limitation of the accumulation of wealth by individuals.

DE SAUSSURE—There is a general desire to see a more equal distribution of wealth in the case of nations as well as in the case of individuals. Unfortunately, this distribution is often made in a way which kills the initiative of the individual and discourages many people from assuming great responsibilities. There are always too many bureaucratic officials who live at the expense of the few men that have the courage to launch private enterprises.

SMERTENKO—I grant that there have been changes in our concept of the importance of wealth, or rather of the wealthy. The point I tried to make—and it applies equally to the masses as to the privileged few—is that the great crisis in civilization which we are facing has affected but slightly the attitude toward the acquisition of wealth. We speak so glibly nowadays about the sacrifices which the people are making for victory, and in so far as millions of young men are willing to risk their lives in the fighting, great sacrifices are being made. But outside of the armed forces, the worker reconciles the concept of sacrifices with increased wages, the manufacturer reconciles it with juicy contracts, whether in essential or nonessential production, the middleman reconciles it with the maximum mark-up on his goods that he can get away with. That each justifies his attitude by pointing to the petty selfishness of the others is beside the point. It seems to me that in the vast conflagration that is destroying all the real values of civilization, the prevalent attitude may be likened to that of men who, instead of putting out the fire that threatens a house, seek to grab for themselves some of the valuable pieces of furniture in it. Our innate selfishness has made us blind to

the fact that when the house is burned down, these pieces of furniture are but useless encumbrances.

I do not think this is an unfair indictment based on isolated instances. The fact is that we are all guilty and that we only accuse others when their selfishness interferes with our own greed. The greatest responsibility lies at the door of the morale building forces of our nation which, with a few courageous exceptions, have ignored this phenomenon or have not dared to protest against it.

As I see it, this attitude toward wealth and work has a direct bearing on our concept of the function of the artist in the present crisis and in contemporary life. We think of the artist, too, as one who goes about his petty business of amusing and entertaining the public for the sake of the rewards and the personal catharsis he finds in his work. We neither demand, nor do we appreciate it when we get it, the more serious application of his creative faculties to the momentous problem which faces us. We ignore the fact that every artist who is worth that name functions as the eyes and the tongue of a people. We do not heed the philosopher nor honor the prophet.

DE SAUSSURE—The artist will keep his function of revealing to man his latent aspirations. The function will remain the same but the aspirations will change. During the past few decades the artist has expressed the most individualistic and esthetic concepts we have; in the future, he will express all our aspirations toward greater solidarity.

THORMANN—I have the impression that society is orienting itself once more toward a social conception of the function of the artist, the same conception we had in the day when the artist was both prophet and priest. Today again it is impossible for the artist to retire to his ivory tower. I believe that we have gone to the other extreme in our disfavor of art for art's sake. The creative spirit refuses a role of a simple chronicler of contemporary life. But it is certainly the mission of the artist to contribute to an understanding of the meaning of life and of events to sift the essential from the accidental and to render spiritual service to social progress.

WOUSAOFONG—It is my belief that art will play the role of religion in the future. Since Christianity took the place of Greek thought, reason has been supplanted by religion because reason does not appeal to emotion, whereas the role of religion is to satisfy human emotions. However, this role can be played by art and therefore I can see the future of what may be called irreligion.

SMERTENKO—In which the artist substitutes for the priest?

WOUSAOFONG—Yes, the artist will substitute in place of the priest and art will play the role of religion.

DOS PASSOS—I don't see what the arts have to do with the discussion. No matter what kind of social system you have, so long as people have the peculiar needs and cravings which the arts satisfy, that sort of expression will spring up in nooks and crannies.

ALMEIDA—Gentlemen, I state with pleasure, precisely because I have never taken part in active politics, that our discussion has taken a turn nearly exclusively political. Mr. Smertenko has also emphasized this point. However, remember one thing that Zilboorg has called to our attention: the act of the politicians, the military, and the economists may have some effect on history, but without any question the thoughts of philosophers will have the greatest effect on history.

Our essential problem is culture. Culture is undergoing profound changes. One of the most agreeable privileges of the Democracies was that we had the power to say when anything changed for the worse, that it was the fault of the government. Now even the governments of the most powerful countries are undergoing a most terrible upheaval. It would not be right to embarrass them.

Yes, culture is undergoing profound changes. This is the time to investigate what it was, what it is, and what it may become. Well then, I return to our point of departure. Culture is an aspiration toward the beautiful and the true. I understand Mr. Wousaofong perfectly when he says that the artist must replace the priest, since we can no longer give people an idea, childish, if you like, of what they desire—a sort of paradise—it is up to the artist to give them something that will replace this idea. He plays, in part, the role of the priest. But there is another side to the problem. He must present not all the truth, because we do not possess it, but the greatest amount of truth possible. We must, at least, re-establish the respect for truth in all its forms. I do not fear overmuch for the future of culture, so long as there are enough people capable of understanding and loving truth for itself.

A FRENCH TOWN *today*

BY
RUDOLF SELKE

THE country is sinister. When, on a summer morning as cold as an October day further north, you pass through in a short little train, composed of three almost empty cars, you are plunged into a sickening fog and you seem to hear the voices of the dead. The fog perpetuates itself—all nature is tinted with the same opaque colors of slate and moldiness. There are neither trees nor bushes here, just a few moss-like grasses. The plateau is stone-covered. Occasionally, these stones pile up into a hamlet. You find it hard to believe that these scattered anthills, this mineral still life, are really composed of walls, roofs, a more or less developed architecture. Nevertheless, slender volutes of smoke witness the presence of man.

The train descends into a precipice. It is warmer, and suddenly the precipice grows into a valley. The various shades of green of pine forests, meadows, vegetable gardens, relieve you, as if you had discovered them on the moon, but still it is sad and oppressive. Only the summer sky, luminous, deep and hopelessly distant, retains the proverbial happiness and warmth of the French Midi. . . . A little archaic bridge astride a stream. . . . Broken-down buildings. . . . A sordid railroad station, containing a trainful of merchandise, cans of milk. . . . And the typical gendarme. You have now arrived in Mende, capital of the department of Lozere, episcopal seat.

How far we are from the rich and gay provinces of France! This is the humblest department; Mende, the smallest, most miserable of all capitals. At first sight, this town is nothing but a mass of moldy stones, only somewhat larger than the ones we saw on the plateau. When we penetrate into this town, we are primarily impressed with its age-old poverty. Nevertheless, this town holds within its walls all that goes into the make-up of French life: Prefecture, City Hall, Palais de Justice, bishop's seat, convents, priests' seminaries, *lycée,* hospitals, prison, cinema, cafés, small shops. There is a daily newspaper, a literary and scientific society, and, of course, a brothel.

Mende shares with all other French cities a petrified past, the heritage of Roman domination, the Hundred Years' War, the Great Revolution, and local legends, horrible, edifying, and unbelievable.

The passions and interests are similar to those described by French writers of all time, and sooner or later you make the discovery that Mende is the town of Emma Bovary, the town of skeptical and human Monsieur Bergeret, the city of the "pals" of Jules Romains. It is also the town of the Frenchman of the year 1941, for his present existence is the diminished and embarrassed existence of defeated France. Isolated by the desert which surrounds it and by the absence of adequate roads which causes the town to be snow-bound all winter, it reacts to

the national misfortune as sensitively—although with considerably less violence—as any great center.

The Cathedral Square is the only spectacular place of the town. It is formed by the yellow-stone Gothic church, a singularly charmless building; by the Palais de Justice, which can be nothing but a miniature Greek temple; by a good-looking building in the Renaissance style, the former bishop's county seat, occupied by the Prefecture since the Combes reforms. This square is empty, ill-paved, lulled to sleep by the fastidious tinkling of a poor bell.

The Cathedral Square has already forgotten the summer of 1940, when it was transformed into a camp for nomads coming on queer vehicles: camouflaged Paris buses, tourist cars tied around with mattresses and covered with household bric-a-brac, harnessed horses, mules, oxen, bending under the weight of their loads —furniture, clothing, grandmothers, babies, canaries in their cages, goats, rabbits, chickens —even small tanks with their machine guns, and enormous steel-fortified trucks, anti-aircraft guns emerging from their roofs, with the occupants, an entire family, bathing in the interior.

It was an invasion of soldiers seeking their regiments, Parisian merchants, Champagne peasants, Alsatian gendarmes, but especially husky blond boys and giant girls from Flanders, Belgium, and Holland. Submerging the small dark silhouettes of the native population, they shook the air with raucous, unintelligible sounds, bringing with them the tumultuous spirit of northern industrial and proletarian centers. The number of inhabitants jumped from six to twenty-seven thousand! Towards autumn, the caravans disappeared, the Cathedral Square resumed its yellow, mournful, sleepy aspect, becoming once more the itinerary of old bigots, funerals, more frequent now because of the wounded dying at the hospital, and weddings, less frequent, because the young men are prisoners, had wandered far away, or had buried themselves in camps later baptized "chantiers de la Jeunesse."

The magnificent facade of the Renaissance palace remains purely decorative—it is not used as an entrance. People enter and leave by the side adjoining the square of the Prefecture, real center of the town, as narrow and animated as the former is spacious and deserted. Encircled by houses blacked by the centuries, separated by a maze of enigmatically named streets, the Prefecture square hustles and bustles as only small-town squares, which have remained medieval, can. Two or three specimens of each category of passers-by suffice to fill it—a few peasants in long black shirts, a half-dozen vegetable-women, some demobilized soldiers, an obviously unemployed man, two nuns in winged bonnets, enormous crosses hanging from their necks, a group of seminary students conducted by a priest, a few *gardes mobiles* escaped from the forbidden zone, feeling out of place and therefore affecting a bland appearance. Blood-stained men carrying a slaughtered pig, still warm. A uniformed fellow who beats the drum and calls out the news—the town crier.

This old lady, gray hair severely gathered under a modest hat, all in mourning, is Madame Francois, owner of the "Bagatelle"; it is said that her "girls" resemble her. This other lady, shaped like a Valkyrie, dressed in what is believed to be in Mende the latest Paris fashion, too heavily made up, too blonde — this is Madame la Préfète.

Sometimes, on a fine day, you can see peasant women kissing the hand of a little pot-bellied old man in a soutane. This is Monseigneur, taking a walk. Sometimes the sombre, fleshless silhouette of the director of the seminary can be seen with him. And then there is the mayor, officer of the Legion of Honor, a very brave man who distinguished himself in the war and who is also very courageous—which is not the same thing. In the countless patriotic proclamations he is obliged to address to his fellow citizens, he always forgets the words *"patrie"* and *"honneur."*

II

THE country is Catholic. Convents, hospices, seminaries, church properties are so numerous in and around Mende that, overlooking this bare and desolate country, they give the impression of a sort of savage "holy city." The Church has for centuries inherited from the rich.

This sad old woman, practically blind, who sells firewood and apples in a smelly, moldy little shop, owns three houses, and her bank account is figured in the tens of thousands of francs. Her husband is *huissier* in the courthouse. The old maid who assists her is their only child; when she is not with her mother, she can be found at mass or with the nuns. The day of her death, the family fortune, consider-

ably augmented, will pass on to the church. . . . The pharmacy of the Catholic hospital is a gem sparkling with precious woods, porcelains, silver—the only thing truly beautiful and well taken care of in the whole town. In the homes, however, there are no toilets—a pipe structure under the windows with funnel-like openings must suffice.

Nevertheless, although believers, obeying the clergy and obsessed by the desire of getting rich, the little people of Mende are not at all fanatical, not even reactionary. In the elections of 1936, the majority of the town—where there practically are no workers—voted for the Popular Front. Among the members of the municipal council, there is only one rightist. This has not changed since. No chauvinism whatever. In the pogrom atmosphere so assiduously promoted by the Vichymen, not one bad word is heard against the Jews. (It is true that there are only two Jewish merchants in Mende, both strangers to the town.) On the contrary, some of the other merchants, the artisans, and especially the nuns are generally heard expressing sympathy for them.

If there is hatred of strangers, it is hatred of the Germans. They are not hated because they defeated France, but because they plunder and humiliate the country; because, in each home, there is a father, son, or brother prisoner; and in some, families of men who remained in England after Dunkirk and are now fighting in Africa or in the southern seas with the Free French.

A year, a year and half ago, the restrictions were hardly noticeable. But now, a penurious existence, very near to hunger, has begun to weigh even on this little town. There is nothing but disgust for the miserable sheets which were once the French press, which now cry that the British want to starve French women and children. Here the Bishop, the veterinary, the baker, and the green-grocer are of the same opinion: France could have easily withstood the British blockade were it not for the Germans, who take away all the wheat, all the meat, all the oil, all the tobacco, and even the *pinard,* who grab all imports from North Africa at the harbors. If there is no thread, no needles, no cooking pots and pans, it is only because the Germans have converted French industry into a tank and cannon factory for "their" war.

The British are well liked. When someone asks another his opinion of a news item, the answer is stereotyped: "I listen to the British radio." Through the open windows of homes, stores, cafes, shops, even administration offices, could be heard the voice of the BBC announcer. One grocer even preferred broadcasts in the English language, only to show where his sympathies lay. But now it is all over. Prison awaits those who listen to British, American, or Russian stations. But people listen secretly, and nothing is believed but news from the above sources.

It is true that there is great sorrow when the British lose a battle, and there are bitter words for the incapacity of their generals. But these are not words of anger, only of disappointment and the feeling of being thwarted in the advancement of their cause.

Now and then, the invisible presence of the Germans takes on a shape. A be-swastika'd plane crashed in the mountain. A small detachment of German troops comes to look for it. What hours of the day or night they devote to their assigned duty is difficult to imagine. All day long they seem to fill the town. Here they are coming out of the tailor's, the department store, the jeweller's, the optician's—always loaded with packages of all sizes. They empty the stores of fine materials, of ladies' underwear, of bicycles, cameras and photographic equipment, watches, luggage, paying with their cursed marks (at twenty francs). Nothing escapes them. Only the little tailor, beaming with pride, tells how he gave them nothing, absolutely nothing, not even a meter, swearing that all he had in the shop belonged to his customers. . . .

It is Thursday, day of the cinema. There are two queues in front of the box office, one formed by the inhabitants and the boys of the *chantier de la jeunesse,* the other by the German soldiers. The French stare at them amid a pregnant silence, until they go up to the balcony. By some chance, a pre-Munich film preaching French-British-German cooperation is being shown, weak and false as that entire period. During the intermission, two or three boys of the *Jeunesse*—hope of Darlan which has turned sour on him—get up from their seats, aroused by the presence of the Boches in their cinema. A critical moment. The public is full of voluptuous suspense. The group's chief saves the situation, visibly much against his will, by his military authority. The evening passes without incident. At the exit, let us stop a moment before a poster which can be seen in all cinemas in France and her colonies. It warns those who leave during the

news showing that they will have to pay another admission fee, since "it is intolerable that a minority should, by their attitude, keep the public from seeing a faithful picture of new France."

This spirit of resistance is more defined in the other social sector, that formed by the administration and the intelligentsia. The Préfet, sporting a military gray moustache and a bold smile at the approach of any female, is vaguely radical, but "does not mix in politics." He puts all his energy into hiding from the eye of the new masters, at the same time shutting *his* eye before the methodical sabotage of his subordinates who joyfully "bury" many instructions coming from Vichy. He is cowardly, completely devoid of convictions, except one: that the institution of the Prefecture will resist every assault. The Secretary-General, the chief of the cabinet, his assistant, are more open in their aversion for the new "ideas." The town commissaire resigned from his post, not wishing to obey the "capitulators." The chief of police brags of having secretly gone to England twice. The doctors, pharmacists, veterinarians, the departmental architect, are not only Anglophiles, but against the Government. The young teachers are all former members of the red unions. The Prefecture young ladies read Proust and Malraux, wear short skirts, and go without stockings. They laugh at the ideal of woman as wife and mother.

From this point to action—what a long road! Little towns do not encourage a strong will or the power to organize. All are not fighters, and the motifs of opposition to the regime are not always pure. One must go elsewhere for real work—in the occupied zone, for example.

At Mende you do what is done all over the free zone—you wait. . . .

III

THE patron saint of Mende is a Negro virgin. At the corners of blind alleys, niches decorated with artificial flowers, framing the brown face, childish and good, smiling at you over an awkward inscription, as if made by the little fingers of the madonna: *"Nigra sum sed formosa"*—I am black but beautiful.

Coptic missionaries brought her from Ethiopia when Gaul was still pagan. Her exotic and naive beauty won the people to Christianity.

What would happen to this negress today, were she to come to trouble people in this way? Gendarmes, smelling of perñod, would apprehend her, and she would be placed in a camp for undesirables. It would not be necessary to look far for such a camp. There is one at Riencros, three kilometers from the Prefecture of Mende, in the old seminary building, situated on a wooded slope overlooking a stream, surrounded by barbed wire. There is a grilled door beneath.

At first this building was used to imprison prostitutes, thieves, and tramps, later women

suspected of working for a foreign power. They are watched by inspectors of morals, recruited partly from the milieu which they must combat: physical or moral brutes, with the gestures and elegance of pimps, always drunk and always ready to be bought for a box of cigars. Since October, 1939, hundreds of women have been sent to this camp, some in their nightgowns. A few were known to be communist, but most were simply refugees—women teachers, painters, writers, actresses, clerks, housewives, workers; German, Austrian, Polish, Russian, Czech, Spanish, Italian. While their husbands, sons, brothers fought in the French Army or the Legion, or worked with a group on some public or military project, these women were housed with the prostitutes and thieves, covered with vermin; subjected to the practical jokes of individuals accustomed to the white slave trade, full of hate for any being socially superior to themselves; expelled and declared to be "dangerous to public safety."

All intervention by deputies, lawyers, organizations is tabu. The "sheltered" woman who leaves the camp is subject to a prison term of from six months to three years. A woman who went to town to get drunk was condemned to six months' imprisonment for "trying to escape." This is why the prison door is not guarded.

A few were freed by decision of a parliamentary commission. The authorities continue to forget to release them. Some women have gone mad; others have forever lost their health. During the entire war, only two were released: a rich prostitute and an adventuress implicated in a political murder.

The fault is not so much Pétain's as Daladier's. Some day, when we look for the causes of the debacle, we shall not forget the infamous treatment of anti-nazi refugees by the Government of the Republic. Worse than that, of wives and mothers of those who fought for her.

Vichy sent a colonel to study the files of five hundred women at the Riencros Camp. An honest man, he remained perplexed before 80 per cent of these "blank" files. These women were completely innocent. But still Vichy does not release them; the regime has no desire to release anti-fascist refugees. Only the privileged, who have succeeded in obtaining visas may leave. The rest are there to stay.

The inhabitants of Mende suffer from the presence of this camp, as if it were a personal misfortune. They are stirred with the deepest sympathy for these women, as if conscious of the stranger come from Africa, whose slanty eyes follow them from their street corners. When one of these women comes to town, the little shopkeepers, so prudent and parsimonious, who would never consent to infringe on the rationing prescription for a neighbor, bring out bags of sugar, coffee, flour, bottles of oil, cut off big slices of lard, fill the stranger's basket with bread!

There are those who cry, "What injustice!" They say, "What a shame." And they add, "We must not be blamed for it—the Germans have done this. They are the rulers of all France."

The upper clergy exerts itself for the interned women. Last winter, the municipality placed at their disposal the salon of the City Hall, for an exposition of works of art. Madame la Préfète and the "society" of Mende came and bought and ordered for thousands of francs. It was a true political manifestation.

The inhabitants of this small town are neither stronger nor braver than their compatriots in other regions of France. All depends on events. The people are waiting.

SCIENCE AND THE GLOBAL WAR

BY

T. SWANN HARDING

THOUGH the United States unofficially re-entered the violent phase of the present World War which began in September, 1939, on May 16, 1940, and though this nation was attacked and forced to engage in hostilities officially immediately after December 7, 1941, we still have little understanding of the conflict. The Global War did not, of course, begin in September, 1939; only the present phase began then. If a date must be picked for its beginning, this would probably be March 31, 1905, on which day the German Kaiser spectacularly disembarked in the harbor of Tangier. Yet even earlier than this, Germany had served notice on the "have" nations, France and Great Britain, of her intention to carve out a colonial empire for herself, if necessary at their expense.

In 1904, it will be remembered, France expressed polite "disinterest" in Egypt, which was ostensibly an independent nation, whereupon Great Britain promised to leave Morocco, also ostensibly an independent nation, to France. Later the same year, Spain and France signed a treaty which, like the Franco-British document, ironically guaranteed Moroccan integrity. Germany complained of being ignored during these proceedings and, in 1905, when Russia was engaged with Japan, she acted. The Kaiser appeared in Tangier. This prolonged and aggravated crisis was destined to develop finally into global war. As a result of Germany's action, an international conference was called in Algeciras. There Great Britain faithfully supported France while Austria appeared as the second of Germany. The General Act, signed April 7, 1906, was dutifully accepted by the Sultan of Morocco. It guaranteed the economic internationalization of his realm, though Germany recognized the "special position" of France in that territory.

Under these circumstances it is scarcely remarkable that Morocco remained far from tranquil. Shootings, stabbings, and revolts became frequent, giving France and Spain provocation to intervene. In 1907, the French had landed in Casablanca. During 1908, France and Germany sparred there over the circumstances surrounding the handling of six deserters from the Foreign Legion. A new agreement was made February 8, 1909. Then the Rif tribesmen revolted and it took fifty thousand Spanish soldiers to quell them. But other disturbances followed; France landed more troops; and finally on July 1, 1911, the German gunboat "Panther" suddenly appeared at Agadir, ostensibly to protect Germany's interests—which France and Britain denied she had. Once more the Entente Powers stood together; the treaty of November 4, 1911, followed. France now got the right to occupy certain points in Morocco as needed and to serve the Moroccan Government in foreign relations, as well as to control its finances and pay foreign debtors. Germany got no political rights in Morocco whatever, but was rewarded with a huge slice of the French Congo, much to the disturbance of the French public. Germany had bluffed her way into colonial power.

The Global War was under way. In 1912, it flamed into violence in the Balkans. Here the great powers were once more fighting one another through the medium of smaller powers, just as they had done in Morocco and as they were later to do in Spain and elsewhere. Finally in 1914, the latent hostilities between the powers escaped control altogether and the Global War flared into world-wide proportions. It engaged more and more nations until in November, 1918, stalemate was reached. An

armistice was signed, but no real peace ensued because no basic understanding was arrived at.

During the years following 1918, a similitude of peace existed but the war continued by economic penetration and diplomatic pressure. Finally in 1931, open hostility flared in China, Japan making the attack for the "have-not" powers. During the Spanish Civil War the world-revolutionary aspects of the Global War became apparent to all who stopped to think. In 1939, the conflict once more openly engaged the great powers and the mutual destruction of human life and property has proceeded at an accelerated pace ever since.

From the standpoint of what is idealized as civilized man it is a primary insanity to arm and deliberately go forth to murder other men and to destroy their property. Yet practically the entire world is now engaged in this essentially irrational activity. Why is that?

Stated with extreme brevity, the cause is the abuse of scientific knowledge and of the technology based upon it. The startling discoveries of a rather small number of disinterested scientific investigators placed in the hands of humanity physical power which it lacked social and economic insight to utilize constructively. Instead, this power was put to use for exploitation, aggression, and destruction. Whereas science and the machine had made freedom from want a physical possibility, man had refused to use these gifts for the enrichment of culture and the promotion of a high standard of living for all. R. M. Evans, a contributor to FREE WORLD, summed up the situation last year when he declared: "The common people of the world today are in revolt against a system that has not properly used the machine and has failed to provide them with a fair and sufficient distribution of the world's goods. The conflict today is a world-wide civil war." Milo Perkins made the point even more clearly in his recent speech when he described this as a long time fight to make a mass-production economy work, and a struggle transcending the present hostilities. The world had proved unable to distribute what it had learned how to produce. "We put up with a civilization which was commodity-rich but consumption-poor too long to avert the present catastrophe," he went on. "When the history of this period is written, . . . the present war will be treated as an incident of the adjustment to the scientific realities of our time. . . . The battle started when the machines became important in the lives of men. It should be over within the generation following this conflict."

This does not in any sense mean that science and technology automatically lead to war, global or otherwise; they could as easily lead to progress and peaceful plenty. The present conflict assumes a global aspect because of technology; we were inevitably drawn in for that reason. But the issue is to determine how man shall use science and the machine. Shall man be slave or master? The anarchical progress and exploitation of science and the machine led to the present war when men like the Nazis sensed their economic and political significance but lacked the culture and humanitarianism to use them constructively. Meanwhile, the exploitation of scientific knowledge had created in man a certain fatalism. He felt lost in a world much too complex for him to comprehend; and the next thing he knew, great blocs of nations were locked in supercontinental wars and seeking mutual annihilation.

II

MODERN man became enamored of mechanical force. He was fascinated by its esthetic precision and sheer power. His machines tended to enslave him because he forgot to develop social and economic science to match progress in physical and biological science. Hence the social forces in operation about him became much too complex and intangible for him to understand. He began to shape his life to ends he did not will. The very geometrical and time patterns forced on him physically and mentally by the machine created outbreaks of nervous irritability.

Thus man's abuse of science and the state of heightened nervous and mental sensibility which supervened as a result made some sort of mass insanity inevitable. That the outbreak first came in and near Europe was also inevitable because it was filled with mutually hostile so-called sovereign powers the very existence of which advances in technology had made obsolete. Furthermore, European industry could no longer sustain its population at a decent standard of living while a return to a simpler, more frugal agrarian existence was impossible as well. Physiologically and psychologically the total conscious activity of human beings is traditional, however. It was natural that they should consider escape from such a situation. For a long time immigration to the

United States offered Europe an outlet for her excess population. But with that avenue gone after we reduced immigration to almost nothing, Central European nations began to regard themselves as have-nots and to imagine that colonies would solve their problem.

Man habitually reacts to situations in accord with inborn connections—conditioned reflexes—which lead to emotions that, once activated, have from time immemorial determined his actions and his reactions merely because they have customarily gone together in the past. The Nazis espoused the philosophy that they could overcome the barriers to their national well-being, not rationally, but by smashing other nations. They planned the step carefully. Psychologists would regard the Nazis as men animated by "displaced aggression." For the time, the Germans could feel that the success of the Nazis and of the Army amounted to their own individual success. They could substitute group success, even though it involved insensate smashing of other nations, as satisfying their own wants. We must beware in return of imagining that our own well-being will necessarily be improved and our democracy strengthened merely by smashing totalitarianism.

Once the Global War has involved the great powers, it must inevitably cover the world before it ended. Thorstein Veblen foresaw this in his "Theory of Business Enterprise," which appeared in 1904. "Whatever the forces at work in the modern situation may eventually bring to pass," he wrote, "the outcome must touch all communities in the same way and in approximately the same degree. If the outcome is dynastic politics and armament again played to a finish in popular squalor, aristocratic virtues, and universal bankruptcy, there will be no peaceable community of matter-of-fact mechanics and shopkeepers left in reserve from which to make a new cultural and industrial start."

Hence isolation was even more impossible for us in 1939 than it was in 1914. When the Kaiser landed at Tangier in 1905, he began the Global War for us as well as for all other nations. We, least of all, have ever been isolationist. In Washington's Administration Citizen Genet was here trying to get us to aid France in Europe. Our difficulties with him and with the French Government continued intermittently until after the defeat of Napoleon. At the same time we had our troubles with England until after the War of 1812. In Jefferson's Administration we, ourselves, went halfway across the world to quell the Tripoli pirates. And finally, John Quincy Adams promulgated the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 to protect not only our own country but all of this hemisphere from European inroads. Even as late as our own Civil War, the interference of England and France in our political affairs was so great that the Czar of Russia sent his fleet into New York and San Francisco harbors to save us from that threat.

We have never been isolated. It is only ignorance of history that made anyone think so. We have always formed an integral part of European civilization. If the countries of Europe let us alone, we got into their affairs by our own efforts. We have, therefore, been in the Global War from its very inception. Where will this war take us and when will it end?

III

MODERN war is a conflict of machines, industrial and military. That power ultimately comes out on top in any temporary stalemate which manages to retool and make machines superior to those of its enemies. In this process blueprints must be drawn, machine tools must be produced, mass-production machines must be tooled, and after a year or so, quantity production of new models is possible. Consequently the nation which decides some years in advance that it intends to go to war has a tremendous advantage over powers which feel satisfied, want peace, and have to build their military machine almost from scratch. Much territory can be occupied and consolidated by the aggressors before their slower opponents get into mass production with better models. Then the process is repeated. The original aggressors go through it all over again under wartime conditions, to come out with better machines and try again. In time, the war reaches another temporary stalemate. The human element is exhausted. Raw materials run out. An armistice is necessary. New soldiers must be trained, new machines produced, new political alliances cemented.

As of 1939, we were the "have" nations. Time and materials were on our side. It was a question of mobilization and production. That is true no longer. The Axis Powers now control 90 per cent of the world's rubber, 70 per

cent of the tin, 65 of the bauxite. Their iron-ore production is but slightly less than that of the United Nations, and they have increased their holdings of zinc, lead, and chrome enormously. The Axis not only controls 43 per cent of the world's steel, a third of the cotton, half the cement, a third of the wood pulp and the manganese and 86 per cent of the potash, but also a third of the wheat, 60 per cent of the rye, 44 per cent of the sugar, and half the butter and margarine. All this means that we cannot sit back and wait for time and production to win for us.

At present, machines and instruments designed for the destruction of human life and property become increasingly complex, expensive, and efficient. Just now the nations are busily engaged in the industrious and workmanlike total destruction of one another's cities. The result of this destruction in terms of world impoverishment almost surpasses computation. To do this job well, however, requires enormous sums of real wealth—raw materials, technical skill, equipment, energy. Today a nation in total war must devote from 60 to 70 per cent of its wealth and energy to destructive ends, leaving but the small residue to maintain a greatly lowered standard of living for civilians. Therefore vast populations the world over live in desperate want and privation so that they may send well-fed, well-clothed, well-armed men by land, sea, and air to destroy the lives and property of others. The effort is not only gigantic, it has a certain magnificence. But it involves strain. It seems logical to believe, therefore, that the present phase of open hostility can scarcely extend beyond three or four years more. The degree of exhaustion and impoverishment achieved by that time will exceed anything known to history. But technology and mass production fortunately still make it possible for spent nations to recover quickly despite their loss of healthy men in mass homicide.

It is reasonable to suppose that some of the powers are already approaching the stage of material and psychological exhaustion which will make a cessation of active hostilities necessary before so very long. It seems certain, however, that what the Axis may have lost in striking power in Europe it has gained in Asia where Japan has the wealthiest and mightiest empire of all time, if she can consolidate her gains. A probable end to the present phase of open hostilities will be the formation of three or four huge geographical blocs which will arm intensively to renew the conflict. The armistice during which this occurs will doubtless be mistaken for peace by many. It may last several years. By the end of it great blocs of nations should exist. The nations composing the blocs would be welded together; the blocs would be mutually hostile. The most murderous phase yet of the Global War should then begin. Our own position should be better than that of almost any other contestants because we began the struggle fabulously rich in real wealth and our power is as yet all but untouched.

There are those who believe that the Global War will continue in one manner or another for an additional generation. In a wide, human sense there can be no victor and no vanquished in this struggle. Only ruin will follow. But the time must come when human beings will not be able to suffer or tolerate the drastic privations at home or the horrors of mechanized warfare. By that time human wealth will have been thoroughly destroyed, the human biological heritage will have been squandered. That point will be one of the most critical in world history. Humanity may then plan to use science intelligently and constructively for the enrichment of human life and culture and to control its destructive uses, or it may once more exploit scientific knowledge so that renewed warfare becomes inevitable. Unless science becomes the servant of the public, there can be no lasting peace and no democracy.

The scheme of life in which we have lived since about 1850 was not planned. It just happened as the result of discoveries by a few scientists and the application of this knowledge at haphazard by technologists, industrialists, businessmen, and bankers. No master plan and no high national or world purpose was in mind. The very complexity of it all bewildered us. Yet science and the machine had created the foundation for a world society. The world design inherited from our ancestors would no longer do; and the continuance of old-fashioned power politics provoked world anarchy and chaos. If we still lack world vision and global understanding, if we persist in fighting merely for the restoration of obsolete sovereignties, the return of colonial rights, the re-establishment of national frontiers, or some new balance of power, if we do not recognize the necessity for building a new and rational world society, we shall perpetuate this anarchy and chaos.

How THE YOUTH of LATIN AMERICA *live*

by Hugo Fernández Artucio

THE present drama of Latin American youth constitutes a fact perceptible by mere intuition. Any traveller who has had an opportunity to visit the cities and hamlets south of the Rio Grande has doubtless observed young men leading a lamentable life of idleness, without education, without work, and without joy in living. These young people who have suffered so precociously the loss of all illusion, whose energies are dispersed in prejudices and deeds that are anti-social, these are the ones who fall such easy prey to politico-social movements which cultivate a "dynamic" philosophy. Through a neglect that has been brought about by complex sociological causes, contemporary Latin American youth is ripe for enlistment in the destructive and murderous cause of fascism.

Essentially three intervening factors create this situation: First, and fundamentally, it may be said that in general young men in Latin America do not have adequate opportunities for work which will at once absorb their superabundant energies and contribute to the formation of a character at a period in their lives when, in the majority of cases, the material and moral possibilities of their adulthood are being limited and defined. In the second place, these youths spend the most precious years of their lives like shorn lambs in an untempered wind, with no far-seeing program of social solidarity to assist and to save them. And finally, even those who are in the privileged position of receiving a systematic education prove that in practice they lack the mental equipment to face the developing needs of the world of today. For to the confusion of ideas—political, religious and others—is added our modern method of news transmission with its ceaseless assault by a mass of material jammed full with intellectual and emotional content.

I wish to present a vivid and eloquent picture which illustrates these general assertions. For this purpose I take the example of Argentine youth, that is to say, of a new generation which would occupy the highest point on a graph of conditions of life, education, and work in all Latin America. In other words, I offer to the reader the least grave, or least tragic example, because Argentina, from the viewpoint of its material progress and of the exemplary character of many of its social and educational institutions, is the country which, among all the Spanish– and Portuguese-speaking Republics of Latin America, offers the least virulent conditions of a grave social malady.

I have taken as a basis for this somewhat delicate exposition two notable documents: a study by the Argentinian educator and sociologist, Ernesto Nelson, and an exposition of the motives behind a proposed law presented to the Argentinian Parliament by the Deputy and educator Don Americo Ghioldi, recently an official visitor to this country. Finally, I have consulted official Argentinian statistics drawn up in 1938 by the engineer, Alejandro Bunge.

Since the population of the Republic of Argentina at that time was estimated as 12,700,000, it is calculated that the number of youths between 15 and 19 years of age is about 1,100,000, of which 604,000 are males (580,000 natives and 24,000 foreigners) and 552,000 are females (535,000 natives and 17,000 foreigners). The youths between 20 and 24 years of age were about 1,100,000, maintaining the same proportions as above.

How do these 1,100,000 youths between 15 and 19 spend their time? In 1937, statistics established the figure of 35,000 for youths of that age employed by industry (25,064 males and 9,286 females) out of an industrial population for the entire country of 580,487. To this figure should be added the number of stu-

dents, which is approximately 90,000, after deducting the figure of approximately 25,000 university students, since they are always over 19 years old. It is very difficult to establish the number of young people who work in the country, or in agriculture. The Argentinian technician mentioned above estimates the figure at approximately 150,000.

In short, of 1,100,000 young people between 15 and 19 years old, only 300,000 are regularly occupied at manual or intellectual tasks. The remaining 800,000 form an immense and suffering army, forsaken, condemned to enforced idleness, discouraged and skeptical—corroded by social bitterness, propitious material for the formation of bands of country vagabonds, of urban rogues, and perhaps for the formation of assault troops with which a native fascism is preparing to destroy the noble institutions which hold together the democratic tradition of the Argentine people.

Besides this question posed by the occupation of so small a part of the youth, there arises the dark problem of the essential lack of culture of those legions. May we be permitted on this point also to return to the example of Argentina, for the very reason that the Republic is, with the single exception of the Republic of Uruguay, the Latin American country containing the least number of illiterates.

Only 37 per cent of Argentinian youths have completed their primary schooling; only 13 per cent have finished grammar school; and only 8 per cent complete their secondary education. When these figures are compared with the estimates in the preceding paragraphs, one arrives at the amazing conclusion that the Argentine Republic—the country which has less illiteracy than any in all Latin America—produces annually 30,000 illiterates of the age of twenty.

"It is sad," as Professor Ernesto Nelson truthfully says, "to verify such a condition in a brutally objective manner. For years this process has been repeating itself, and it necessarily and progressively lessens the proportion of cultivated people in the population. In the superposition of the social classes, our cultural stratum is extremely thin, and rests upon thick layers of ignorance and frustration."

Now then, what happens to the youths who have the opportunity to study? A group of secondary teachers in Uruguay has asserted, on the basis of daily teaching experience, that during the last fifteen years young people have shown a markedly increasing tendency to abandon the study of the classics and a much more grave tendency to abandon the use of books. A "reading crisis" exists in Uruguayan teaching which has brought with it a sequel of vices that are serious from an intellectual point of view: parasitism of the student in regard to the teacher, evasion of responsibility by the student,

general lack of interest in the acquisition of a solid culture.

While traveling through South America under the auspices of the Council of Education of Uruguay, I had an opportunity through interviews with the teaching authorities in the majority of the Republics visited to note that the "Uruguayan" sickness is a continental sickness. As to its technical causes, I have arrived at the conclusion that teaching no longer offers young people, attracted as they are by the multiple incitements of present day life, a motive, a deep center of interest which can compete with the many causes of distraction.

Apparently, teaching does not offer at present the "technical defenses" necessary in order to present itself as more attractive than any of the other centers of interest which surround the young. And what is more serious, if lacks homogeneous and carefully wrought ideals. Naturally, I am speaking of teaching in democratic countries, inasmuch as totalitarian countries offer "ideals"—as England offered them during the time of the reform of Ruskin, or as they existed in Europe and in America at the beginning of the century under the aegis of liberalism. Teaching in America today does not, as a rule, enable young people to form an idea of the world which satisfies their eager spiritual yearning. The problem was stated recently by a Latin American writer, the present Minister of Education of the Republic of Colombia, Don Germán Arciniegas, in a talk given to a group of students from the United States and Latin America. He said that our cultural problem lies not merely in the extension of literacy to the great masses, but also in the creation of a pedagogic instrument necessary to give to the man-to-be an idea that he belongs to an organic cycle, which includes the species and the cosmos, man and the earth.

The foregoing applies to those young people who have the opportunity to receive culture. How dark is the outlook when one thinks about the enormous masses who receive no culture and whose minds are like great tracts of land lying fallow. Their consequent material contribution to contemporary American social organization endangers our entire inherited tradition of democracy, and hence the very future of the southern part of the hemisphere.

More than half a century ago, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, the great Argentinian pedagogue who was also president of the Republic, after having struggled all his life against tyranny, established, "Educate the sovereign," as the epitome of his thoughts on government. Educate the sovereign, yes, because that means enabling the people to exercise that attribute, sovereignty, which is the basis of the democratic conception of the modern state. That is a fundamental and urgent task which identifies itself with the defense of democracy in America. To approach it with courage and decision is one way of defeating totalitarianism.

—Translated by Richard Holder

HUNGARY: *Germany's silent partner*

By DAVID F. STORRS

NAZI Germany has a partner which Hitler, contrary to his usual tactics, is shielding from public view as much as possible. That partner is Hungary, whose adherence to the Axis is played down to a minimum for reasons best known to the nazi propaganda machine. Thus, although Hungarian armies are fighting side by side with the Germans against Russia, they are never mentioned in German dispatches; on the other hand, the recent resignation of Admiral Horthy as Regent of Hungary has been worked around to place him in a sympathetic light as an unwilling collaborator with nazism. Like the mission of Horthy's distant relative and fascist agent, Tibor Eckhardt, in the United States, these suspicious circumstances indicate that the Nazis hope to see the silent partnership with Hungary as a sort of lifeline to safety if and when the war goes against them.

As a matter of fact, from the very first steps of aggression made by the Nazis in Central Europe, Hungary has been playing the jackal to Germany's lion. Immediately after Munich, Hungary obtained southern Slovakia, a territory which never belonged to her but which she had once before taken from the Slovaks. Later came the Hungarian occupation of Transylvania; and, after the defeat of Yugoslavia, the final grab of northern Serbia.

Everywhere the record of Hungarian occupation is the same. A frightful, bestial treatment of the population which in many respects surpasses the terrorism of the Nazis and is always used in the service of the German masters, has won for the Hungarians the undying hatred of the people of Central Europe. The court record of an episode in a city of Slovakia that must be nameless shows what they have to suffer. The names of the characters and localities are slightly changed to save the victims from further violence. The innkeeper Vendelin Monak gave this testimony under oath.

"Before the Hungarians occupied Slavikov and Bottovo, near Rimska Seci, we were assured by our Government that no harm would come to us. So we stayed in our homes, for we too saw in the Hungarians only a people we had never harmed. We quickly learned that our Government was wrong. Already the first day, that is, the morning of November seventh, the soldiers surrounded my house. On the next day, the guard opened my living quarters and in burst Hungarian storm troopers, who without any ado put us in irons and took us, also Jan Vyrom and Josef Oskvarkom, to the police station at Rimska Seci. There we were asked what it was we were doing on October fifth, the day the Hungarian terrorists first fell upon our settlement.

"The next day, that is, November ninth, the storm troopers dragged us to the military headquarters at Rimska Seci, where they locked us up. With us they imprisoned the wife of Commissary Novak of Rimska Seci, also the Commissary Master of Jehlava and his father and thirteen-year-old son. There were seven of us in all. Then into the room came soldiers, Hungarian Hussars, who occupied the town. They carried thongs of horsehide. With these they bound our hands behind us and then stood us along the room facing the wall, and with other ropes, some braided three times, they began to beat us, head and body. Three times the soldiers were replaced with a fresh unit. They were assisted in this four and a half hours of torture by a Hungarian storm trooper. At three o'clock, when we were all more or less unconscious, and thought the boy and the woman dead, a Hungarian officer with black inlays on his uniform came in and told the soldiers not to beat us any more. He then looked us over to see if any were dead, and went out again.

"We were kept in this place until the fourteenth of November. We slept on a bit of hay that was brought us each evening by the soldiers. Food was given us twice a day. While we who were in irons were being beaten and

tortured, others of our village, including the women, were threatened with the same treatment if they did not move out of the occupied territory given to Hungary by Germany. These, too, were under continual military guard. On November fourteenth, we who were in irons were placed on military trucks and taken to Feledinca, the county military headquarters. But there they would not accept us on account of the confusion; so we were taken to Rimska Sobota, where they kept us each in solitary confinement until November twenty-seventh. On this day Hungarian storm troopers took us back to the military headquarters at Feledinca for a hearing.

"I was the first to be brought before the Hungarian commander, who put these questions to me: 'Who of your village returned the fire of our soldiers on the fourth of October? Who was it that shot our corporal during the firing? Talk now! We know it was some of you.'

"I told him I knew nothing; that when the firing opened on our village, I was busy getting to safety the women and children whose husbands were away in the army. The major then told me that as innkeeper I must know, that in an inn everything is discussed. I kept telling him I knew nothing. And I really knew nothing. But I did say that the Slovakian civilian population did not take part in the fight with the Hungarians, which was also the truth.

"At which the commander ordered the soldiers to take me out, saying, 'We'll loosen that tongue of his.'

"Then storm troopers took me to other quarters, where there were two soldiers present. Here they undressed me and bound me, naked, face down to a bench. Then with a strong birch they took turns in beating me wherever the blows landed. Mostly they beat me over the toes and heels, while a trooper held his hat over my face and gagged my mouth so I couldn't scream. The others of my fellow prisoners had to look on my torture. The soldiers and the storm troopers beat me until they broke the strong birch into pieces, pounding me between-times in the head with their fists, breaking one of my teeth. When my torturers saw that no beating could make me lose consciousness, they untied me from the bench and took me to the woodshed, where they stood my blood-dripping feet on a sharp-pointed block of wood, tied my hands back of me, and slinging a rope over a rafter in the woodshed, pulled me up until my feet barely touched the ground. I hung in this way for about half an hour, while the storm troopers stood by with a bucket of water until I should faint. But to their dismay I continued to remain conscious, at which they kept kicking me with their boots in the stomach and the groin. Then they took a block on which wood is chopped, about 25 or 30 kilos in weight, and hung it on my back with the remark: *'Doegoel j meg, te kutya buedoes tót!'* (Go on and die, you dog—you stinking Slovak!) But even this I stood for about another twenty minutes, whereupon they at last untied me, saying among themselves: *'Még ilyen eroes kutya tót nem volt a kezuenkben!'* (We've never had such a strong dog of a Slovak before.) Then they took me back to the room where they had undressed and beaten me and ordered me to dress and put my boots on. But my feet were so swollen, the boots weren't anywhere near their size; much less could I put them on. So a storm trooper put them on, by first ripping them and then squeezing my feet unmercifully into them.

"After all this, they again took me before the military commander, who asked me if my tongue was now loosened. I told him I couldn't tell him anything, because I knew nothing. He then began to storm and yell that he would again send me to the woodshed. Whereupon I told him I couldn't stand any more torture, that he better have me shot, or if he begrudged even a bullet for me, to have me hanged on the same rope on which I had been hoisted in the woodshed. When he saw

he could get nothing out of me, he winked at a storm trooper to take me out. The trooper took me to the prison cell, where I had to lie on bare boards.

"After me, Jan Vyrom and Josef Oskvarkom came in for torture of the same kind. When the storm troopers could not make Vyrom lose consciousness by beating, they squeezed his sexual organs so hard that he fainted dead away. With Oskvarkom they did not have the time to work so long, so three troopers encircled him and beat him with their fists until he fell to the floor, when they jumped up and down all over him. But even this torment couldn't make Oskvarkom tell what he didn't know. So they took him and locked him up also in our cell.

"The next day a soldier came in to look at us and when he saw the ledge of the cell all drenched with blood, he sent a doctor to treat us. He treated us and made us pay for it.

"But why talk further? From this it is plain to see what the Hungarians are. It was a relief to learn in the military prison at Budapest, where they later jailed us, that we were to be exchanged for Hungarian terrorists. Thus on the twentieth of December they put us, bound, on a police truck and took us to the station. Twenty-nine of us they put in a single coach, including four women, and one Catholic priest. Our money they took away from us, and for forty-eight hours we were given no food. Then under a strong guard they locked us up in a third-class coach and took us to Novy Zamky, where our Government was to take us in exchange for the Hungarians. But for some reason the train bringing the terrorists did not arrive as scheduled and we began to fear we would be taken back to Budapest when, at six o'clock, the glad news came. An engine was hooked to our car and took us to Galanty. There half an hour later came the train, with more than three hundred Hungarian terrorists and the Slovak delegation that took us over.

"We were freed of our irons, and as each name was called, we entered our own train that had brought the Hungarian terrorists. There everywhere—under benches, in ash containers, and on the racks—were remnants of bread of which the Hungarian terrorists had had their fill. We fell upon these pieces like beasts of prey and in a little while there wasn't a crumb of bread left in the coach. We didn't look to see if it was clean or not; the main thing was that it was bread and we were starving.

"And that is how they treated us in Hungary—whose own Magyars were treated decently among our people and, what is more, humanely."

II

THIS testimony does not represent an isolated instance of an individual or even a group. It is merely a more brutal manifestation of the manner that the people of the smaller countries are treated by the nazi masters and their satellites, whether these nations opposed nazi domination, like the Czechs, or submitted to it, like the Slovaks. Berlin and Budapest have become the leading slave markets of the world and Hungarians, as well as Germans, are treating the oppressed peoples in a way that would have scandalized the slave traders of ancient times.

Hungary has violated the right of asylum in regards to the Czechs for the sake of currying favor with the Nazis. After the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, thousands of Czechs crossed the border into Hungary believing that they would be protected by the international law which provides that such refugees, if captured, are subjected to a fine or a short imprisonment and are then free in the country where they have taken refuge. But

Hungary has no more respect for such laws than her nazi partner. Those Czechs who fell into the hands of Hungarian officials are held, not as political prisoners, but as common prisoners. Since 1939, hundreds of these refugees have been kept in the vile, ancient prisons of Hungary. High-ranking officers and diplomats, professors from the Prague and Brno universities, college and high school students have been kept in the unheated cells of the Budapest city jails, suffering hunger and cold and deprived of the most elementary sanitary conveniences and medical aid.

There are at the present moment known to be fifteen hundred of these Czech political prisoners in Hungary's prisons. Not one of these prisoners transgressed in any way except in seeking to escape from the threat of death and imprisonment which awaited them at home. Fifteen hundred known prisoners—but who can say how many more? The three worst Hungarian prisons, according to those who have managed to escape, are the vermin-laden Toronszhaz Concentration Camp, the Citadel, described as "in all probability the last medieval prison in actual use today," where 250 army officers, soldiers, students and professors are interned, and the concentration camp near Seged Hedmezovasardhaly where "more than a hundred Czech officers and civilian refugees are being mistreated with no regard for human decency and dignity."

The horrible conditions of these torture-camps are best indicated by the fact that many try to escape despite the strong probability of being shot. Now and then a miracle does occur; one gets through. One of the escaped tells a story of two Czech army officers who dared to face the hail of bullets in an attempted escape. Both were caught and thrown with several other men into fetid subterranean cells, where they are beaten and tortured by sadistic keepers. "Their food consists of black coffee, a bit of raw cabbage, a nauseous something called soup, and no bread of any kind. Their ragged clothing is no protection against cold and vermin. Their outlook is the daily threat of being turned over to the German executioners." Hunger, unsanitary conditions, and torture have worked havoc among the prisoners, both mentally and physically—for no succor comes from anywhere. One such unfortunate, in order to get a little food, broke the gold filling out of his tooth to buy a bit of bread from the guard. Nor are these three the only Hungarian prisons where not only international law, but Christianity and decency are violated. All the old prisons along the frontier towns of Hungary are overcrowded with Czech prisoners, especially along the Jugoslav, Slovak, and Rumanian frontiers.

From time to time, such as are to be delivered into German hands are collected at a concentration spot called Tolonzhaz. Here, on the bare concrete, in the bleak of winter, ill-clad, shivering, hungry unfortunates are forced to spend four or five months before they are taken to the Slovak border and there handed to waiting Gestapo. The selection of those who are to be returned is left to the capriciousness of the Hungarians. Nazi Germany can safely trust her Hungarian partner to anticipate her wishes. "Hungary knows no mercy," says one who escaped. "Brutality is rampant everywhere. Czechs from the highest walks of life are forced to associate with the lowest types of derelicts and criminals in Hungarian dungeons. They are fed only once a day. They have no means of exercise and are exposed to all the brutality and grossness of an overcrowded, unsupervised, unsanitary prison cell. Lack of food and medical attention are the greatest causes of suffering. One of the refugees, in need of surgical attention, after torture, was operated on while he was chained hand and foot. Forgotten and cut off from the rest of the world, they are forced to linger there, hoping even to be sent back to the German hell from which they tried to escape."

Slowly news of the actions of the Hungarian officials and storm troopers seeps out of the country and is even made known to the people of Hungary. The latter have taken no stand in opposition to the decisions of their leaders and have even been enthusiastic about the territorial gains which Hungary has made as a result of her partnership with Hitler. But now some of the marks on the debit side of the ledger are beginning to appear. They are written in the red blood of Hungarian youth as Hitler demands more and more men to aid his forces in the Russian campaign. News also of the terrible cost to the Hungarian troops in occupied Yugoslav territory is gradually spreading among the people. And finally, as everywhere else, Hitler has been taking the food of Hungary for his own purposes, and increasing complaints of local destitution are sounded throughout the land. The silent partner may soon cry out loud.

THE ROAD FORKS HERE

By Howard O. Eaton

Throw doubt on the motives of our Allies; hope that "Hitler and Stalin will bleed each other white"; give Hitler all the trumps in his game of "divide and conquer."

Remember—"United We Stand." Work for a "Philadelphia Convention" which will write a Declaration of the Independence of Man and formulate the peace aims of the Democracies.

Hint darkly that "the Communists have the only underground in Europe," and that the Reds will "take over" the day Hitler goes.

Create the basis for an "underground" of all lovers of freedom throughout subjugated Europe (including Communists).

Insist that we are merely fighting to restore the *status quo ante* and the world chaos of "sovereign states" which will breed other and bigger wars.

Insist that we are fighting to defend the "four freedoms," collective security, and the World Government which alone can achieve these goals.

Repeat to all and sundry that "the problem is terribly complicated and it is too much for the human brain to grasp." Don't try to do it.

Create a research institute of world reconstruction in collaboration with educational institutions to bring together the best brains for the solution of this problem.

Refuse to give thought to the problems of world government and economic reconstruction until "after the war is over."

Think NOW about the nature of the peace and the effective development of the United Nations into a World Government.

PLANS
FOR THE FUTURE

The interest in planning for the future is one of the most encouraging manifestations of the people's reaction to the war. This interest may be of immense help in the creation of a new and free world. However promising this interest may be, alone it is not enough. It must be buttressed by knowledge; it must be implemented by action. At present, precise knowledge of progressive forms of international organization and co-operation is the prime necessity. For unless these forms are discussed and evaluated, unless concrete proposals are formulated and public opinion is rallied behind them, the proponents of the status quo, the "experts" of reaction will again discard as utopian all ideas and suggestions leading to a democratic world order and will again establish a peace as "practical," as permanent, and as wise as the peace of Versailles and all the subsequent efforts at appeasement.

Since its foundation, FREE WORLD *has called upon all who are able, to dedicate themselves to these plans for the future. It has published many articles which have treated specific aspects of the problem of creating a free and democratic world order. But with this issue,* FREE WORLD *goes a step further by introducing a new section which will present the most important plans for the future formulated by government agencies and private organizations in the United States and abroad. We hope to secure from Europe and Asia, from free and subjugated countries, all the diverse proposals of future world organization which merit serious consideration.*

The Editors feel that this is one of the greatest services which FREE WORLD *can render to its readers and to the public in general. Our publication of these plans, which will be summarized as they become available rather than in the order of their importance, will in no sense signify our approval of the proposals. In fact, we shall feel free to comment critically on each plan when we present it, and every so often, we shall publish a general survey with a view toward shaping and co-ordinating these proposals into a coherent whole.*

I - Commission to Study the Organization of Peace

ESTABLISHED immediately after the outbreak of the war in Europe "to study the reorganization of the world for peace, in preparation for the vast work of reconstruction which will face the world upon the termination of this conflict," the Commission issued the following seven-point program on June 6, 1941:

JAMES T. SHOTWELL,
Chairman

CLARK M. EICHELBERGER,
Director

WILLIAM A. NEILSON,
Chairman of the Executive Committee

CLYDE EAGLETON,
Chairman of the Studies Committee

EMILY HICKMAN,
Chairman of the Education Committee

1. We believe that war can and must be eliminated; but this can only be done by providing a substitute for war which can adequately settle disputes, remedy injustice, and maintain rights between nations. We recognize our responsibility in building and upholding such an order.

2. We regard as essential, and will work for freer commercial interchange between nations and more equitable labor and living standards, under proper rules of law, and with adequate protection of the entire community of nations.

3. Democracy, by its very principles, must concede to each nation the form of government which its people desire subject to the

assurance by law of standards of individual liberty within each nation, and subject to an international guarantee against aggression by any nation. We hold that an international Bill of Rights, with such guarantees, is an indispensable basis of our own peace and security.

4. We believe that international peace requires adequate guarantees for racial, religious, and political minorities.

5. Recognizing that free interchange of ideas and knowledge between peoples is necessary to the advancement of civilization, we will work toward the furtherance of international understanding through these means.

6. We believe that the United States should be prepared to assist from our abundant resources in meeting the post-war emergencies of starvation and disorder and in restarting the wheels of peaceful industry everywhere. These efforts should be planned as part of the whole program of reconstruction and should lead into the permanent organization of peace.

7. It is a prerequisite to the realization of the above aims that the forces of lawlessness now dominant in so much of the world should be checked and overthrown.

The Commission operates through plenary sessions, attended by the membership of approximately 110 persons, and through meetings of the Executive and Studies Committees, in which topics for the papers which make up the full reports of the Commission are outlined and assigned to individual members either for preparation or for reassignment to other writers. Papers are circulated and discussed before publication, and the general introductory chapters are officially discussed in plenary sessions.

The Commission asserts that the organization of peace "must have back of it the force of a unifying ideal. The sovereignty of the nation-state is no longer adequate. The alternatives are world empire, achieved by conquest, or some form of association, such as world federation, achieved by consent. . . . As a civil community gives to the individual a security in his rights, a richness of social life and an economic surplus in which he can share, more than compensating for the freedom he sacrifices, so any future federation of nations must offer to its units political and economic security, cultural intercourse, and the opportunity for a high plane of living that will more than compensate for the sovereignty sacrificed."

It holds that exaggerated notions of the character of sovereignty have hampered the development of a system of world federation for which certain limitations on sovereignty are essential. It states that:

"Nations must renounce the claim to be the final judge in their controversies with other nations and must submit to the jurisdiction of international tribunals. The basis of peace is justice; and justice is not the asserted claim of any one party, but must be determined by the judgment of the community.

"Nations must renounce the use of force for their own purposes in relations with other nations, except in self-defense. The justification for self-defense must always be subject to review by an international court or other competent body.

"The right of nations to maintain aggressive armaments must be sacrificed in consideration for an assurance of the security of all, through regional and world-wide forces subject to international law and adequate to prevent illegal resorts to international violence.

"Nations must accept certain human and cultural rights in their constitutions and in international covenants. The destruction of civil liberties anywhere creates danger of war. The peace is not secure if any large and efficient population is permanently subject to a control which can create a fanatical national sentiment impervious to external opinion.

"Nations must recognize that their right to regulate economic activities is not unlimited. The world has become an economic unit; all nations must have access to its raw materials and its manufactured articles. The effort to divide the resources of the world into sixty economic compartments is one of the causes of war. The economic problem arising from this effort has increased in gravity with the scientific and industrial progress of the modern world."

Similarly, the Commission lists certain new institutions, both world-wide and regional, which will be essential to perform the services that can no longer be left to each state acting separately.

1. An international court with jurisdiction adequate to deal with all international disputes on the basis of law.

2. International legislative bodies to remedy abuses in existing law and to make new laws whenever technical progress requires the adjustment of international practice.

3. Adequate police forces, world-wide or regional, and world-wide economic sanctions, to prevent aggression and to support international covenants.

4. International machinery with authority to regulate international communication and transportation and to deal with such problems as international commerce, fi-

nance, health, nutrition, and labor standards—with regard to all of which the successful working of the constitution of the International Labor Organization offers valuable lessons.

5. Appropriate authorities to administer backward areas ceded to the world federation. Such administration should give precedence to the interest of the inhabitants of the area, looking to their eventual self-government; should assure all nations equal economic opportunity within the area; and should facilitate colonization and economic development of areas suitable for that purpose without injury to the native inhabitants. International corporations might well be encouraged to enlist world-wide support for the constructive task of developing such areas under supervision of such authorities.

Economic Problems

AMONG other studies on economic aspects of world organization published by the Commission along with its Preliminary Report, is a Memorandum on Economic Justice Among Nations by Ernest Minor Patterson. Specific precautions and suggestions are advanced, with a preliminary warning against acceptance of any unduly simplified procedure in dealing with problems so complex.

"First is the observation that little or no relief is apt to come through the migration of people. . . . Moreover, there is serious reason to doubt whether the shift of large numbers of people to the newer parts of the world, which are largely agricultural, would give any material relief. . . .With proper safeguards, international loans will be of assistance but the resumption of indiscriminate lending would be unfortunate. . . . It is not to be supposed that any country, for example the United States, can quickly lend large sums abroad and then abruptly stop such advances without encountering large defaults. In the present enthusiasm for giving assistance to Latin-American countries, there is need for the greatest of caution, since it is not yet clear that servicing charges can be met by all of the borrowers.

"Bilateral commercial agreements of the sort that have been entered into by many countries in recent years should be definitely discouraged unless there can be introduced into them the unconditional most-favored-nation clause which is to be found in the so-called Hull Agreements. . . . A mere stabilization of the exchanges will be quite inadequate in itself and indefinitely large losses may accrue to some or all of the parties that undertake such stabilization, unless they at the same time take other measures which are necessary. . . . With this qualification stabilization of currencies through agreements to that effect are to be recommended.

"Since the greatest of assistance must come from an enlarged flow of trade, it follows that the most important steps to be taken have to do with the lowering of trade barriers. . . . For the United States in particular it may be urged that an open mind toward all of the proposals that have been made is important, as well as the consciousness that many of the difficulties from which the world is suffering today are due in part to the policies followed by the United States during the last twenty years. So long as the people and government of any one country care to extend credits to others, it is possible to maintain an excess of exports (both visible and invisible) over imports, but it is not possible to maintain a steadily functioning economic organization unless the adaptations required by a creditor position are undertaken with considerable rapidity. For years the most hopeful movement to relieve tensions was the one known by the name of our Secretary of State, Mr. Hull."

Transitional Period

THE most recent study of major proportions completed by the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace is an examination of the conditions and desirable procedures to come during the period after the cessation of war and before the establishment of permanent organization. This survey, called "The Transitional Period" and published in April, 1942, stresses the urgency of problems which the world will face as soon as fighting stops, problems not only of reconstruction but also of the shaping of the permanent system of world order.

"The solutions to be found after this war are to be sought in something more fundamental than reparations from the conquered, or Red Cross succor for the starving. Temporary and charitable alleviations will not be enough. The day is long past when the military commander in the field can lay down the terms of armistice and carry them into effect. Indeed, it may now be asked whether the traditional method of ending war—by armistice, peace conference, and treaty followed ultimately by ratification—is adequate for our needs."

The Commission comes to the following conclusions to be borne in mind during subsequent consideration of the problem: "Reconstruction can only be undertaken upon an international basis, though it seems probable now that the American people must be prepared to assume a large part of the responsibility. The work of reconstruction must begin immediately upon the cessation of hostilities; the rapidity with which supplies can be sent and political control established may prevent bloody civil wars. Consequently, plans should at once be formulated; we cannot wait to improvise them when the shoot-

ing stops. The success with which the problems of reconstruction are met will have much to do with making possible the final organization of a peaceful international society. To organize such a society, it will not be enough to seek to restore what we had before; the hope and aspiration for a better world with higher social standards must be satisfied."

The Commission points out that the specific post-war conditions which are to be expected include famine and disease, civil disorder, economic collapse, uprooted peoples, derelict colonies, social insecurity, and false indoctrination.

The interrelation of these problems indicates the need of international machinery and an over-all organization as well as the underlying importance of determining what sort of political control is possible or desirable for the transitional period. "At the end of hostilities, the responsibility for the reconstruction of the world will rest upon the victors, whether they like it or not, and whether anyone else likes it or not. Of the victors, the greatest contributions will have been made by Britain, China, Russia, and the United States; others, too, will have contributed to the victory. The work of restoration will presumably rest mostly upon the British and the Americans because of their available resources, though it is too early to say how far they will have been worn down, or how much others may be able to contribute."

In summarizing its recommendations, the Commission emphasizes the responsibilities implied in political control as follows:

"Those who are victors must behave, not as victors have in the past, but as a police power acting in the name of the community of nations. It is a democratic principle, to be upheld by democracies, that force shall be used only by authority of the community, and in accord with law. . . . The transitional period offers an opportunity for selecting and testing, for ascertaining the various national needs and for building stable public opinion, for laying the foundations of a permanent world order. . . . It must be proved beyond doubt that aggression can be restrained. . . . Toward this end, the military occupation of Germany or Japan may be necessary. In any case, authority within the area of the aggressor States should not be returned to their peoples until they have demonstrated their willingness and ability to participate in a permanent world order. . . .

"When the collapse of the despotisms appears, the emergency will be desperate and the needs will be great. Time cannot be spared then for setting up machinery. . . . It is impossible to say how long a period will or should elapse between the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a permanent world order. It is clear, however, that the traditional methods of ending a war—armistice, conference, and treaty—are inadequate, and should be abandoned. . . . Time for study and deliberation is essential in the democratic process, and for the solution of vast problems.

"The foregoing considerations cannot be laid aside while we win the war. They are part of winning the war; and the winning of the war would mean little gain for us unless we are prepared to consolidate its gains into stability and security. No time is too soon to begin the study, to prepare the institutions and to accept the pledges and obligations necessary if we are to bring order and hope, within any reasonable time, back to a shattered world."

EDITORIAL COMMENT

The great service rendered by the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace is indicated in the Preliminary Report and in the discussion of the Transitional Period. It is also obvious that the greatest contribution which the Commission will make lies in the field of international law and in the juridical phase of international relations. This emphasizes the need and the hope that in the near future the reports of the Commission will consider all of the aspects of the limitation of national sovereignty. An even more vital subject for immediate consideration is the problem of democracy as the necessary basis of international order. At present, the Commission has barely touched on this, the crucial problem in the creation of a free world. For example, in its section on the responsibilities entailed by political control, the Commission foresees the eventual occupation of the aggressor states "until they have demonstrated their willingness and ability to participate in a permanent world order." But the necessity and the means of establishing a democratic system in these countries—the only guarantee of respect for international law—are not treated. They must be fully considered and presented in any adequate plan for the future.

II—Department of Agriculture

INTER-BUREAU COMMITTEE ON POST-WAR PLANNING

ROY KIMMEL, *Chairman*

JOHN CAMP	MELVILLE COHEE
MORDECAI EZEKIEL	NORMAN GOLD
BERT JOHNSON	CHARLES KELLOGG
PAUL KEPNER	RAY MARSH
WILLIAM MUSBACH	WALTER RUDOLPH
HUGO SCHWARTZ	LOUISE STANLEY
ROBERT WALKER	ERNEST WIECKING

THE United States Department of Agriculture defines the first and biggest post-war job in the following statement: "We must transfer an estimated 23,000,000 to 26,000,000 persons from war activities back to peace-time production. The great machine the nation is building for destructive purposes of war can be used just as fully for the constructive purposes of peace. And people can work just as hard to make the world a better place to live in after the war as they are now working to defeat our enemies during the war." According to the Department's Post-War Plans, a pamphlet series, the work of agricultural planning falls into four main parts:

1. A program of rural facilities and services in such fields as health, housing, education, medical care, and electrification;

2. A program of physical resources that will provide employment to people in rural areas as needed;

3. A study of agricultural industrial relations in the post-war period;

4. An assessment of the probable 1954 productive plant—what will be needed to feed adequately an estimated population of 134,000,000.

Setting up of democratic procedures for studying and making decisions in this field is an important part of the Department's plan. An estimated 120,000 farm men and women are on the community, county, and state committees. In addition to these, some forty-seven state committees and two thousand county committees all over the country, "the Department of Agriculture has established regional post-war planning committees in nine regions throughout the United States. These committees comprise officials of the various agencies of the Department. They are a link between the state, county, and community planning committees on the one hand and the Washington Post-War Planning Committee on the other. Thus the regional committees can convey to Washington plans developed by local people, and the workers in Washington can convey their ideas to the local people." Though the state is regarded as the most important unit in drawing up plans, the Department expects that general plans for smaller units, such as counties, watersheds, or problem areas, will be built side by side with the state plans.

In December, 1941, and April, 1942, the Department of Agriculture issued pamphlets on the special problem of agricultural-industrial relations after the war which stress the wisdom of taking measures to prevent a depression. The work of the sub-committee on these relations is at present devoted to stimulating public discussion on "the reasons why farmers and others interested should be concerned with what will happen to industrial employment and foreign trade after the war. Ways that can be followed to maintain industrial production and employment after the war. . . . Changes in agricultural production and policies abroad and developments in international settlements affecting our foreign trade in farm products. . . . Decentralization of industry in rural towns and cities. . . . Problems in distribution of farm products, especially methods of reducing marketing costs or broadening distribution to low-income families."

In answer to the question, "What will happen to the demand for farm products after the war?" the Department has issued a group of charts which illustrate the fundamental idea that farm prosperity is related to city prosperity and to international trade.

Educating the Public

IN driving home to the farmer the interdependence of agricultural and industrial workers, the Department makes splendid use of the graphic charts presented in their pamphlets. The facts and statistics fully substantiate the following conclusions concerning this aspect of economic co-operation:

1. Farmers cannot be prosperous unless the people who buy their products are also prosperous. That includes their customers in our cities, and customers in foreign countries as well.

2. If present better farm returns are to continue after the war is over, ways will have to be worked out by which all the

consumers of farm products can continue pretty fully employed and can earn enough to buy all the food and other things they need and want.

3. Ways will have to be found to keep industry producing as much for our own needs in times of peace as we produce now for destruction in time of war.

4. In studying the post-war problem, farmers should therefore give serious thought to its industrial and foreign aspects and to the steps that may need to be taken to maintain prosperity among consumers of farm products.

Another medium of enlightenment on post-war problems is the monthly bulletin, *Land Policy Review,* in the March issue of which John J. Haggerty makes the significant point that the ultimate decision in regard to the character of the post-war world should be left to public opinion on the basis of the information presented by the experts.

The International Wheat Agreement

A REALLY outstanding indication of the Department's contribution to the post-war world in the making may be found in the Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the International Trade in Wheat, issued by the Department of State on July 1, 1942. This is the result of months of deliberation by experts and officials of four wheat-exporting countries, Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the United States, and the wheat-importing United Kingdom. That Russia does not participate in this agreement is due to the fact that discussions began before the U.S.S.R. had joined the United Nations. It excites special interest not only because of its scientific foundation, but also because it actually implements the idealism frequently expressed in public addresses and statements by Vice-President Wallace and Milo Perkins, his aid in the Board of Economic Welfare.

Article 1 of the preamble cites the fact that a post-war accumulation of wheat surpluses will present increasing difficulties for the producing countries and this, "because of the interdependence of nations," will affect *all* countries. Hence appropriate action must be taken now.

Article 2 points out that a solution of this problem must form an essential part of any sensible program of world economic reconstruction. It calls for co-operation by all countries concerned in international trade in wheat. Mr. Wallace's Ever-Normal Granary is given an international significance in the assertion of the basic importance of "the orderly distribution of wheat and flour in domestic and international trade at such prices as are fair to consumers and provide a reasonable remuneration to producers, and for the maintenance of world supplies which shall be at all times ample for the needs of consumers without being so excessive as to create a world burden of unwanted surpluses."

Article 3 declares that "co-operative action is also necessary to meet the need for relief in the war-stricken areas of the world by the supply and distribution of gifts of wheat." Here Wallace's idealism is implemented in a practical way.

Article 4, like much of the preamble, concerns assurance of abundant supplies of wheat for all. But it goes on to say that we must abolish the "economic incentives to high-cost production" too often used, while we lower the

INCOMES OF CITY PEOPLE, AND RETAIL SALES OF MEATS AND DAIRY PRODUCTS, UNITED STATES, 1921-41
Index Numbers (1924-29 = 100)



* Adjusted for seasonal variation; 3-month moving average. △ Nonagricultural income payments.

QUANTITY OF IMPORTS, BUSINESS ACTIVITY, AND FARM EXPORTS, UNITED STATES, 1921-40

Index Numbers (1935-39 = 100)



barriers to world trade and see that prices charged consumers are not substantially higher than the international price of wheat.

Article 5 deserves quotation in full because it shows that this entire wheat policy is predicated upon sound nutrition for all people in all nations. Let experts in nutrition decide what the populations require in the way of food and then undertake the job of providing it. "In many countries the standard of living would be improved by increasing the consumption of wheat through a lowering of prices. In all countries the standard of living would be improved by stimulating the consumption of foods rich in vitamins, proteins, and minerals. The increased production of such foods would offer a more valuable use for land which has at times been used uneconomically for high-cost production of wheat."

Article 6 reads: "Producers of an international commodity such as wheat are directly affected by standards of living throughout the world, by international purchasing power, and by prevailing policies and practices affecting international trade generally. There can be no basic solution of the problem of export surpluses without a general reduction of import barriers, and no measure should be taken or maintained which has the effect of retarding such reduction or of preventing in any way the fullest possible development of international trade."

EDITORIAL COMMENT

While the work of the planning committee of the Department of Agriculture is now only in the beginning and organizational stages, it is already performing an essential function. To proceed with democratic methods from the ground up, both in drawing forth and in putting into effect the ideas of the farmers, is no easy task to carry on under the pressures and daily transformations of war-time Washington. This emphasis on popular development of plans for the future and the simultaneous program of educating farmers in the field of their common interests with industrial workers are activities which will bear fruit in the coming time of decision. Only when this kind of planning is translated into continuous and prompt action can we hope for the enlightened attitude of men everywhere on which democracy depends.

In the case of the Wheat Agreement, although the document is concerned with but one commodity, it offers a blueprint of the manner in which each other commodity should be studied by the experts and officials of government so that similar international agreements, much broader in scope than this one on wheat, could be attained for each. The document should be studied in full by those interested in actual details of production control, stocks, export control, price control, the relief pool, and the council and executive committee set up to enforce the agreement. The preamble states a new international philosophy which is fully implemented by what follows, and that is a portent of a better world to come.

III–Federal Union

CLARENCE J. STREIT, *President*

BOARD OF DIRECTORS:

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FEDERAL UNION INC., which was established in 1939, adopted the following statement of policy at its second annual convention, held in St. Louis on June 26-28, 1942:

"We Federal Unionists believe that, if a free society is to exist anywhere in the world, the United Nations must win a complete victory over the Axis dictators and militarists, and establish a just and durable peace.

"We believe that an international organization to include all the peoples of the world is essential to peace, to international law and order, and to the economic progress and spiritual development of mankind. We urge the prompt creation of such an international organization.

"But this is not enough. The ultimate condition for a just and lasting peace is a Federal Union of all mankind. As the first step toward this end and as the best way to win the war and extend those basic freedoms for which we are fighting, we believe that we, the people of the United States, should lead in forming *now,* behind the strongest possible Bill of Rights, a Federal Union of those peoples with whom we have compelling natural ties. Opposed to imperialism in all its forms, this nucleus Union should be open to all peoples who are prepared to share the rights and responsibilities of the Union. We call upon our fellow citizens to join with us in the prompt realization of these aims."

A resolution implementing the foregoing policy was voted on the same occasion; it may be taken as representing the present formulation of the ideas of Federal Union concerning the methods of achieving world federation:

1. That the people of the United States, acting through their government, set up machinery for urgent consideration of how the principles of federal union, as exemplified in the Constitution and in other federal governments, might best be applied internationally now to win this war and and secure enduring peace, a better standard of living, greater justice and more individual freedom.

2. That such consideration should comprehend:

   a. The full application of federal principles to a nucleus composed of such nations as are found ready and able to undertake this step with greatest hope of success.

   b. The partial application of federal principles to an all-inclusive world organization, beginning with all the United Nations as a nucleus.

   c. The preparation of draft constitutions designed to achieve both the objectives.

3. That the machinery for this action might be provided, for example, in some such ways as either or both of the following suggestions:

   a. That the United States Government invite both its neighbors, Canada and the United States of Mexico—both of which are Federal Unions—to form with it a New World Committee of Three for the purpose of organizing a broader Expert Commission on International Federal Union. To make the most of the world's available experience in this field, the members of this commission should be drawn from the peoples that have actually governed themselves by federal union. All the members of this commission would sit as private citizens, and none could represent any government. The commission would submit its report and its draft constitutions to the New World Committee for transmission to all concerned with a view of action.

   b. That the United States Government invite the members of the existing Inter-Parliamentary Union to hold an emergency session in the United States to consider this whole problem, and particularly its bearing on the maintenance of the institutions of free, representative government.

Earlier Policies

THE policy and resolution quoted here supersede the "new parallel policy" adopted by the board of directors in the spring of 1942. A bulletin released on May 4, indicated the two parallel lines of action, urging the immediate formation of a Union among the people of the United States and "those peoples with whom we have compelling natural ties," and the formation of an all-inclusive international organiza-

tion in which the United States, the British Commonwealth, China, Russia, India, and the other powers known as the United Nations or "any Union of such powers" should take the lead. This association must be "predicated upon a limitation of national sovereignty; and should contain such elements of federalism as are found to be practicable."

The question of why China, India, Russia, and Latin America should not be included in the federal nucleus was answered in a Green Paper, issued on May 25, by the argument that to insure success the core must be a federation of nations with the longest experience in free self-government and the greatest power. "Therefore, if we attempted to federate with peoples with comparatively little or no free, orderly, self-governing background or experience, we would cut ourselves loose from all the highly successful precedents of the last 150 years, and we would find ourselves adrift in uncharted waters. Under such circumstances, we could feel no reasonable assurance of the success of our huge experiment. And this time we *must* be successful, even if we have to set up a model world government on a small scale first."

From its beginning, Federal Union has maintained a central idea: world union for peace can be best achieved through a nucleus international union on democratic principles of those states or nations most experienced in self-government. "Union Now," the book by Clarence J. Streit which first set forth the plan in 1939, foresaw the way to the securing of peace and freedom through "Union now of the Democracies that the North Atlantic and a thousand other things already unite—Union of these few peoples in a great federal republic built on and for the thing they share most, their common democratic principle of government for the sake of individual freedom."

Though by March, 1941, when "Union Now with Britain" appeared, there were only seven of the original fifteen Democracies sufficiently free from nazi domination to be regarded as possible members of the nucleus union, the essential plan remained. The American President and Congress were urged to invite the Democracies of the British Commonwealth to unite with us provisionally, set up a provisional Inter-Continental Congress, and convoke constitutional conventions. As before, the nucleus federation would be merely the seed of ultimate world organization. "Though circumstances lead us to start the Union with only English-speaking founders, we can counteract any fears this may rouse by admitting at the earliest opportunity democracies of other languages."

EDITORIAL COMMENT

The noteworthy changes in the policies of Federal Union, which may be exemplified by the changing concept of those peoples with whom we have natural ties—the North Atlantic Democracies in 1939; Canada and Mexico in 1942—serve to show the readiness with which the organization has adapted its program to the changing historical situation, while retaining the basic idea of federation among nations. As a rallying point for people interested in or susceptible to the dream of world unity, Federal Union has had remarkable success. As a blueprint for actual world organization, however, the plan, in all of its stages of development, has had the limitation of being too legalistic in its approach to the problems involved. The differences between the "democracy" of Ireland and of Switzerland, for example, which were included in the original nucleus, are more striking than the geographical and cultural "ties" which Federal Union emphasized. In the present plan, the "ties" which are to unite Canada, the United States, and Mexico are not defined adequately in terms of the kind of internal democracy which must form the basis of international union. But more important is the fallacy that a world organization must be started by nations bound by "natural ties." We have seen in the case of France, Italy, and Spain—perhaps the best example of "natural ties" in the history of civilization—that these ties are meaningless when governments are drawn into opposing political alignments; on the other hand, in the formation of the American Union, we have seen the federation of such states as Massachusetts and Georgia, which had a minimum of "natural ties" but were animated by intelligent self-interest and a common belief in representative government.

THE UNDERGROUND REPORTER

A CORRECTION

THE Underground Reporter published in the May issue of FREE WORLD committed a regrettable mistake in which some important Italian underground activities were not credited to the Giustizia and Liberta movement. We regret it so much the more since we have a deep respect for that courageous organization and for its heroic fighters. There were also some inaccuracies in the dates of the incidents related. The necessary measures have been taken to avoid a repetition of similar happenings.

Paris, May 1, 1942.

THE world upheaval weighs heavily on the mind, twisting or crushing it, creating spiritual confusion. Daily hardships too discourage free and serious examination. But on second thought do great movements of ideas always proceed from profound analysis? Do they not rather germinate from confusion and suffering? In any case, it is certain that we are not in a position to perceive great movements of opinion, hampered as we are by the degrading routine of daily life; the great silence that surrounds us impedes observation of the ideas which are stirring among laboring people, the secret ponderings and maturing resolutions. It is possible, however, to observe what is already well known and that which begins to transpire.

There is, first of all, what may be called "received" opinion, that opinion which the authorities encourage to come out into the open in speech and in writing. This opinion has interest for us in so far as it reflects, more or less obliquely, the opinions of certain workers' centers. It is the expression of two groups and two spokesmen.

The socialist group, led by Charles Spinasse, former member of the Popular Front, speaks through his weekly paper, *Le Rouge et le Bleu,* which displays the tricolor on its white cover. On the other hand, there is the older group of the syndicalist collaborators, Dumoulin, Rey, Guiraud, Zaretti, etc., with the weekly paper, *L'Atelier,* which has reached its fifty-ninth number. Spinasse and his friends left *L'Effort,* the paper in the Free Zone, where the censor of Vichy hampered their movements, and came to Paris, tempted by the vogue of socialism, which had full permission under the benevolent eye of the occupying forces to assert its doctrines, publish, oppose the past, and join together in the future against the Anglo-Saxon and bolshevist world. They were not long in finding out that Parisian socialism was of an altogether special nature and that the socialists could only proceed within the limits of certain laws, if not under strict direct command.

The absence of important people among the members of the movement is probably the reason for the particularly tolerant manner toward Spinasse, ex-minister of the Popular Front. Even so, *Le Rouge et le Bleu* is anything but a fighting organ, and if it has been able to get by without the bowing and scraping exacted from others, it has had to adopt self-restraint and

an extremely reserved and moderate tone. Although it accepts the obligations imposed on all those who write in occupied countries, it has not been spared forceful attacks from the French fascist press, especially the Doriotists, whose ambition it was to get Spinasse and his companions to the scaffold. Old hates have not been appeased, even if the Socialists on their side profess mutual pardon and reconciliation.

The Red and Blue Socialists cherish a hope, that of preserving certain socialist elements while rallying to the new order and breathing into it some virtues of socialism. In this effort they seek a reason for living and a right to exist. "Because we are vanquished, must we Frenchmen and Socialists abandon the work of developing a French social doctrine, inspired by our socialist traditions, respecting the liberties of all those orders to which we remain bound, but nevertheless adapted to the future conditions of our lives in a Europe which we too, as much as anyone else, want to help to establish?"

These Red and Blue Socialists revert in social theory as far back as Proudhomme, back to Saint Simon, even farther when necessary. They invoke the French Utopians when they sketch out an order based on love, generosity, pardon, reason, and justice. This better world they hope to build along with their opponents "according to the requirements of a portion of liberty, of equality, and of human dignity, as they are indicated to us by the traditions of Christian humanism."

Their friends from Belgium, in the group of Henri de Man, profess the same faith. In the paper *Le Travail* they write: "That which concerns us most is that the essential part of Western thought be saved; that is to say, a certain conception of man which makes him 'the measure of all things,' and which refuses to reduce him to a mere unit of his race or of his class in a given moment of history, or to a mere cell of society. Man is like this no doubt, but he is something else besides. He has his special destiny by the same right as the country he lives in. He has inalienable rights which are accorded to the individual by twenty centuries of humanism and which it would not be possible to deny him without returning to barbarism."

The Paris Socialists also refuse fiercely "to explain all and to revaluate everything according to the doctrine of the racial struggle," just as they reject the "terrifying unity of thought, method, and action" which are opposite to that "harmony in diversity" doubtless inspired in Spinasse by his reading of Montesquieu.

Facing the Ugly Facts

TURNING the pages of *Le Rouge et le Bleu,* one descends from this paradise into the harsh class struggle. The occupying forces shoot hostages, establish martial law; the Nazis and the Vichy Government put into practice revenge for 1936 or build, often on sand, paternalistic social peace. Everywhere resound the lamentable echoes of feeble miseries and sufferings very far removed from the paradise of the Saint-Simonians. And even the pages of *Le Rouge et le Bleu* pretend to sound this echo.

In spite of the humiliation to socialism of going back one century, nevertheless there is significance in this clinging to the values of the Personality, with a capital P, and of Man, with a capital M—and this in the midst of negation of humanism both Christian and non-Christian. This demonstrates that the new order has in it no virtues, no human atmosphere, superior to traditional humanism and proves thereby the weakness of the appeal which it can exercise. Certainly this combining of the idea of humanity dignity with the shackling of the mind is a foggy notion bound to fail. *Le Rouge et le Bleu* will pay for this. This is its destiny. But what matters most is the nobler longing, the more resolute convictions to which it responds and to which it appeals and which will not yield to new seductions.

Nazi Loud-Speaker

THE gang which runs *L'Atelier* is rather different. It has made progress. To be sure, it is older, a year older than Spinasse and his *Rouge et Bleu. L'Atelier* is a kind of German loud-speaker, translating into French for the benefit of the syndicates. It acclaims German victories, "which are delivering us from bolshevist barbarism." People who are given to serene meditation will have a long time to try to figure out what danger the honest active members of a syndicate had to fear from the "barbarism of bolshevism," if not from the rivalry of its communist representatives. *L'Atelier* believes that the future world has something to gain from a Japanese victory, which will liberate Asia from the Anglo-Saxon monopoly and release the riches necessary for the establishment of the new order. It demands France's collaboration with a German Europe and sees the recall of Pierre Laval, who is consecrated as the great statesman and beslavered with compliments and affection, as one of the essential conditions in the launching of the new order.

Occasionally *L'Atelier* completes the scale by sounding the note of anti-Semitism,

either denouncing "the Jewish invasion of Perigord," or making out that America is ruled by the Jews—this, of course, after America's entry into the war against Germany. There is no one to remind Dumoulin and his friends that President Roosevelt was not always "the liege lord of international Judaism" in their eyes. It is easy to believe that this bunch of nazi flowers has not won much sympathy among the workers; a year ago *L'Atelier* founded a syndicalist action circle among the workers' clubs but to date it has not succeeded in making an organization of any consequence.

If there is this element of disharmony between *Le Rouge et le Bleu* and *L'Atelier*, there exists in return noticeable harmony in those problems which interest workers' circles. *L'Atelier* also adopts the watchword of Proudhomme, "Revolution is reconciliation." Never mind if the reconciliation is one-sided; it is always possible to avoid blame by criticizing the wickedness of the employers. If it does not invoke Saint Simon, it rides its own hobbyhorse of corporatism and makes use of *La Tour du Pin*—which does not make syndicalism any younger.

Blocked Wages

COLLABORATION among classes goes hand in hand with Franco-German collaboration. Nevertheless, reconciliation has its limits, limits prescribed by the working syndicates and echoed by Dumoulin as well as Spinasse. Even though the syndicates have been directed by the most moderate elements, such as Belin and Dumoulin, since the communist purge of 1939 and the German control of 1940, they nevertheless represent the most imperative claims of the working classes. These have been recently centering their attention on two problems, wages and the syndicalist status.

Since 1939, wages blocked by law have been readjusted only once, in May, 1941. The increase of 10 per cent was absurd compared to the cost of living. According to official statistics, the average monthly wages of 1,700 francs for Paris, 1,350 for Lyon and Marseille, the minimum of 965 for Belfort (765 for the women), and 1,000 for Besancon, were considered by ministerial decree as "normal wages." At the same time the general statistics of France show for the period between October, 1939, and October, 1941, an increase of 52 per cent on beef, 83 per cent on pork, 75 per cent on bacon, 104 per cent on butter, 70 per cent on oil, etc., etc. Freezing wages at the scale of 1939 in such a way that even employers who are willing to do so have no right to raise salaries, keeps workers at famine level, especially in the presence of partial unemployment. (The work week averages 40 hours. In August, 1941, barely 16 per cent of employees worked 48 hours a week.) Only workmen in factories run by the Germans are better paid; this discrepancy is the cause of ill feeling.

In its Christmas number *L'Atelier* described the sad working conditions: "This year has weighed on us with all the weight of its inglorious fifty-two weeks during which we had to run — run after work, run after the subway, run to the tradesmen, run after working cards and tickets, hurl ourselves into a mob, walk the pavements restlessly, get delirious over a packet or just a few cigarettes, faint with joy over a half-gallon of red wine. Christmas of the destitute and the wretched, because someone is trying desperately to turn us into a race of paupers, mendicants, and suppliants. The results: doubt, discouragement, pessimism, moral weakening, atrophy of conscience, confusion of soul." Every week *L'Atelier* receives a mail "which exudes ill feeling and which tends to prove that the restrictions are felt only by the working classes."

The protest seems to have been powerful and the syndicates have taken it up. A minimum of 2,000 to 2,500 francs a month is demanded, and syndicate meetings have come out strongly in favor of the change. The other problem which worries the syndicate meetings but at the same time enlivens them, is the "working chart." Under this name the Government of Vichy has promulgated a law which tends to organize "professional families," employers and employees together, with obligatory membership and supervision of the syndicate by mixed "social committees" of employers and employees; which suppresses interprofessional unions and deprives the syndicates of their traditions for the purpose of delegating their management to the social committees. The Government counterbalanced this measure by ordering that these social committees would be given special funds to be deducted from the war profits of the manufacturers. Committees for the organization of industry and the chambers of commerce have been maintained.

Most of the important syndicalist organizations have issued more or less formal criticisms against the chart—for example, the syndicates in metal, mines, wood, leather, skins, etc. Here is, by way of illustration, the decision of the Federation of Employees: "The National Council of the syndicates of employees declares itself convinced that the social peace essential to the revival of France cannot come about without collaboration between classes, but there cannot be any

sincere collaboration unless the employer and the employee are on a footing of strict equality. The Council regrets that the working chart does not agree to this necessity. The power of the employer is augmented in the committees of organization. . . . The workers are deprived of any interprofessional ties; they are put under the inspection of the social committees. They cannot even designate freely their own representatives. Worse still, the law allows the organizing of mixed associations, created, inspired, and directed by the employers." And the National Council lets the syndicates decide freely whether they will collaborate or refuse to collaborate with the organizations of the working chart.

An Appeal to Battle

THIS is the most "courageous" resolution. The other syndicates decided to give it a fair trial, though criticizing it in many ways. The syndicate of wood, however, after similar criticisms, recalls the importance of the syndicalist law of 1884 and appeals to its members "to believe in the future of syndicalism as a major force for their moral and physical well-being in the modern economic world. It calls on its active members never to abandon the love they have given to their original syndicalist organizations. It urges them to defend and to claim in every circumstance the right of workers who belong to the syndicates to have as true representatives men who have gained their free and willing confidence by zeal and devotion for syndicalism."

In Paris in 1941, this resolution sounded like an appeal to battle. Beyond the disturbing questions of salaries and syndicalist status, the working class does not commit itself in any way. Before its eyes those who are building a new order on paper are loudly proclaiming both the virtues of a future that would be "communal, socialist, European, etc.," as well as reforms of the structure of the estates-general, in a vocabulary inherited from the Popular Front. This last is crude and shallow, without popular appeal. Besides, the model which inspires them, Hitler's German state, is there in the form of the occupying forces, invaders and oppressors, and that's no advantage for seducing the masses. And in fact, the masses are not seduced.

Even the officials have to admit that the people draw back and grow more stubborn in their attachment to the past regime. It seems as though they had become transfixed in the state of mind they were in when the storm of 1939 caught them by surprise. Most of them live provisionally; life is suspended awaiting the crucial moment of national liberation. One waits for it; one anticipates it; one hopes for it, and in the meanwhile the old class hatreds, the rancors, the ideas of class revenge still exist among the majority of employers and employees. This manifests itself in the common, everyday concern about working conditions and wages, about pennies, which necessarily become the main anxiety in these difficult times. Even the terminology of their quarrel frequently remains just as it was before 1937.

There is something very comforting in this attachment for the past, in so far as it expresses itself in a refusal to conform to a new order. In Paris, one looks in vain for the manifestations of collective enthusiasm that Berlin saw at the height of National Socialism. For the last year and a half, the collaborationists have not been able to get together a single meeting of any importance. This love of the past, however, means not only faithfulness, but also conservatism and sterility. It may seem disturbing that a year and a half after the defeat, not a single revival, not one idea of reorganization can be found.

To make a just estimate of this period, one must not forget that hundreds of thousands of workmen are shut up in prison camps in Germany, or that tens of thousands of active workmen are trapped and imprisoned at home, and many are shot. The repression is on such a large scale that even the communist organization seems to have been gravely affected and hardly expresses itself any more. But it must be pointed out also that at the time when it was exerting itself in constant activity, it did not contribute any important share to a revival or to a new point of departure.

A FREE WORLD CHECK LIST of BOOKS

VICTORY THROUGH AIR POWER, by Major Alexander de Seversky. 354 *pages. Simon and Schuster;* $2.50

STRATEGY FOR VICTORY, by Hanson Baldwin. 172 *pages. Norton;* $1.75

RUSSIA'S FIGHTING FORCES, by Capt. Sergei N. Kournakoff. 258 *pages. Duell, Sloan and Pearce;* $2.50

MECHANIZED MIGHT, by Major Paul C. Raborg. 284 *pages. Whittlesey House;* $2.50

Among the present spate of military books, some are written in the conviction that in a democracy public opinion can and should pass on the larger issues of policy. Others are intended to enable the layman to follow military events more intelligently. Alexander de Seversky's and Hanson Baldwin's books belong in the first category. The development and potentialities of air power, Major de Seversky argues, have completely revolutionized the nature of warfare in a manner which few in the military hierarchies seem to appreciate. Air power has become the overwhelmingly decisive factor in warfare; and the author's analysis of the first three years of the war seems unanswerably to underscore that fact. It is now scientifically possible to win the war through intensive and long-distance bombing. Three things, Major de Seversky claims, have frustrated the growth of air power in this country: the inability of minds wedded to the obsolescences of the past to understand the revolution in warfare that air power has wrought; the vested interests and jealousies of the older military and naval services; and the fears of the aviation companies in the pre-war period that expansion of their facilities might have disastrous consequences for their profits in the post-war era. The major may have overstated his case. But his book is vigorously written and, for the layman at any rate, compellingly and convincingly argued.

"Strategy for Victory" is a balanced and cautious analysis of our military situation and prospects. Mr. Baldwin refuses to see any particular service as decisive and insists that victory can come only through complete co-ordination of all forces—land, sea, and air. But that requires total mobilization which we are still far from achieving. Among the more important and interesting emphases in the volume are Mr. Baldwin's demand for a better public relations program for the fighting forces; his assertion that we shall require a major land offensive in the West in order to win the war; his refusal to regard Australia as a vital base in our war against Japan; and his insistence on a more adequate definition of our war aims as an essential element in victory.

In "Russia's Fighting Forces," the reader will find a good general account of Russia's military tradition, the organization and techniques of the Red Army and its strategy in the present war. Captain Kournakoff attributes Soviet strength to Russia's military past, the Soviet's revolutionary conception of warfare, the refusal of its leadership to be bound by outmoded concepts, and the grim determination of a people who know—and value—what they are fighting for.

Major Raborg insists that no victory can be decisive without efficient mechanized and motorized land armies. His book is an attempt at a comprehensive survey of the development of mechanization and motorization, particularly in the United States Army. The discussion tends to become too technical and the average layman will not find this a particularly readable or exciting volume.

—David W. Petegorsky

THE REAL ITALIANS, by Carlo Sforza. 156 *pages. Columbia;* $2.00

In the brief chapters of this little book on his people, the outstanding exile from Italy, her former Minister for Foreign Affairs, glances at

their psychology, literature, concept of family, religion, and foreign relations. His main thesis is that the Italians are by nature internationalists, and that skepticism in politics and fascism as a creed are "anti-Italian." In proof of his people's internationalism, Count Sforza cites Dante and Aquinas; in proof that fascism is outside the true national character, he cites the Italian tradition of individualism.

Count Sforza seems unable to accept the idea that his race may possess the defects of their qualities. But cannot the personality of a nation have serious flaws, just as the personalities of certain notable individuals have, and still be worth a great deal to humankind? The non-Italian observer cannot feel that the politico-religious unity at which Dante and Aquinas aimed proves the Italian people to be internationalists in the modern sense; nor can he feel that fascism is outside the Italian tradition. Nothing that the members of a nation have done, no matter how unpleasing, can be accepted by the impersonal historian as foreign to that nation's character.

Count Sforza's country is justly famed as one of the founders of Western culture. It seems an idle task to try to explain away the unpleasing qualities of a people who have given so much to humanity for so many centuries. With the nation as with the individual, good and bad qualities always exist in shifting balance. Any Italian whatsoever, be he good or bad, may be termed a "Real Italian." But those whom Count Sforza has here described with the full resources of his scholarship and eloquence are beyond all doubt the best Italians.

—R. W.

VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC, by Alexander Kiralfy, 283 pages. John Day; $2.75

Before December 7, 1941, many American experts on Far Eastern affairs held that the United States should attack Japan and subdue her within six weeks or six months with the co-operation of Britain, Holland, and China. Some even held that Japan could be easily blockaded by the A B C D powers and forced to surrender because of lack of vital raw materials. These experts lacked accurate knowledge regarding Japan. Japan has driven the United States, Britain, and Holland out of the vast region between Burma, New Guinea, and the Philippines; at the same time, she has succeeded in cutting off rubber, tin, oil, iron ore, and other vital raw materials from the United Nations. She has cut off the Burma Road and is now carrying on a campaign against China; she has attacked Alaska and the Aleutian Islands and is getting ready to attack Soviet Russia's Siberian territory and the maritime Provinces. How did all this happen?

The author of this work points out in detail that Japan's preparations for the war and "dynamic secrecy or concealment of preparation for an offensive" have played an important part in the victories so far achieved. Japanese victories are due to carefully conceived offensive tactics and Japan cannot be defeated by the defensive tactics pursued by the United States. So long as the Pacific theater of the war is regarded as a mere "secondary front," the psychological conditions necessary for victory will be lacking. In this excellent study, illustrated by many maps drawn by the author, the tremendous significance of Siberia and Vladivostok as America's "shield in the Pacific" has been depicted. America must not allow Japan to get control over Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces, because Japan, in control of these regions, will make any offensive by the United Nations very difficult. The author makes it clear that defense of the Siberian Eastern Province from Japanese attack will not be an easy task because of the difficulties involved in getting reinforcements and supplies. An offensive against Manchukuo from Vladivostok, Khabarsk, and Chita through the combined efforts of Russia, the United States, and China—full use of air, sea, and land powers—may prevent Japan from attacking Siberia.

Lastly, the author holds that, as the key to victory in the Pacific lies in the north, so the key to the north lies in the Sakhalin. The United Nations must occupy Sakhalin and thence wage merciless war on the Japanese country and destroy Japan's sources of power. This is the only way to win victory over Japan. The book has a broader scope. It is a valuable contribution in the field of naval strategy in the Pacific and its relation to other theaters of the present global war.

—Taraknath Das.

BEHIND THE URALS, by John Scott. viii + 280 pages. Houghton Mifflin; $2.75

In 1931, when John Scott emerged from the University of Wisconsin with his B. A. and with no job prospects, he decided to travel to the Soviet Union, whose social and economic experimentation had fired his enthusiasm. Wisely, he learned a welder's trade before applying for admission, and wisely he settled down in Magnitogorsk, where he plied his trade for five years, married a Russian peasant girl, and thus had a first-hand opportunity to observe the vast process of transformation which was going on about him.

Out of this experience has come a book which is "must" reading for intelligent and unbiased persons interested in the developmental prob-

lems of the Soviet Union. Mr. Scott does not attempt to be profound or philosophical; his book is neither a defense nor an attack; but he has set down a moving account of his experiences which is far more impressive than many a book of more pretentious character. In no other book of this reviewer's acquaintance can one find so convincing an account of the way in which, through appalling blundering, frequent mismanagement, and tremendous labor, the Soviet leaders made a successful attempt to telescope the industrial revolution into a few breathless years.

—G. K.

NEW POEMS 1942, *Edited with an Introduction by Oscar Williams. 286 pages. Peter Pauper Press;* $3.00

ANTHOLOGY OF CANADIAN POETRY, Compiled by Ralph Gustafson. 123 pages. Penguin; 25 cents

Mr. Williams's latest anthology is an embodiment of the dilemma of contemporary poetry. Still afraid for the most part of the common touch, the modern poet continues to communicate highly specialized feelings in a style that yields its meaning only to the closest inspection. One wonders how long it will be before the war thrusts upon the poet a realization of the ties that bind him to his less articulate fellow men. Thus far there has been one straw to show which way the poetic wind is blowing: Mr. T. S. Eliot has recently published an essay in praise of the verse of Rudyard Kipling. If the bellwether turns toward intelligibility, the flock will surely follow.

Say what one will of Kipling—and more than enough has been said against that fiery imperialist—he wrote graphically, and people still quote him. Little from Mr. Williams's gleaning will stick in anyone's memory. Closer to the eternal verities of nature and labor are the verses in Mr. Gustafson's compilation. These Canadian poets, deep-rooted in their Dominion, suffer from none of the spiritual etiolation of the other group. If their poems are never major ones, they are still worth reading for their keen perceptions, lucidity, and healthiness of attitude.

Mr. Williams's poets will find that they cannot nowadays go on calling down Hamlet's curse that they were ever born to set the times aright. Where the vision fails, the people perish. Thinking too precisely on the event, a permissible luxury in times of peace, is a pitiful weapon with which to confront an era of blood, sweat, and tears. The modern reader cannot but prefer this slim sheaf of Canadian verse, so honest and wholesome within its limitations, to the rationalized self-consciousness, studied posturing, and irresponsible intellectualism of "New Poems 1942."

—R. W.

JAPAN A WORLD PROBLEM, by H. J. Temperley, 150 pages. John Day; $1.75

In this interesting book, the author, an Australian journalist who spent at least two decades in the Far East and is now in the employ of the National Government of China, has expressed the following ideas: Japanese civilization is reactionary in spirit. The Japanese have borrowed most of their cultural assets from outside. The dream of a Japanese empire in the continent of Asia is not a new one; a very serious attempt, which failed, was made in the sixteenth century. The so-called "mission of Japan in Asia" is nothing but a clever pretext for her imperialism and aggression against China and other lands to further the ambition of world domination; thus the Japanese and the Nazis have many things in common. Japanese feudal leaders and militarists should be driven out of power and the Japanese constitution should be so revised that the Japanese common people will have a chance to establish a decent government. After the victory of the United Nations, Japan should be disarmed. "Japan should be deprived of all footholds (including property, factories, mines, railways, etc.) on the Asiatic mainland, including China proper, Manchuria, and Korea; Japan should be ousted from Formosa, the Loochoos, the Kuriles, the Bonins, and other insular possessions adjacent to the mainland as well as from the mandated islands. Some would be prepared to see these island territories made available to Britain and America as naval and air bases."

Undoubtedly there are flaws in these statements if sweepingly used against Japan alone. For instance, reactionary spirit is in existence in all imperialistic countries. Western imperialist nations started their extra-European expansion earlier than the sixteenth century and they have not stopped their aggression against the weak yet. They have their pretext of "civilizing the backward peoples."

In Appendices, Mr. Temperley prints two very valuable documents—General Honjo's report to the Japanese minister of war regarding a program of expansion, and several chapters from General Araki's pamphlet giving his conceptions of Japan's Mission. These documents were prepared some ten years ago and thus they are important in disclosing Japan's early preparation for her present program of imperialist expansion.

—T. D.

THE LOST PEACE, by Harold Butler. 246 *pages. Harcourt, Brace;* $2.75

In this stimulatingly written combination of personal narrative and analysis of the twenty years' interval between the wars, the ex-director of the International Labor Office has given us one of the sanest and, in some respects, most profound volumes that has been published during the war. The peace was lost, Mr. Butler argues, largely because the treaties represented an attempt to superimpose anachronistic political relationships on a body of social and economic realities they could no longer fit. The makers of the peace were utterly unaware of, or completely ignored, the manner in which technological change had transformed the problems of social organization; and concepts such as unlimited sovereignty or national self-determination were wholly out of accord with what an intelligent settlement demanded. Mr. Butler urges that the next peace should first deal with the problems of social and economic reorganization. That will provide the setting within which final political settlement may become possible. Mr. Butler's observations are searching and incisive. But his analysis would have been considerably strengthened had he examined the roots of aggressive nationalism and imperialism in the development of monopoly capitalism within the major states.

THE UNFINISHED TASK: ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FOR DEMOCRACY, by Lewis Corey. xiii + 314 pages. Viking; $3.00

Mr. Corey is greatly disturbed over the future relationship between politics and economics in the post-war world because he feels that the circumstances may lead many persons to support a politico-economic arrangement in which an overly centralized governmental system will attempt to exercise entirely too much direct control over economic processes. Alarmed by the implications of this excessive "statism," Mr. Corey has attempted both to sound a warning note and to produce some solution to the problem. The key to the solution, he feels, lies in a greater separation of political from economic power. Such separation can be achieved through the development of new types of public corporations in which the boards of directors "no longer represent ownership or financial interests but management and other functional groups actuated by a new economic morality of management for production and welfare." These new corporations, rationally organized, will give preponderant representation to management and a minority representation to organized labor. Government need not have direct representation. As another prescription in the Laski-Lerner vein for a "brave new world," the book is thoughtful and provocative.

HIMMLER NAZI SPIDER MAN, by George Hamilton Combs, Jr., 64 *pages. David McKay Company.* 50 *cents*

Mr. Combs's incisive comments on the radio on current events have led him naturally to the consideration of some of the characters who supply the darker news which he must discuss, and in this brief historical sketch of Heinrich Himmler he has presented a dramatic and interesting story of the development of one of the most powerful as well as one of the most vicious personalities in the nazi hierarchy. "He is the only man in the world for whom no one has ever said a good word," writes Mr. Combs. "Even Goering has had a few lukewarm supporters." This is the composite opinion of all the men who have contributed to Mr. Combs's knowledge of his subject.

THE TRANSFER OF POPULATIONS, by Mark Vishniak. 94 *pages. Yiddish Scientific Institute.* 75 *cents*

Dr. Vishniak, formerly professor of public law in Moscow and Paris, presents in Yiddish a study of the legal and historical backgrounds for the transfer of populations from the seventeenth century to the time of Hitler's "exchanges" of 1939-40. He considers the entire question from the point of view of the settlement of minority problems after the war, but he refuses to accept the idea that the minorities can be, in Woodrow Wilson's phrase, "bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels or pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power."

FOR A FREE AUSTRIA IN A FREE WORLD. 16 *pages. Austro-American Committee.* 10 *cents*

This brief report of conditions in Austria since Hitler marched into Vienna and announced that he had great plans for the future of the land of his birth is another piece of evidence in the vast record book of nazi sins. It runs the gamut from the usual measures against liberals and intellectuals, then against farmers, workers, and soldiers, until all that represented Austrian culture is defiled or destroyed. The report incorporates information from underground sources about growing discontent and resistance, and it includes a brief summary of the activities of the Free Austrian movement in this country and abroad.

WHO'S WHO IN THIS ISSUE

JAY ALLEN, on-the-spot reporter of the Spanish War, appeared in our December issue with an account of the reverberations of Hitler's invasion of Russia in a military prison at Chalon-Sur-Saone. Mr. Allen's book from which these articles are taken will be published by Harper's this fall.

HUGO FERNANDEZ ARTUCIO, director of the Latin-American Bureau of Free World and professor of philosophy at the University of Montevideo, received continental recognition as a leader of South American youth when he was elected Secretary-General for South America by the World Youth Congress. An officer of the Socialist party in Uruguay during the dictatorship of Gabriel Terra, he was imprisoned several times for political activities in support of democracy.

SENATOR WARREN ROBINSON AUSTIN is a member of the Senate committees on Military Affairs, Interstate Commerce, and Territorial and Insular affairs. As a prominent Republican and United States Senator from the State of Vermont, his remarks concerning the purposes of this war have significant bearing on the famous speech of Vice-President Wallace printed in our June issue.

FRANCIS BIDDLE, Attorney General of the United States, who began his career as private secretary to Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court, carries into his present distinguished office the Holmes tradition of enlightened administration of justice.

This month appears the third of a series of four articles by *LOUIS DOLIVET,* one of the Editors of FREE WORLD. The first two dealt with the potential forces of Europe and Asia, and the last, which will be published in our September issue, will review the whole question of planning for the future.

HOWARD O. EATON, professor of philosophy at the University of Oklahoma, is Editor of the *New Federalist,* a series of studies of post-war reconstruction.

T. SWANN HARDING, information specialist of the Department of Agriculture and frequent contributor to magazines, is the author of Ill-Fed People Are Not Free, in our March issue, and of The Dilemma of Science, in our May issue.

Although *EMANUEL NEUMANN* is a member of the New York Bar, his primary concern is with the problems of Palestine and the Near East, where he has lived for many years. He has written and lectured extensively on the subject.

DAVID W. PETEGORSKY, whose analysis of recent books on underground activities appeared in the July issue of FREE WORLD, has now joined the fighting forces in Canada.

Born in Australia, *DENIS PLIMMER* is now a free-lance writer in New York. He is the author of a play, "Land's End," which was produced in London in 1937.

STANLEY POSTEK, able-bodied seaman, tells about himself in the article written with the collaboration of Mr. Plimmer. He is probably on the way to Murmansk now.

RUDOLPH SELKE is a former editor of the *Frankfurter Zeitung,* official German translator of Ilya Ehrenburg, and was formerly a contributor to important European newspapers and magazines.

HENRY STANLEY is the pen name of a member of the Administration in Canada. In our April issue he contributed an article called How to Make an Ally of India. His article this month takes up the problem in the light of subsequent events.

DAVID F. STORRS, an American journalist, spent some time in Central Europe just before the outbreak of the war. Though he is now in Lidgerwood, North Dakota, he has managed to retain contact with the democratic elements in the countries of the Danube Basin.

PROFESSOR H. G. QUARITCH WALES, orientalist and director of the Greater India Research Committee, has added to his academic studies a sympathetic concern in the political and military situation in the Far East. He contributed the article, The Defense of India, in the June issue of FREE WORLD.

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

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